Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Essentialists and Essentialism' and 'Plural Quantification Exposed'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

7 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
23367 Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
     From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
     A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / n. Axiom of Comprehension
10779 A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: If φ contains no bound second-order variables, the corresponding comprehension axiom is said to be 'predicative'; otherwise it is 'impredicative'.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §1)
     A reaction: ['Predicative' roughly means that a new predicate is created, and 'impredicative' means that it just uses existing predicates]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
10781 A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: I offer these three claims as a partial analysis of 'pure logic': ontological innocence (no new entities are introduced), universal applicability (to any realm of discourse), and cognitive primacy (no extra-logical ideas are presupposed).
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §1)
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10783 Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: If my arguments are correct, the theory of plural quantification has no right to the title 'logic'. ...The impredicative plural comprehension axioms depend too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §4)
10778 Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: According to its supporters, second-order logic allow us to pay the ontological price of a mere first-order theory and get the corresponding monadic second-order theory for free.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §0)
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
10782 The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: Our modern general concept of an object is given content only in connection with modern quantificational logic.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §2)
     A reaction: [He mentions Frege, Carnap, Quine and Dummett] This is the first thing to tell beginners in modern analytical metaphysics. The word 'object' is very confusing. I think I prefer 'entity'.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
14380 The distinction between necessary and essential properties can be ignored [Rocca]
     Full Idea: Some philosophers distinguish between necessary properties and essential properties. This distinction is irrelevant to my purposes. Following Yablo, I shall ignore this distinction in what follows.
     From: Michael della Rocca (Essentialists and Essentialism [1996], I n1)
     A reaction: This is two years after Kit Fine's seminal paper suggesting the distinction is real. The first step towards a good metaphysics is to realise that Della Rocca and Yablo have made a horrible mistake.