39 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
12027 | There must be a plausible epistemological theory alongside any metaphysical theory [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: No metaphysical account which renders it impossible to give a plausible epistemological theory is to be countenanced. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 9.1) | |
A reaction: It is hard to object to this principle, though we certainly don't want to go verificationist, and thus rule out speculations about metaphysics which are beyond any possible knowledge. Some have tried to prove that something must exist (e.g. Jacquette). |
12463 | Unlike correspondence, truthmaking can be one truth to many truthmakers, or vice versa [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: I assume a form of truthmaking theory, ..which is a many-many relation, unlike, say correspondence, so that one entity can make multiple truths true and one truth can have multiple truthmakers. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §1) | |
A reaction: This sounds like common sense, once you think about it. One tree makes many things true, and one statement about trees is made true by many trees. |
12005 | The symbol 'ι' forms definite descriptions; (ιx)F(x) says 'the x which is such that F(x)' [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: We use the symbol 'ι' (Greek 'iota') to form definite descriptions, reading (ιx)F(x) as 'the x which is such that F(x)', or simply as 'the F'. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 4.1) | |
A reaction: Compare the lambda operator in modal logic, which picks out predicates from similar formulae. |
12010 | Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules? [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: The typical semantic account of validity for propositional connectives like 'and' presupposes that meaning is given by truth-tables. On the natural deduction view, the meaning of 'and' is given by its introduction and elimination rules. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 4.4) |
12023 | Vagueness problems arise from applying sharp semantics to vague languages [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: It is very plausible that the sorites paradoxes arose from the application of a semantic apparatus appropriate only for sharp predicates to languages containing vague predicates (rather than from deficiency of meaning, or from incoherence). | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 7.3) | |
A reaction: Sounds wrong. Of course, logic has been designed for sharp predicates, and natural languages are awash with vagueness. But the problems of vagueness bothered lawyers long before logicians like Russell began to worry about it. |
14375 | If structures result from intrinsic natures of properties, the 'relations' between them can drop out [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: If a relation holds between two properties as a result of their intrinsic natures, then it appears the relation between the properties is not needed to do the structuring of reality; the properties themselves suffice to fix the structure. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.1) | |
A reaction: [the first bit quotes Jubien 2007] He cites a group of scientific essentialists as spokesmen for this view. Sounds right to me. No on seems able to pin down what a relation is - which may be because there is no such entity. |
14378 | Science aims at identifying the structure and nature of the powers that exist [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: Scientific practice seems aimed precisely at identifying the structure and nature of the powers that exist. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.3) | |
A reaction: Good. Friends of powers should look at this nice paper by Jacobs. There is a good degree of support for this view from pronouncements of modern scientists. If scientists don't support it, they should. Otherwise they are trapped in the superficial. |
12467 | Powers come from concrete particulars, not from the laws of nature [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: The source of powers is not the laws of nature; it is the powerful nature of the ordinary properties of concrete particulars. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.2) | |
A reaction: This pithily summarises my own view. People who think the powers of the world derive from the laws either have an implicit religious framework, or they are giving no thought at all to the ontological status of the laws. |
12017 | In all instances of identity, there must be some facts to ensure the identity [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: For each instance of identity or failure of identity, there must be facts in virtue of which that instance obtains. ..Enough has been said to lend this doctrine some plausibility. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.5) | |
A reaction: Penelope Mackie picks this out from Forbes as a key principle. It sounds to be in danger of circularity, unless the 'facts' can be cited without referring to, or implicitly making use of, identities - which seems unlikely. |
12024 | If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock. [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: If we imagine a possible world in which two clocks in a room make one clock from half the parts of each, the judgement 'these two actual clocks could have been a single clock' does not seem wholly false. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 7.4) | |
A reaction: You would, of course, have sufficient parts left over to make a second clock, so they look like a destroyed clock, so I don't think I find Forbes's intuition on this one very persuasive. |
11885 | Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: Forbes argues that, unless we posit individual essences, we cannot guarantee that identities across possible worlds will be appropriately grounded in other properties. | |
From: report of Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 2.4 | |
A reaction: There is a confrontation between Wiggins, who says identity is primitive, and Forbes, who says identity must be grounded in other properties. I think I side with Forbes. |
12014 | An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: An individual essence of an object x is a set of properties I which satisfies the following conditions: i. every property P in I is an essential property of x; ii. it is not possible that some object y distinct from x has every member of I. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.1) | |
A reaction: I am coming to the view that stable natural kinds (like electrons or gold) do not have individual essences, but complex kinds (like tigers or tables) do. The view is based on the idea that explanatory power is what individuates an essence. |
12015 | Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: A non-trivial individual essence is properties other than a) those following from a de dicto truth, b) properties of existence and self-identity (or their cognates), c) properties derived from necessities in some other category. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.1) | |
