15 ideas
23326 | In the third century Stoicism died out, replaced by Platonism, with Aristotelian ethics [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: By the second century CE Aristotelianism and Platonism had begun to eclipse Stoicism, and by the end of the third century Stoicism had no followers. All philosophers now opted for some form of Platonism, but including Aristotle's ethical principles. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 04) | |
A reaction: The idea that Aristotelian ethics dominated that period is new to me. Stoic influence remained strong in Augustine, and hence in Christianity. |
23335 | In late antiquity nearly all philosophers were monotheists [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: I am inclined to think that almost all philosophers in late antiquity were monotheists. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 08) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure when late antiquity begins, in this remark. Maybe as early as 100 CE. Epictetus talks of Zeus as if he is supreme. |
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
23333 | The idea of free will achieved universal acceptance because of Christianity [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: There is no doubt that the notion of a free will found almost universal acceptance owing to the influence of Christianity. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 07) | |
A reaction: This is presumably because a free will not only elevates us above the animals, qualifying us for immortality, but also gives us absolute and ultimate responsibility for our lives, which thus justifies either salvation or damnation. |
23337 | The Stoics needed free will, to allow human choices in a divinely providential cosmos [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: The Stoics said that everything happens according to a divine providential plan, so they had to explain how this was compatible with human choices. They tried to do this with their doctrine of freedom and a free will. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 10) | |
A reaction: Epictetus made our ability to choose central to moral life, so he particularly needed (and thus created, it seems) this doctrine. |
23334 | For Christians man has free will by creation in God's image (as in Genesis) [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: The Christian view, following Genesis, is that man is created in the image of God, and this is understood as crucially involving the idea that man has a free will in the image of God's will. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 08) | |
A reaction: The idea of free will evidently originated with Epictetus, but was taken up by Christians because it fitted doctrinal needs. Even Epictetus saw free will as originating in Zeus. |
23336 | There is no will for Plato or Aristotle, because actions come directly from perception of what is good [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: Plato and Aristotle do not have a notion of a will, since for them a willing, a desire of reason, is a direct result of one's cognitive state: once one sees something to be good, one will it. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 09) | |
A reaction: The point is that their decisions are 'direct', whereas the will introduces the concept of a final arbiter which weighs up the desires, reasons and drives. The historical steps were first the meta-choosing, then the will as entity, then the will as free. |
20937 | The state should produce higher civilisations for all, in tune with the economic apparatus [Gramsci] |
Full Idea: The role of the State is always that of creating new and higher types of civilisation; of adapting the 'civilisation' and the morality of the broades popular masses to the necessities of the continuous development of the economic apparatus of production. | |
From: Antonio Gramsci (Selections from Prison Notebooks [1971], 2 'Collective') | |
A reaction: This makes education virtually the prime role of the state. Reminiscent of Sir John Reith's original dream, in the 1930s, for the BBC. Many marxists feel that the economy is in direct conflict with morality and civilisation. |
20935 | Eventually political parties lose touch with the class they represent, which is dangerous [Gramsci] |
Full Idea: At a certain point in their lives, social classes become detached from their traditional parties. In that particular form ...the parties are no longer recognised by their class as its exopression. ...The field is then open for violent solutions. | |
From: Antonio Gramsci (Selections from Prison Notebooks [1971], 2 'Parties') | |
A reaction: Left wing parties pursue ideologies that don't connect with the actual current interests of the working class, and righ wing parties are taken over by rich elites who don't value safe traditonal communities. (This thought is resonant in the 2018 UK). |
20936 | Caesarism emerges when two forces in society are paralysed in conflict [Gramsci] |
Full Idea: Caesarism (as the emergence of a 'heroic' personality) expresses a situation in which the forces in conflict balance each other in a catastrophic manner ...which can only terminate in their reciprocal destruction. | |
From: Antonio Gramsci (Selections from Prison Notebooks [1971], 2 'Caesarism') | |
A reaction: He goes on to distinguish progressive and reactionary versions of Caesarism. Gramsci's interest is in the circumstances that throw up such people. Marx had identified 'Bonapartism'. |
20941 | Totalitarian parties cut their members off from other cultural organisations [Gramsci] |
Full Idea: A totalitarian party ensures that members find in that particular party all the satisfactions that they formerly found in a multiplicity of organisations. They break the threads that bind them to extraneous cultural organisms. | |
From: Antonio Gramsci (Selections from Prison Notebooks [1971], 2 'Organisation') | |
A reaction: British parties traditionally had a 'club house', where you could do most of your socialising. Presumably Nazis left the church, and various interest groups. |
20939 | What is the function of a parliament? Does it even constitute a part of the State structure? [Gramsci] |
Full Idea: The question has to be asked: do parliaments, even in fact constitute a part of the State structure? In other words, what is the real function? | |
From: Antonio Gramsci (Selections from Prison Notebooks [1971], 2 'Parliament') | |
A reaction: Nice question. In the UK it is only the cabinet which has active power. Backbench MPs are usually very frustrated, especially if their party has a comfortable majority, and their vote is not precious. They are privileged lobbyists. |
20938 | Liberalism's weakness is its powerful rigid bureaucracy [Gramsci] |
Full Idea: Liberalism's weakness is the bureacracy - the crystallisation of the leading personnel - which exercises power, and at a certain point it becomes a caste. | |
From: Antonio Gramsci (Selections from Prison Notebooks [1971], 2 'Hegemony') | |
A reaction: This sounds more like what is called 'the Establishment' in Britain, which is the hidden controllers of power, rather than the administrators (whose role is only despised by right-wingers). |
20940 | Perfect political equality requires economic equality [Gramsci] |
Full Idea: The idea that complete and perfect political equality cannot exist without economic equality ...remains correct. | |
From: Antonio Gramsci (Selections from Prison Notebooks [1971], 2 'The State') | |
A reaction: In the west we are living in a period (2018) when the top 0.1% of the wealthy are racing away, creating huge inequality. Their wealth controls the media, and it seems unrestrainable. The belief that we live in a 'democracy' is an illusion. |
23313 | The Gnostic demiurge (creator) is deluded, and doesn't care about us [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: The Gnostics thought the demiurge or creator pursues its own interests without regard for what this does to us, a being lacking in wisdom and goodness, as seen by its deluding itself into thinking that it is God, and demanding worship. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], Intro) | |
A reaction: Frede mentions Irenaeus as a source of this view. The idea that the Great Being doesn't care about us seems a fairly accurate observation. |