Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Reality of Numbers' and 'The Method of Truth in Metaphysics'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
23367 Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
     From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
     A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
18344 Truth and falsehood must track what does or doesn't exist [Bigelow]
     Full Idea: If something is true, then it would not be possible for it to be false unless either certain things were to exist which don't, or else certain things had not existed which do.
     From: John Bigelow (The Reality of Numbers [1988], 19)
     A reaction: This is described by Rami as Bigelow's 'famous' formulation of the idea that 'truth supervenes on being' in a general way. An immediate question would be about fictions. Is Malvolio a stupid man, given that he doesn't exist? We must stretch 'exist'.
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
4042 Metaphysics requires the idea of people (speakers) located in space and time [Davidson]
     Full Idea: An intelligible metaphysics will assign a central place to the idea of people (= speakers) with a location in public space and time.
     From: Donald Davidson (The Method of Truth in Metaphysics [1977], §III)
     A reaction: The 'location' is the interesting bit, requiring people to be bodies, not abstractions. A big, plausible claim, but hard to prove.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
4041 Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain [Davidson]
     Full Idea: Sentences held true (the linguistic representatives of beliefs) determine the meanings of the words they contain.
     From: Donald Davidson (The Method of Truth in Metaphysics [1977], §II)
     A reaction: Maybe. Historically, truth and belief presumably precede words and sentences. But words separate off from beliefs very easily. I'm not convinced. Words initiate language, not beliefs?