19 ideas
20455 | Philosophy really got started as the rival mode of discourse to tragedy [Critchley] |
Full Idea: The pre-Socratics are interesting, but philosophy really begins in drama; it's a competitive discourse to tragedy. Which is why Plato's 'Republic' excludes the poets: they're the competition; gotta get rid of them. | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 6) | |
A reaction: That's an interesting and novel perspective. So what was the 'discourse' of tragedy saying, and why did that provoke the new rival? Was it too fatalistic? |
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
20446 | Philosophy begins in disappointment, notably in religion and politics [Critchley] |
Full Idea: I claim that philosophy begins in disappointment, and there are two forms of disappointment that interest me: religious and political disappointment | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: You are only disappointed by reality if you expected something better. To be disappointed by the failures of religion strikes me as rather old-fashioned, which Critchley sort of admits. Given the size and tumult of modern states, politics isn't promising. |
20449 | Science gives us an excessively theoretical view of life [Critchley] |
Full Idea: One of the problems with the scientific worldview is that it leads human beings to have an overwhelmingly theoretical relationship to the world. | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: Critchley is defending phenomenology, but this also supports its cousin, existentialism. I keep meeting bright elderly men who have immersed themselves in the study of science, and they seem very remote from the humanist culture I love. |
20448 | Phenomenology uncovers and redescribes the pre-theoretical layer of life [Critchley] |
Full Idea: Phenomenology is a philosophical method that tries to uncover the pre-theoretical layer of human experience and redescribe it. | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: I would be delighted if someone could tell me what this means in practice. I have the impression of lots of talk about phenomenology, but not much doing of it. Clearly I must enquire further. |
9967 | 'Impure' sets have a concrete member, while 'pure' (abstract) sets do not [Jubien] |
Full Idea: Any set with a concrete member is 'impure'. 'Pure' sets are those that are not impure, and are paradigm cases of abstract entities, such as the sort of sets apparently dealt with in Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) set theory. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Ontology and Mathematical Truth [1977], p.116) | |
A reaction: [I am unclear whether Jubien is introducing this distinction] This seems crucial in accounts of mathematics. On the one had arithmetic can be built from Millian pebbles, giving impure sets, while logicists build it from pure sets. |
9968 | A model is 'fundamental' if it contains only concrete entities [Jubien] |
Full Idea: A first-order model can be viewed as a kind of ordered set, and if the domain of the model contains only concrete entities then it is a 'fundamental' model. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Ontology and Mathematical Truth [1977], p.117) | |
A reaction: An important idea. Fundamental models are where the world of logic connects with the physical world. Any account of relationship between fundamental models and more abstract ones tells us how thought links to world. |
9965 | There couldn't just be one number, such as 17 [Jubien] |
Full Idea: It makes no sense to suppose there might be just one natural number, say seventeen. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Ontology and Mathematical Truth [1977], p.113) | |
A reaction: Hm. Not convinced. If numbers are essentially patterns, we might only have the number 'twelve', because we had built our religion around anything which exhibited that form (in any of its various arrangements). Nice point, though. |
9966 | The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure [Jubien] |
Full Idea: The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure per se. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Ontology and Mathematical Truth [1977], p.115) | |
A reaction: This is the Structuralist idea beginning to take shape after Benacerraf's launching of it. Note that Jubien gets there by his rejection of platonism, whereas some structuralist have given a platonist interpretation of structure. |
9963 | If we all intuited mathematical objects, platonism would be agreed [Jubien] |
Full Idea: If the intuition of mathematical objects were general, there would be no real debate over platonism. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Ontology and Mathematical Truth [1977], p.111) | |
A reaction: It is particularly perplexing when Gödel says that his perception of them is just like sight or smell, since I have no such perception. How do you individuate very large numbers, or irrational numbers, apart from writing down numerals? |
9962 | How can pure abstract entities give models to serve as interpretations? [Jubien] |
Full Idea: I am unable to see how the mere existence of pure abstract entities enables us to concoct appropriate models to serve as interpretations. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Ontology and Mathematical Truth [1977], p.111) | |
A reaction: Nice question. It is always assumed that once we have platonic realm, that everything else follows. Even if we are able to grasp the objects, despite their causal inertness, we still have to discern innumerable relations between them. |
9964 | Since mathematical objects are essentially relational, they can't be picked out on their own [Jubien] |
Full Idea: The essential properties of mathematical entities seem to be relational, ...so we make no progress unless we can pick out some mathematical entities wihout presupposing other entities already picked out. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Ontology and Mathematical Truth [1977], p.112) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Jubien is a good critic of platonism. He has identified the problem with Frege's metaphor of a 'borehole', where we discover delightful new properties of numbers simply by reaching them. |
9969 | The empty set is the purest abstract object [Jubien] |
Full Idea: The empty set is the pure abstract object par excellence. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Ontology and Mathematical Truth [1977], p.118 n8) | |
A reaction: So a really good PhD on the empty set could crack the whole nature of reality. Get to work, whoever you are! |
20454 | Wallace Stevens is the greatest philosophical poet of the twentieth century in English [Critchley] |
Full Idea: Wallace Stevens is the greatest philosophical poet of the twentieth century in the English language - full stop - in my humble opinion. | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 6) | |
A reaction: I include this because I tend to agree, and love Stevens. Hear recordings of him reading. I once mentioned Stevens in a conversation with Ted Hughes, and he just shrugged and said Stevens 'wasn't much of a poet'. Wrong. |
20456 | Interesting art is always organised around ethical demands [Critchley] |
Full Idea: I don't think that art can be unethical. I think that interesting art is always ethical. It is organised around ethical demands. | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 8) | |
A reaction: It is a struggle to make this fit instrumental music. Critchley likes punk rock, so he might not see the problem. How to compare Bachian, Mozart, Beethovenian and Debussyian ethics? Not impossible. |
20447 | The problems is not justifying ethics, but motivating it. Why should a self seek its good? [Critchley] |
Full Idea: The issue is not so much justification as motivation, that in virtue of which the self can be motivated to act on some conception of the good. ...How does a self bind itself to whatever it determines as its good? | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: That is a bold and interesting idea about the starting point for ethics. It is always a problem for Aristotle, that he can offer no motivation for the quest for virtue. Contractarians start from existing motivations, but that isn't impressive. |
20452 | Anarchism used to be libertarian (especially for sexuality), but now concerns responsibility [Critchley] |
Full Idea: Anarchism in the 1960s was libertarian and organised around issues of sexual liberation. That moment has passed. People are and should be organising around responsibility. | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 3) | |
A reaction: So there are two types of anarchism, focused on freedom or on responsibility. An organisation like Greenpeace might represent the latter. |
20450 | The state, law, bureaucracy and capital are limitations on life, so I prefer federalist anarchism [Critchley] |
Full Idea: I begin with the ontological premise that the state is a limitation on human existence. I am against the state, law, bureaucracy, and capital. I see anarchism as the only desirable way of organising, politically. ...Its political form is federalist. | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 3) | |
A reaction: Hm. Some sympathy, but caution. All systems, even federalist anarchism, are limitations on our lives, so which limitations do we prefer? The law aspires to a calm egalitarian neutrality, which seems promising to me. |
20451 | Belief that humans are wicked leads to authoritarian politics [Critchley] |
Full Idea: If you think human beings are wicked, you turn to an authoritarian conception of politics, the Hobbesian-Machiavellian-Straussian lie. | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 3) | |
A reaction: Right-wingers also tend to believe in free will, so they can blame and punish. Good people are more inspired by a great leader than bad people are? (Later, Critchley says authoritarians usually believe in original sin). |