12 ideas
23326 | In the third century Stoicism died out, replaced by Platonism, with Aristotelian ethics [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: By the second century CE Aristotelianism and Platonism had begun to eclipse Stoicism, and by the end of the third century Stoicism had no followers. All philosophers now opted for some form of Platonism, but including Aristotle's ethical principles. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 04) | |
A reaction: The idea that Aristotelian ethics dominated that period is new to me. Stoic influence remained strong in Augustine, and hence in Christianity. |
23335 | In late antiquity nearly all philosophers were monotheists [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: I am inclined to think that almost all philosophers in late antiquity were monotheists. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 08) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure when late antiquity begins, in this remark. Maybe as early as 100 CE. Epictetus talks of Zeus as if he is supreme. |
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
21750 | Science is sympathetic to truth as correspondence, since it depends on observation [Quine] |
Full Idea: Science, thanks to its links with observation, retains some title to a correspondence theory of truth. | |
From: Willard Quine (On the Nature of Moral Values [1978], p.63) | |
A reaction: I would describe what he is affirming as a 'robust' theory of truth. An interesting aside, given his usual allegiance to disquotational, and even redundancy, accounts of truth. You can hardly rely on observations if you think they contain no truth. |
21748 | More careful inductions gradually lead to the hypothetico-deductive method [Quine] |
Full Idea: Our inductions become increasingly explicit and deliberate, and in the fulness of time we even rise above induction, to the hypothetico-deductive method. | |
From: Willard Quine (On the Nature of Moral Values [1978], p.57) | |
A reaction: This seems to defer to Hempel's account of scientific theorising. I wander what exactly 'rising above' means? |
23334 | For Christians man has free will by creation in God's image (as in Genesis) [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: The Christian view, following Genesis, is that man is created in the image of God, and this is understood as crucially involving the idea that man has a free will in the image of God's will. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 08) | |
A reaction: The idea of free will evidently originated with Epictetus, but was taken up by Christians because it fitted doctrinal needs. Even Epictetus saw free will as originating in Zeus. |
23333 | The idea of free will achieved universal acceptance because of Christianity [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: There is no doubt that the notion of a free will found almost universal acceptance owing to the influence of Christianity. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 07) | |
A reaction: This is presumably because a free will not only elevates us above the animals, qualifying us for immortality, but also gives us absolute and ultimate responsibility for our lives, which thus justifies either salvation or damnation. |
23337 | The Stoics needed free will, to allow human choices in a divinely providential cosmos [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: The Stoics said that everything happens according to a divine providential plan, so they had to explain how this was compatible with human choices. They tried to do this with their doctrine of freedom and a free will. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 10) | |
A reaction: Epictetus made our ability to choose central to moral life, so he particularly needed (and thus created, it seems) this doctrine. |
23336 | There is no will for Plato or Aristotle, because actions come directly from perception of what is good [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: Plato and Aristotle do not have a notion of a will, since for them a willing, a desire of reason, is a direct result of one's cognitive state: once one sees something to be good, one will it. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 09) | |
A reaction: The point is that their decisions are 'direct', whereas the will introduces the concept of a final arbiter which weighs up the desires, reasons and drives. The historical steps were first the meta-choosing, then the will as entity, then the will as free. |
21749 | Altruistic values concern other persons, and ceremonial values concern practices [Quine] |
Full Idea: Altruistic values attach to satisfactions of other persons, without regard to ulterior satisfactions accruing to oneself. Ceremonial values attach to practices of one's society, without regard to satisfactions accruing to oneself. | |
From: Willard Quine (On the Nature of Moral Values [1978], p.58) | |
A reaction: An interesting distinction, but probably as blurred and circular as (according to Quine) the analytic/synthetic distinction. |
21751 | Love seems to diminish with distance from oneself [Quine] |
Full Idea: One cannot reasonably be called upon to love even one's neighbour quite as oneself. Is love to diminish inversely as the square of the distance? Is it to extend to other species than one's own? | |
From: Willard Quine (On the Nature of Moral Values [1978], p.65) | |
A reaction: Quine isn't actually saying that love is inherently egoistic, but that is the implication. The power of my love is at its most powerful when it is closest to home. |
23313 | The Gnostic demiurge (creator) is deluded, and doesn't care about us [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: The Gnostics thought the demiurge or creator pursues its own interests without regard for what this does to us, a being lacking in wisdom and goodness, as seen by its deluding itself into thinking that it is God, and demanding worship. | |
From: Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], Intro) | |
A reaction: Frede mentions Irenaeus as a source of this view. The idea that the Great Being doesn't care about us seems a fairly accurate observation. |