12 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
22371 | Determinism threatens free will if actions can be causally traced to external factors [Foot] |
Full Idea: The determinism which worries the defender of free will is that if human action is subject to a universal law of causation, there will be for any action a set of sufficient conditions which can be traced back to factors outside the control of the agent. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Free Will as Involving Determinism [1957], p.63) | |
A reaction: She draws on Russell for this, but neither of them mention whether the causation is physical. Free will seems to imply non-physical causation. |
3546 | 'Phronesis' should translate as 'practical intelligence', not as prudence [Annas] |
Full Idea: The best translation of 'phronesis' is probably not 'prudence' (which implies a non-moral motive), or 'practical wisdom' (which makes it sound contemplative), but 'practical intelligence', or just 'intelligence'. | |
From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.3) |
22372 | Not all actions need motives, but it is irrational to perform troublesome actions with no motive [Foot] |
Full Idea: We do not expect that everything a rational man does should be done with a motive, ...but we do expect a man to have a motive for many things that he does, and would count anyone who constantly performed troublesome actions without a motive as irrational. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Free Will as Involving Determinism [1957], p.66) | |
A reaction: Interestng, because the assessment of whether someone is 'rational' therefore needs a criterion for when a motive seems required and when not. 'Significant' actions need a motive? |
3547 | Epicureans achieve pleasure through character development [Annas] |
Full Idea: Since having a virtue does not reduce to performing certain kinds of acts, the Epicurean will achieve pleasure only by aiming at being a certain kind of person. | |
From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.4) | |
A reaction: No Epicurean would want to merely possess virtues, without enacting them. I assume that virtues are sought as guides to finding the finest pleasures (such as friendship). |
3543 | Cyrenaics pursue pleasure, but don't equate it with happiness [Annas] |
Full Idea: Cyrenaics claimed our final good was pleasure, best achieved by seeking maximum intensity of pleasurable experiences, but they explicitly admitted that this was not happiness. | |
From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 1) |
3541 | Ancient ethics uses attractive notions, not imperatives [Annas] |
Full Idea: Instead of modern 'imperative' notions of ethics (involving obligation, duty and rule-following), ancient ethics uses 'attractive' notions like those of goodness and worth | |
From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], Intro) |
22373 | People can act out of vanity without being vain, or even vain about this kind of thing [Foot] |
Full Idea: It makes sense to say that a man acts out of vanity on a particular occasion although he is not in general vain, or even vain about this kind of thing. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Free Will as Involving Determinism [1957], p.69) | |
A reaction: Aristotle tells us that virtues and vices are habits, and also have an intellectual component, implying that the person believes in that sort of behaviour. Anyone can have 'a little moment of vanity'. |
3550 | Principles cover life as a whole, where rules just cover actions [Annas] |
Full Idea: Principles concern not just types of actions, but one's life as a whole, grasping truths about the nature of justice, and the like; they explain rules, giving the 'why' and not just the 'what'. | |
From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.4) |
3551 | Virtue theory tries to explain our duties in terms of our character [Annas] |
Full Idea: An ethics of virtue moves from an initial interest in what we ought to do to an interest in the kinds of people we are and hope to be, because the latter is taken to be the best way of understanding the former. | |
From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.5) |
3552 | If excessively good actions are admirable but not required, then duty isn't basic [Annas] |
Full Idea: Supererogatory actions are admirable and valuable, and we praise people for doing them, but they do not generate obligations to perform them, which casts doubt on obligation as the basic notion in ethics. | |
From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.6) |
3542 | We should do good when necessary, not maximise it [Annas] |
Full Idea: Why should I want to maximise my acting courageously? I act courageously when it is required. | |
From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 1) |