38 ideas
4697 | There has been a distinct 'Social Turn' in recent philosophy, like the earlier 'Linguistic Turn' [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: The Social Turn is as defining a characteristic of contemporary philosophy as the Linguistic Turn has been of the earlier twentieth century period. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: A helpful observation. It ties in with externalism about concepts (Twin Earth), impossibility of Private Language, and externalism about knowledge. |
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
4731 | Good reasoning will avoid contradiction, enhance coherence, not ignore evidence, and maximise evidence [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: The four basic principles of rationality are 1) avoid contradiction, 2) enhance coherence, 3) avoid ignoring evidence, and 4) maximise evidence. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: I like this, and can't think of any additions. 'Coherence' is the vaguest of the conditions. Maximising evidence is still the driving force of science, even if it does sound quaintly positivist. |
4735 | Just as maps must simplify their subject matter, so thought has to be reductionist about reality [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: A map that is identical in all respects with that which is mapped is just useless. So reductionism is not just a good thing - it is essential to thought. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: A useful warning, when thinking about truth. It is folly to want your thoughts to exactly correspond to reality. I want to understand the world, but not if it requires being the world. |
4703 | The epistemic theory of truth presents it as 'that which is licensed by our best theory of reality' [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: The epistemic theory of truth presents it as 'that which is licensed by our best theory of reality'. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Dangerous nonsense. This leaves truth shifting as our theories change, it leads to different truths in different cultures, and no palpable falsehood in ignorant cultures. Don't give it house-room. |
4701 | To say a relative truth is inexpressible in other frameworks is 'weak', while saying it is false is 'strong' [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Weak alethic relativism holds that while a statement may be true in one framework, it is inexpressible in another. Strong alethic relativism is where a sentence is true relative to one framework, but false relative to another. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: The weak version will be Kuhn's 'incommensurability' of scientific theories, while the strong version will be full Protagorean relativism, saying all beliefs are true. |
21544 | It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist [Russell] |
Full Idea: It seems that when a proposition is false, something does not subsist which would subsist if the proposition were true. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.76) | |
A reaction: This looks to me like a commitment by Russell to the truthmaker principle. The negations of false propositions are made true by some failure of existence in the world. |
4705 | Logical relativism appears if we allow more than one legitimate logical system [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Logical relativism emerges if one defends the existence of two or more rival systems that one may legitimately choose between, or move back and forth between. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: All my instincts rebel against this possibility. All of Aristotle's and Kant's philosophy would be rendered meaningless. Obviously you can create artificial logics (like games), but I believe there is a truth logic. (Pathetic, isn't it?) |
4700 | A third value for truth might be "indeterminate", or a point on a scale between 'true' and 'false' [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Suggestions for a third value for truth are "indeterminate", or a scale running from "true", through "mostly true", "mainly true", "half true", "mainly false", "mostly false", to "false", or maybe even "0.56 true". | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Anything on a sliding scale sounds wrong, as it seems to be paracitic on an underlying fixed idea of 'true'. "Indeterminate", though, seems just right for the truth of predictions ('sea-fight tomorrow'). |
21539 | Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell] |
Full Idea: The law of excluded middle may be stated in the form: If p is denied, not-p must be asserted; this form is too psychological to be ultimate, but the point is that it is significant and not a mere tautology. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.41) | |
A reaction: 'Psychology' is, of course, taboo, post-Frege, though I think it is interesting. Stated in this form the law looks more false than usual. I can be quite clear than p is unacceptable, but unclear about its contrary. |
4704 | Wittgenstein reduced Russell's five primitive logical symbols to a mere one [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: While Russell and Whitehead used five primitive logical symbols in their system, Wittgenstein suggested in his 'Tractatus' that this be reduced to one. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This certainly captures why Russell was so impressed by him. In retrospect what looked like progress presumably now looks like the beginning of the collapse of the enterprise. |
21538 | If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell] |
Full Idea: If two people can perceive the same object, as the possibility of any common world requires, then the object of an external perception is not in the mind of the percipient. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.33) | |
A reaction: This is merely an assertion of the realist view, rather than an argument. I take representative realism to tell a perfectly good story that permits two subjective representations of the same object. |
4711 | Anti-realists say our theories (such as wave-particle duality) give reality incompatible properties [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: The anti-realist says we have theories about the world that are incompatible with each other, and irreducible to each other. They often cite wave-particle duality, which postulate incompatible properties to reality. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Most physicists, of course, hate this duality, precisely because they can't conceive how the two properties could be real. I say realism comes first, and the theories must try to accommodate that assumption. |
