3 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
22013 | Subjects distinguish representations, as related both to subject and object [Reinhold] |
Full Idea: In consciousness the subject distinguishes the representation from the subject and object, and relates it to both. | |
From: Karl Leonhard Reinhold (Foundations of Philosophical Knowledge [1791], p.78), quoted by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 04 | |
A reaction: This is a reminder that twentieth century analytic discussions of perception were largely recapitulating late Enlightenment German philosophy. This is a very good definition of sense-data. I can think about my representations. Reinhold was a realist. |
19387 | Hypotheses come from induction, which is comparison of experiences [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We construct a hypothesis on the basis of an induction, that is on the basis of a comparison of experiences. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Elements of Law and Justice [1669], p.2) | |
A reaction: This fits the traditional positivist picture of science (observe-hypothesise-predict-observe). I like the definition of induction as 'comparison of experiences', because it doesn't reduce it to sequences of objects, and points to coherence. |