Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Of Grammatology' and 'Introspection'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined

23367	Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
	Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
	From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
	A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory

5691	The adverbial account of sensation says not 'see a red image' but be 'appeared to redly' [Shoemaker]
	Full Idea: Some who reject the act-object conception of sensation favour an 'adverbial' account, where (instead of the act of 'seeing a red image') it is better to speak of 'being appeared to redly'.
	From: Sydney Shoemaker (Introspection [1994], p.398)
	A reaction: The point is that you couldn't perceive without a colour (or travel without a speed), so the qualifying adverb is intrinsic to the process, not a separate object. The adverbial theory will imply a fairly minimal account of universals.

16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection

5687	For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker]
	Full Idea: Some writers distinguish introspection from a pre-introspective awareness of mental phenomena, saying one is not properly introspecting unless one is not only aware of the phenomena, but aware that one is aware of them.
	From: Sydney Shoemaker (Introspection [1994], p.395)
	A reaction: The test question might be what we think animals do. I think I agree with the 'writers'. You are either just aware of the contents or qualia or images of thought, which is not introspection, or you become introspectively aware that you are having them.

5688	Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker]
	Full Idea: Foundationalist epistemology takes all empirical knowledge to be grounded in the introspective knowledge each mind has of its own states, …holding that introspective judgements are 'incorrigible' or 'infallible', and mental states are 'self-intimating'.
	From: Sydney Shoemaker (Introspection [1994], p.396)
	A reaction: Descartes' foundationalist Cogito also seems to be based on introspection, making introspection the essence of all foundationalism. The standard modern view is that introspective states are incorrigible, but not infallible.

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity

21929	Derrida focuses on ambiguity, but talks of 'dissemination', not traditional multiple meanings [Derrida]
	Full Idea: Derrida affirms something like an 'ambiguity of meaning'. But he explicitly contrasts the word he uses to characterize the phenomenon at issue, what he calls 'dissemination', with the traditional concept of 'polysemia' - multiple meanings.
	From: Jacques Derrida (Of Grammatology [1967]), quoted by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 2 'After'
	A reaction: The point, I presume, is that there is vagueness and elision to the meanings, rather than a list of options, such as bank/bank. Context (sense-making paths) is crucial for Derrida. Can the analytic apparatus for the logic of vagueness be brought to bear?