4698 | What counts as a fact partly depends on the availability of human concepts to describe them [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: What counts as a fact partly depends on human input, such as the availability of concepts to describe such facts. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: The point must be taken. I am happy to generalise about 'The Facts', meaning 'whatever is the case', but the individuation of specific facts is bound to hit the current problem. |
21534 | The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell] |
Full Idea: It may be doubted whether relations can be adequately characterised by anything except the fact that they relate. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.27) | |
A reaction: We can characterise a rope that ties things together. If I say 'stand to his left', do I assume the existence of one of the relata and the relation, but without the second relata? How about 'you two stand over there, with him on the left'? |
21540 | Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell] |
Full Idea: In some sense which it would be very desirable to define, a relational proposition seems to be 'about' its terms, in a way in which it is not about the relation. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.53) | |
A reaction: Identifying how best to specify what a proposition is actually 'about' is a very illuminating mode of enquiry. You can't define 'underneath' without invoking a pair of objects to illustrate it. A proposition can still focus on the relation. |
21536 | When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing [Russell] |
Full Idea: When, after hearing the notes of a melody, I perceive the melody, the notes are not presented as still existing. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.31) | |
A reaction: This is a good example, supporting Meinong's idea that we focus on 'intentional objects', rather than actual objects. |
4715 | We may say that objects have intrinsic identity conditions, but still allow multiple accounts of them [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Those defending the claim that objects exist with identity conditions not imposed by us, do not have to say that there is just one account of those objects possible. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This seems right, but the test question is whether the mind of God contains a single unified theory/account. Are multiple accounts the result of human inadequacy? Yes, I surmise. |
21535 | Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time [Russell] |
Full Idea: Only those objects exist which have to particular parts of space and time the special relation of 'occupying' them. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.29) | |
A reaction: He excepts space and time themselves. Clearly this doesn't advance our understanding much, but it points to a priority in our normal conceptual scheme. Is Russell assuming absolute space and time? |
21533 | Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell] |
Full Idea: Contingency derives from the fact that a sentence containing a verb in the present tense - or sometimes in the past or the future - changes its meaning continually as the present changes, and stands for different propositions at different times. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.26) | |
A reaction: This immediately strikes me as a bad example of the linguistic approach to philosophy. As if we (like any animal) didn't have an apprehension prior to any language that most parts of experience are capable of change. |
4719 | Maybe developments in logic and geometry have shown that the a priori may be relative [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: A weaker form of relativism holds that developments in logic, in maths and in geometry have shown how a relativised notion of the a priori is possible. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This is non-Euclidean geometry, and multiple formalisations of logic. Personally I don't believe it. You can expand these subjects, and pursue whimsical speculations, but I have faith in their stable natural core. Neo-Platonism. |
21537 | I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell] |
Full Idea: I prefer to advocate ...that the object of a presentation is the actual external object itself, and not any part of the presentation at all. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.33) | |
A reaction: Although I am a fan of the robust realism usually favoured by Russell, I think he is wrong. I take Russell to be frightened that once you take perception to be of 'presentations' rather than things, there is a slippery slope to anti-realism. Not so. |
4720 | Sense-data are only safe from scepticism if they are primitive and unconceptualised [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: The reason sense-data were immune from doubt was because they were so primitive; they were unstructured and below the level of conceptualisation. Once they were given structure and conceptualised, they were no longer safe from sceptical challenge. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: The question of whether sense-data are conceptualised doesn't have to be all-or-nothing. As concepts creep in, so does scepticism, but so what? Sensible philosophers live with scepticism, like a mad aunt in the attic. |
21532 | Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential [Russell] |
Full Idea: Although empiricism as a philosophy does not appear to be tenable, there is an empirical manner of investigating, which should be applied in every subject-matter | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.22) | |
A reaction: Given that early Russell loads his ontology with properties and propositions, this should come as no surprise, even if J.S. Mill was his godfather. |
4722 | Modern epistemology centres on debates about foundations, and about external justification [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: The two dichotomies which set the agenda in contemporary epistemology are the foundationalist-coherentist debate, and the internalist-externalist debate. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: Helpful. Roughly, foundationalists are often externalists (if they are empiricists), and coherentists are often internalists (esp. if they are rationalists). An eccentric combination would make a good PhD. |
4724 | Internalists say the reasons for belief must be available to the subject, and externalists deny this [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Internalism about justification says that the reasons one has for a belief must be in some sense available to the knowing subject, ..while externalism holds that it is possible for a person to have a justified belief without having access to the reason. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: It strikes me that internalists are talking about the believer being justified, and externalists talk about the belief being justified. I'm with the internalists. If this means cats don't know much, so much the worse for cats. |
