7 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
20955 | Art can make reason more all-inclusive, by articulating what seemed inexpressible [Bowie] |
Full Idea: The early German Romantics argued that art pointed to a more all-inclusive conception of reason, which can offer ways of articulating what is not conceptually accessible. | |
From: Andrew Bowie (Introduction to German Philosophy [2003], 5 'Reason') | |
A reaction: [This is Novalis, F.Schlegel, Schleiermacher, and Hölderlin] I'm in favour of expanding reason, to include assessment of situations and coherence, rather than just stepwise reasoning. Not sure that art 'articulates' something new. |
20950 | German Idealism says our thinking and nature have the same rational structure [Bowie] |
Full Idea: German Idealism aims to demonstrate that our thinking relates to a nature which is intelligibly structured in the same way as our thinking is structured. | |
From: Andrew Bowie (Introduction to German Philosophy [2003], 3 'Limits') | |
A reaction: Now that's an idealism I might buy into. Frege thought his logic was mapping rational reality. My angle is that we are a product of this 'reality', so we should expect our thinking to be similarly structured. Reason is derived from nature. |
20942 | Nazis think race predetermines the self [Bowie] |
Full Idea: The Nazi idea is that the self is predetermined primarily by its race. | |
From: Andrew Bowie (Introduction to German Philosophy [2003], Intro) | |
A reaction: I suspect that I occasionally encounter this view, in very patriotic people. But then you meet people who feeling that their self is mainly determined by support of a football team. Note, though, 'pre-'determined. Hegel makes this idea possible? |
20946 | Rhetoric is built into language, so it cannot be stripped from philosophy [Bowie] |
Full Idea: The attempt to rid philosophy of rhetoric falls prey precisely to that fact that what is involved in rhetoric is inherent in what is built into all natural languages by their genesis in the real historical world. | |
From: Andrew Bowie (Introduction to German Philosophy [2003], 2 'Hamann') | |
A reaction: Rhetoric can range from charming to bullying, and it is the latter which is the problem. The underlying issue is dogma versus dialectic. Some analytic philosophers have a good shot at being non-rhetorical. |
22381 | Being a good father seems to depend on intentions, rather than actual abilities [Foot] |
Full Idea: Being a good father, or daughter, or friend seems to depend on one's intentions, rather than on such things as cleverness and strength. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Goodness and Choice [1961], p.138) | |
A reaction: Not sure about that. In wartime a good father might need to be actually brave, and in times of hardship be actually economically successful. 'He meant well, but he was a hopeless father'? |
22380 | Some words, such as 'knife', have a meaning which involves its function [Foot] |
Full Idea: The word 'knife' names an object in respect of its function. That is not to say (simply) that it names an object which has a function, but also that the function is involved in the meaning of the word. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Goodness and Choice [1961], p.134) | |
A reaction: It seems faintly possible that someone (a child, perhaps) could know the word and recognise the object, but not know what the object is for. Ditto with other things which have functional names. |