8 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
17435 | Objects do not naturally form countable units [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Objects do not by themselves naturally fall into countable units. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Isolation and Non-arbitrary Division [1997], 2.2) | |
A reaction: Hm. This seems to be modern Fregean orthodoxy. Why did the institution of counting ever get started if the things in the world didn't demand counting? Even birds are aware of the number of eggs in their nest (because they miss a stolen one). |
17433 | We can still count squares, even if they overlap [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: The fact that there is overlap does not seem to inhibit our ability to count squares. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Isolation and Non-arbitrary Division [1997], 2.2) | |
A reaction: She has a diagram of three squares overlapping slightly at their corners. Contrary to Frege, these seems to depend on a subliminal concept of the square that doesn't depend on language. |
17439 | There is no deep reason why we count carrots but not asparagus [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Why do speakers of English count carrots but not asparagus? There is no 'deep' reason. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Isolation and Non-arbitrary Division [1997]) | |
A reaction: Koslick is offering this to defend the Fregean conceptual view of counting, but what seems to matter is what is countable, and not whether we happen to count it. You don't need to know what carrots are to count them. Cooks count asparagus. |
17434 | We struggle to count branches and waves because our concepts lack clear boundaries [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: The reason we have a hard time counting the branches and the waves is because our concepts 'branches on the tree' and 'waves on the ocean' do not determine sufficiently precise boundaries: the concepts do not draw a clear invisible line around each thing. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Isolation and Non-arbitrary Division [1997], 2.2) | |
A reaction: This is the 'isolation' referred to in Frege. |
17436 | We talk of snow as what stays the same, when it is a heap or drift or expanse [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Talk of snow concerns what stays the same when some snow changes, as it might be, from a heap of snow to a drift, to an expanse. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Isolation and Non-arbitrary Division [1997], 2.2) | |
A reaction: The whiteness also stays the same, but isn't stuff. |
16635 | Incorporeal substances are powers or forces [Descartes, by Pasnau] |
Full Idea: In one of his last letters Descartes describes incorporeal substances as 'powers or forces'. | |
From: report of René Descartes (Two letters on mind [1649], Feb 1649) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 08.4 | |
A reaction: Only a glimmer, but I really like this idea. (Ellis flirts with it somewhere). Minds are deeply and intrinsically active things. Try ceasing to think for five minutes. Apparently 12th century Cistercian authors were keen on the idea. |
16684 | Impenetrability only belongs to the essence of extension [Descartes] |
Full Idea: It is demonstrated that impenetrability belongs to the essence of extension and not to the essence of any other thing. | |
From: René Descartes (Two letters on mind [1649], More, Apr 1649), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 15.5 | |
A reaction: I'm not sure that I understand how pure extension can be impenetrable. |