5 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
10710 | We accept substance, to avoid infinite backwards chains of meaning [Wittgenstein, by Potter] |
Full Idea: Wittgenstein is the most renowned modern proponent of substance, and argued that sense must be determinate ...and that any conceptual scheme which genuinely represents a world cannot contain infinite backward chains of meaning. | |
From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (works [1935]) by Michael Potter - Set Theory and Its Philosophy 03.3 | |
A reaction: This is a key idea for explaining the somewhat surprising revival of the notion of substance in modern times, when it appeared to have been buried by atomism in the seventeenth century. The new argument is a semantic one. |
16634 | I can't be unaware of anything which is in me [Descartes] |
Full Idea: Nothing can be in me of which I am entirely unaware. | |
From: René Descartes (Reply to First Objections [1641]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 08.4 | |
A reaction: This I take to be a place where Descartes is utterly and catastrophically wrong. Until you grasp the utter falseness of this thought, the possibility of you (dear reader) understanding human beings is zero. Here 'I' obviously means his mind. |
3635 | Essence must be known before we discuss existence [Descartes] |
Full Idea: According to the laws of true logic, we must never ask about the existence of anything until we first understand its essence. | |
From: René Descartes (Reply to First Objections [1641], 108) |
3634 | We can't prove a first cause from our inability to grasp infinity [Descartes] |
Full Idea: My inability to grasp an infinite chain of successive causes without a first cause does not entail that there must be a first cause, just as my inability to grasp infinite divisibility of finite things does not make that impossible. | |
From: René Descartes (Reply to First Objections [1641], 106) |