4723 | Coherence involves support from explanation and evidence, and also probability and confirmation [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Coherentist justification is more than absence of contradictions, and will involve issues like explanatory support and evidential support, and perhaps issues about probability and confirmation too. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: Something like this is obviously essential. Is the notion of 'relevance' also needed (e.g. to avoid the raven paradox of induction)? Coherence of justification will combine with correspondence for truth. |
4709 | Ontological relativists are anti-realists, who deny that our theories carve nature at the joints [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Ontological relativists are anti-realists in the strong sense; they hold as meaningless the view that our theories carve nature at the joints. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This pinpoints my disagreement with such relativism, as it seems obvious to me that nature has 'joints', and that we would agree with any sensible alien about lots of things. |
4725 | Contextualism says that knowledge is relative to its context; 'empty' depends on your interests [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Contextualist about knowledge say that "to know" means different things in different context. For example, a warehouse may be empty for a furniture owner, but not for a bacteriologist or a physicist. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: There is obviously some truth in this, but we might say that 'empty' is a secondary quality, or that 'empty for furniture' is not relative. We needn't accept relativism here. |
4732 | One may understand a realm of ideas, but be unable to judge their rationality or truth [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: It is possible to conceive of one understanding the meaning of a realm of ideas, but holding that one cannot judge as to the truth or rationality of the claims made in it. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: I think Davidson gives good grounds for challenging this, by doubt whether one 'conceptual scheme' can know another without grasping its rationality and truth-conditions. |
21542 | Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell] |
Full Idea: Correct judgements have a transcendent object; but with regard to incorrect judgements, it remains to examine whether 1) the object is immanent, 2) there is no object, or 3) the object is transcendent. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.67) | |
A reaction: Why is it that only Russell seems to have taken this problem seriously? Its solution gives the clearest possible indicator of how the mind relates to the world. |
21541 | The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell] |
Full Idea: Every property of the object seems to demand a strictly correlative property of the content, and the content, therefore, must have every complexity belonging to the object. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.55) | |
A reaction: This claim gives a basis for his 'congruence' account of the correspondence theory of truth. It strikes me as false. If I talk of the 'red red robin', I don't mention the robin's feet. He ignores the psychological selection we make in abstraction. |
4710 | Verificationism was attacked by the deniers of the analytic-synthetic distinction, needed for 'facts' [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Verificationism came under attack from empiricists who were friendly to the banishment of traditional metaphysics, but unfriendly to the analytic-synthetic distinction, on which the idea of a 'factual statement' depended. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: I don't accept this move because I don't consider the 'facts' to be language-dependent. They are pre-linguistic, they outrun that capacity of our language, and they are available to animals. |
21543 | If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell] |
Full Idea: If p is a false affirmative proposition ...then it seems obvious that if we believe not-p we do know something true, so belief in not-p must be something which is not mere disbelief. This proves that there are negative propositions. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.75) | |
A reaction: This evidently assumes excluded middle, but is none the worse for that. But it sounds suspiciously like believing there is no rhinoceros in the room. Does such a belief require a fact? |
4717 | If we abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction, scepticism about meaning may be inevitable [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: There may be no way to avoid scepticism about meaning if you abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction in the way Quine does. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: My suspicion was always that Quine's proposal began the slippery road to hell. It appears to be pragmatists who are most drawn to Quine's idea. The proposal that all my analytic propositions could be treated as synthetic totally baffles me. |
4706 | Early Quine says all beliefs could be otherwise, but later he said we would assume mistranslation [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: In his earlier work, Quine defended the view that no belief (including logic) is in principle unrevisable, but in his later work (1970) he took the conservative view that we would always impute mistranslation rather than deviancy. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: I take it he was influenced by Davidson's 'principle of charity'. He says that if someone asserts 'p and not-p', we would assume a misunderstanding of 'and' or 'not'. |
4734 | Cryptographers can recognise that something is a language, without translating it [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: It makes sense to think that one could recognise that something is a language without necessarily being able to translate it; cryptographers do this all the time. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: Maybe, but cryptographers usually have a lot of context to work with. If we met extraterrestrials if might not be so clear. One can only spot patterns, and crystals have those. |
4727 | The chief problem for fideists is other fideists who hold contrary ideas [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: The chief problem for fideists is other fideists who hold contrary ideas. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: The other problem is trying to find grounds for sticking to the object of one's faith, rather than changing from time to time. |