5 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
4377 | Intellectualism is an excessive emphasis on reasoning in moral philosophy [Burnyeat] |
Full Idea: Intellectualism, a one-sided preoccupation with reason and reasoning, is a perennial failing in moral philosophy. | |
From: Myles F. Burnyeat (Aristotle on Learning to be Good [1980], p.70) | |
A reaction: But Kant's reply would be that while there is much more to moral behaviour, the only part which matters in morality is the reasoning part. And Socrates' view (ignorance is evil) is not obviously wrong. |
21375 | Reason can be vicious, and great crimes have to be rational [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Reasonable and vicious are quite consistent with each other, in fact, only through their union are great and far-reaching crimes possible. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.83), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Against' | |
A reaction: This is opposed to Kant, who always looks wildly optimistic in his hope that high rationality entails a morally good will. Good people seem to have a fairly irrational empathy with their fellow citizens. |
21379 | Man's three basic ethical incentives are egoism, malice and compassion [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Man's three fundamental ethical incentives, egoism, malice and compassion, are present in everyone in different and incredibly unequal proportions. In accordance with them, motives will operate on man and actions will ensue. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.192), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Egoism' | |
A reaction: A well chosen trio. Kant would be shocked that he has left out duty, which is supposed to rise above such feelings. |
21376 | Philosophy treats animals as exploitable things, ignoring the significance of their lives [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: In philosophical morals animals are mere 'things', mere means to any end whatsoever. ...Shame on such a morality, that fails to recognise the eternal essence that lives in every living thing, and shines forth with inscrutable significance from all eyes. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.96), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Against' | |
A reaction: Good. I find Kant's theoretical indifference to animals very creepy (despite his kind attitude to them). And I also think the utilitarians are wrong to only value animals for their pain, as if any animal could be shredded for fun, if it felt no pain. |