A reaction: [I have compressed Forbes] Rather than adding all these qualificational clauses to our concept, we could just tighten up on the notion of a property, saying it is something which is causally efficacious, and hence explanatory. |
12013 | Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: The essential properties of a thing will typically depend upon what category of thing it is, and perhaps also on some more particular facts about the thing itself. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.1) | |
A reaction: I see no way of dispensing with the second requirement, in the cases of complex entities like animals. If all samples are the same, then of course we can define a sample's essence through its kind, but not if samples differ in any way. |
12012 | Essential properties are those without which an object could not exist [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: An essential property of an object x is a property without possessing which x could not exist. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.1) | |
A reaction: This is certainly open to question. See Joan Kung's account of Aristotle on essence. I am necessarily more than eight years old (now), and couldn't exist without that property, but is the property part of my essence? |
12022 | Same parts does not ensure same artefact, if those parts could constitute a different artefact [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: Sameness of parts is not sufficient for identity of artefacts at a world, since the very same parts may turn up at different times as the parts of artefacts with different designs and functions. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 7.2) | |
A reaction: Thus the Ship of Theseus could be dismantled and turned into a barn (as happened with the 'Mayflower'). They could then be reconstituted as the ship, which would then have two beginnings (as Chris Hughes has pointed out). |
12025 | Artefacts have fuzzy essences [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: Artefacts can be ascribed fuzzy essences. ...We might say that it is essential to an artefact to have 'most' of its parts. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 7.6) | |
A reaction: I think I prefer to accept the idea that essences are unstable things, in all cases. For all we know, electrons might subtly change their general character, or cease to be uniform, tomorrow. Essences explain, and what needs explaining changes. |
12020 | An individual might change their sex in a world, but couldn't have differed in sex at origin [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: In the time of a single world, the same individual can undergo a change of sex, but it is less clear that an individual of one sex could have been, from the outset, an individual of another. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 6.5) | |
A reaction: I don't find this support for essentiality of origin very persuasive. I struggle with these ideas. Given my sex yesterday, then presumably I couldn't have had a different sex yesterday. Given that pigs can fly, pigs can fly. What am I missing? |
11888 | Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: Forbes has two principles of identity, which we can call the No Bare Identities Principle (identities hold in virtue of other facts), and the No Extrinsic Determination Principle (that only intrinsic facts of a thing establish identity). | |
From: report of Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 127-8) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 2.7 | |
A reaction: The job of the philosopher is to prise apart the real identities of things from the way in which we conceive of identities. I take these principles to apply to real identities, not conceptual identities. |
12003 | De re modal formulae, unlike de dicto, are sensitive to transworld identities [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: The difference between de re and de dicto formulae is a difference between formulae which are, and formulae which are not, sensitive to the identities of objects at various worlds. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 3.1) |
14377 | Possibilities are manifestations of some power, and impossibilies rest on no powers [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: To be possible is just to be one of the many manifestations of some power, and to be impossible is to be a manifestation of no power. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.2.1) | |
A reaction: [This remark occurs in a discussion of theistic Aristotelianism] I like this. If we say that something is possible, the correct question is to ask what power could bring it about. |
14376 | States of affairs are only possible if some substance could initiate a causal chain to get there [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: A non-actual state of affairs in possible if there actually was a substance capable of initiating a causal chain, perhaps non-deterministic, that could lead to the state of affairs that we claim is possible. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.2) | |
A reaction: [He is quoting A.R. Pruss 2002] That seems exactly right. Of course the initial substance(s) might create a further substance, such as a transuranic element, which then produces the state of affairs. I favour this strongly actualist view. |
14379 | Counterfactuals invite us to consider the powers picked out by the antecedent [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: A counterfactual is an invitation to consider what the properties picked out by the antecedent are powers for (where Lewis 1973 took it to be an invitation to consider what goes on in a selected possible world). | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.4.3) | |
A reaction: A beautifully simple proposal from Jacobs, with which I agree. This seems to be an expansion of the Ramsey test for conditionals, where you consider the antecedent being true, and see what follows. What, we ask Ramsey, would make it follow? |
14372 | Possible worlds are just not suitable truthmakers for modality [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: Possible worlds are just not the sorts of things that could ground modality; they are not suitable truthmakers. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: Are possible world theorists actually claiming that the worlds 'ground' modality? Maybe Lewis is, since all those concrete worlds had better do some hard work, but for the ersatzist they just provide a kind of formal semantics, leaving ontology to others. |
12028 | De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: De re necessity does not differ from de dicto necessity in respect of how it arises: it is still a form of conceptual necessity. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 9.4) | |
A reaction: [Forbes proceeds to argue for this claim] Forbes defends a form of essentialism, but takes the necessity to arise from a posteriori truths because of the a priori involvement of other concepts (rather as Kripke argues). |
12466 | All modality is in the properties and relations of the actual world [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: Properties and the relations between them introduce modal connections in the actual world. ..This is a strong form of actualism, since all of modality is part of the fundamental fabric of the actual world. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4) | |
