7920
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Descriptive metaphysics aims at actual structure, revisionary metaphysics at a better structure [Strawson,P]
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Full Idea:
Descriptive metaphysics (e.g. Aristotle and Kant) is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world; revisionary metaphysics (e.g. Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley) is concerned to produce a better structure.
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From:
Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], Intro)
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A reaction:
This distinction by Strawson was incredibly helpful in reinstating metaphysics as a feasible activity. I don't want to abandon the revisionary version. We can hammer the current metaphysics into a more efficient shape, or even create new concepts.
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7922
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Descriptive metaphysics concerns unchanging core concepts and categories [Strawson,P]
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Full Idea:
Descriptive metaphysics is primarily concerned with categories and concepts which, in their fundamental character, change not at all. They are the commonplaces of the least refined thinking, and the indispensable core for the most sophisticated humans.
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From:
Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], Intro)
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A reaction:
This seems to be the basic premise for a modern metaphysician such as E.J.Lowe, though such thinkers are not averse to suggesting clarifications of our conceptual scheme. The aim must be good foundations for a successful edifice of knowledge.
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7921
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Close examination of actual word usage is the only sure way in philosophy [Strawson,P]
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Full Idea:
Up to a point, the reliance upon a close examination of the actual use of words is the best, and indeed the only sure, way in philosophy.
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From:
Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], Intro)
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A reaction:
Probably the last bold assertion of ordinary language philosophy, though Strawson goes on the defend his 'deeper' version of the activity, which he says is 'descriptive metaphysics', rather than mere 'analysis'. Mere verbal analysis now looks hopeless.
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9282
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I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others [Strawson,P]
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Full Idea:
One can ascribed states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them to others. One can ascribe them to others only if one can identify other subjects of experience, and they cannot be identified only as subjects of experience.
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From:
Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], 3.4)
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A reaction:
A neat linguistic twist on the analogy argument, but rather dubious, if it is actually meant to prove that other minds exist. It is based on his view of predicates - see Idea 9281. If the rest of humanity are zombies, why would I not apply them?
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19035
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General Relativity allows substantivalism about space-time - that it has independent properties [Hoefer]
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Full Idea:
General Relativity describes space-time in a way that allows it to exist with determinate properties not reducible to the properties and relations of its material contents. Hence nearly all physicists and philosophers writing on GR are substantivalists.
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From:
Carl Hoefer (The Metaphysics of Space-Time Substantivalism [1996], p.5), quoted by Barbara Vetter - Potentiality 7.3
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A reaction:
I'm encouraged by this, as I instinctly favour substantivalism. Imagine removing all the objects from space-time, one by one. What happens as you approach the end of the task? Once they are removed, can they be replaced?
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