A reaction: This is the view of modality which I find most congenial, with the notion of 'powers' giving us the conceptual framework on which to build an account. |
14371 | We can base counterfactuals on powers, not possible worlds, and hence define necessity [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: Together with a definition of possibility and necessity in terms of counterfactuals, the powers semantics of counterfactuals generates a semantics for modality that appeals to causal powers and not possible worlds. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §1) | |
A reaction: Wonderful. Just what the doctor ordered. The only caveat is that if we say that reality is built up from fundamental powers, then might those powers change their character without losing their identity (e.g. gravity getting weaker)? |
12008 | Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: There is no means by which we might distinguish a possible world from what is true at it. ...Whereas our ability to separate a place, or a time, from its occupier is crucial to realism about places and times, as is a distance relation. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 4.2) | |
A reaction: He is objecting to Lewis's modal realism. I'm not fully convinced. It depends whether we are discussing real ontology or conceptual space. In the latter I see no difference between times and possible worlds. In ontology, a 'time' is weird. |
12009 | The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: The main objection to realism about worlds is from epistemology. Knowledge of properties of objects requires experience of these objects, which must be within the range of our sensory faculties, but only concrete actual objects achieve that. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 4.2) | |
A reaction: This pinpoints my dislike of the whole possible worlds framework, ontologically speaking. I seem to be an actualist. I take possibilities to be inferences to the best explanation from the powers we know of in the actual world. We experience potentiality. |
12465 | Concrete worlds, unlike fictions, at least offer evidence of how the actual world could be [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: Lewis's concrete worlds give a better account of modality (than fictional worlds). When I learn that a man like me drives a truck, I gain evidence for the fact that I can drive a truck. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 12464. Jacobs still rightly rejects this as an account of possibility, since the possibility that I might drive a truck must be rooted in me, not in some other person who drives a truck, even if that person is very like me. |
12464 | If some book described a possibe life for you, that isn't what makes such a life possible [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: Suppose somewhere deep in the rain forest is a book that includes a story about you as a truck-driver. I doubt that you would be inclined the think that that story, that book, is the reason you could have been a truck driver. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: This begins to look like a totally overwhelming and obvious reason why possible worlds (especially as stories) don't give a good metaphysical account of possibility. They provide a semantic structure for modal reasoning, but that is entirely different. |
12469 | Possible worlds semantics gives little insight into modality [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: If we want our semantics for modality to give us insight into the truthmakers for modality, then possible worlds semantics is inadequate. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.4) | |
A reaction: [See the other ideas of Jacobs (and Jubien) for this] It is an interesting question whether a semantics for a logic is meant to give us insight into how things really are, or whether it just builds nice models. Satisfaction, or truth? |
12007 | Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: Someone impressed by the parallel between tense and modal operators ...might suggest that just as we can speak of places and times forming their own manifolds or spaces, so we can say that worlds are the points of logical space. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 4.2) | |
A reaction: I particularly like the notion of worlds being "points of logical space", and am inclined to remove it from this context and embrace it as the correct way to understand possible worlds. We must understand logical or conceptual space. |
12011 | Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: An elucidation of transworld identity can be regarded as an elucidation of the boundaries of possibility for ordinary things. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.1) | |
A reaction: I presume that if we don't search for some such criterion, we just have to face the possibility that Aristotle could have been a poached egg in some possible world. To know the bounds of possibility, study the powers of actual objects. |
12016 | The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: The motivation for investigating individual essences should be obvious, since if every object has such an essence, the problem of elucidating transworld identity can be solved. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.1) | |
A reaction: It is important that, if necessary, the identities be 'individual', and not just generic, by sortal, or natural kind. We want to reason about (and explain) truths at the fine-grained level of the individual, not just at the broad level of generalisation. |
12004 | Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: The outstanding technical objection to counterpart-theoretic semantics concerns its handling of the logic of identity. In quantified S5 (the orthodox semantics) a = b → □(a = b) is valid, but 'a' must not attach to two objects. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 3.5) |
12021 | Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness, as opposed to the sort of essentialism that gives non-trivial conditions sufficient for transworld identity. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 6.6) | |
A reaction: 'Haecceitism' is the doctrine that things have primitive identity. A 'haecceity' is a postulated property which actually does the job. The key point of the view is that whatever it is is 'primitive', and not complex, or analysable. I don't believe it. |
12029 | We believe in thisnesses, because we reject bizarre possibilities as not being about that individual [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: The natural response to an unreasonable hypothesis of possibility for an object x, that in such a state of affairs it would not be x which satisfies the conditions, is evidence that we do possess concepts of thisness for individuals. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 9.4) | |
A reaction: We may have a 'concept' of thisness, but we needn't be committed to the 'existence' of a thisness. There is a fairly universal intuition that cessation of existence of an entity when it starts to change can be a very vague matter. |