22 ideas
8766 | In much wisdom is much grief [Anon (Ecc)] |
Full Idea: In much wisdom is much grief. | |
From: Anon (Ecc) (21: Book of Ecclesiastes [c.200 BCE], 01.18) | |
A reaction: If this is true, then the question is of what there is in wisdom that will compensate for the grief. Personally I doubt the whole claim. Some wisdom involves grief, but most of it involves pleasure, even when understanding of evil is the target. |
1642 | We must fight fiercely for knowledge, understanding and intelligence [Plato] |
Full Idea: We need to use every argument we can to fight against anyone who does away with knowledge, understanding, and intelligence, but at the same time asserts anything at all about anything. | |
From: Plato (The Sophist [c.359 BCE], 249c) | |
A reaction: Thus showing that reason is only central if you want to put a high value on it? |
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
7494 | Laughter is mad; of mirth, what doeth it? [Anon (Ecc)] |
Full Idea: I said of laughter, It is mad: and of mirth, what doeth it? | |
From: Anon (Ecc) (21: Book of Ecclesiastes [c.200 BCE], 02.02) | |
A reaction: Not much of an argument, but an interesting support for the extreme anti-hedonistic puritanical view. Most people would praise laughter as an end in itself, so 'what doeth it?' seems to miss the point. |
8767 | Sorrow is better than laughter [Anon (Ecc)] |
Full Idea: Sorrow is better than laughter: for by the sadness of the countenance the heart is made better. | |
From: Anon (Ecc) (21: Book of Ecclesiastes [c.200 BCE], 07.03) | |
A reaction: This writer fails to see the good in laughter. If he did, he would have a more balanced view, and we could take this opinion more seriously. Theatre audiences always seem keen to hunt out jokes where none are intended. |
1645 | The desire to split everything into its parts is unpleasant and unphilosophical [Plato] |
Full Idea: To try to set apart everything from everything is not only especially jangling, but it is the mark of someone altogether unmusical and unphilosophic. | |
From: Plato (The Sophist [c.359 BCE], 259e) |
287 | Good analysis involves dividing things into appropriate forms without confusion [Plato] |
Full Idea: It takes expertise in dialectic to divide things by kinds and not to think that the same form is a different one or that a different form is the same. | |
From: Plato (The Sophist [c.359 BCE], 253d) |
1644 | Dialectic should only be taught to those who already philosophise well [Plato] |
Full Idea: The dialectical capacity - you won't give it to anyone else, I suspect, except to whoever philosophises purely and justly. | |
From: Plato (The Sophist [c.359 BCE], 253e) |
20478 | In discussion a person's opinions are shown to be in conflict, leading to calm self-criticism [Plato] |
Full Idea: They collect someone's opinions together during the discussion, put them side by side, and show that they conflict with each other at the same time on the same subjects.... The person sees this, gets angry at themselves, and calmer towards others. | |
From: Plato (The Sophist [c.359 BCE], 230b) | |
A reaction: He goes on to say that the process is like a doctor purging a patient of internal harms. If anyone talks for long enough (even a good philosopher), their opinions will probably be seen to be in conflict. But which opinions do you abandon? |
11278 | What does 'that which is not' refer to? [Plato] |
Full Idea: What should the name 'that which is not' be applied to? | |
From: Plato (The Sophist [c.359 BCE], 237c) | |
A reaction: This leads into a discussion of the problem, in The Sophist. It became a large issue when modern logic was being developed by Frege and Russell. |
1643 | If statements about non-existence are logically puzzling, so are statements about existence [Plato] |
Full Idea: When the question was put to us as to the name of 'that which is not', to whatever one must apply it, we got stuck in every kind of perplexity. Are we now in any less perplexity about 'that which is'? | |
From: Plato (The Sophist [c.359 BCE], 250d) | |
A reaction: Nice. This precapitulates the whole story of modern philosophy of language. What started as a nagging doubt about reference to non-existents ends as bewilderment about everything we say. |
7022 | To be is to have a capacity, to act on other things, or to receive actions [Plato] |
Full Idea: A thing really is if it has any capacity, either by nature to do something to something else or to have even the smallest thing done to it by the most trivial thing, even if it only happens once. I'll define those which are as nothing other than capacity. | |
From: Plato (The Sophist [c.359 BCE], 247e) | |
A reaction: If philosophy is footnotes to Plato, this should be the foundational remark in all discussions of existence (though Parmenides might claim priority). It seems to say 'to be is to have a causal role (active or passive)'. It also seems essentialist. |
1641 | Some alarming thinkers think that only things which you can touch exist [Plato] |
Full Idea: One group drags everything down to earth, insisting that only what offers tangible contact is, since they define being as the same as body, despising anyone who says that something without a body is. These are frightening men. | |
From: Plato (The Sophist [c.359 BCE], 246b) |
10784 | Whenever there's speech it has to be about something [Plato] |
Full Idea: Whenever there's speech it has to be about something. It's impossible for it not to be about something. | |
From: Plato (The Sophist [c.359 BCE], 262e) | |
A reaction: [Quoted by Marcus about ontological commitment] The interesting test case would be speech about the existence of circular squares. |
16122 | Good thinkers spot forms spread through things, or included within some larger form [Plato] |
Full Idea: It takes dialectic to divide things by kinds...such a person can discriminate a single form spread through a lot of separate things…and forms included in a single outside form…or a form connected as a unit through many wholes. | |
From: Plato (The Sophist [c.359 BCE], 253d) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This is very helpful in indicating the complex structure of the Forms that Plato envisages. If you talk of the meanings of words (other than names), though, it comes to the same thing. Wise people fully understand their language. |
10422 | The not-beautiful is part of the beautiful, though opposed to it, and is just as real [Plato] |
Full Idea: So 'the not beautiful' turns out to be ..both marked off within one kind of those that are, and also set over against one of those that are, ..and the beautiful is no more a being than the not beautiful. | |
From: Plato (The Sophist [c.359 BCE], 257d) | |
A reaction: [dialogue eliminated] This is a highly significant passage, for two reasons. It suggests that the Form of the beautiful can have parts, and also that the negations of Forms are Forms themselves (both of which come as a surprise). |
15855 | If we see everything as separate, we can then give no account of it [Plato] |
Full Idea: To dissociate each thing from everything else is to destroy totally everything there is to say. The weaving together of forms is what makes speech [logos] possible for us. | |
From: Plato (The Sophist [c.359 BCE], 259e) | |
A reaction: This I take to be the lynchpin of metaphysics. We are forced to see the world in a way which enables us to give some sort of account of it. Our metaphysics is 'inference to the best logos'. |
1637 | A soul without understanding is ugly [Plato] |
Full Idea: The soul that lacks understanding must be set down as ugly. | |
From: Plato (The Sophist [c.359 BCE], 228d) | |
A reaction: The teleological view of things understands their nature in things of their perfection. and the essence of beauty is perfection. It is the mind's nature to know. Failing to know is as ugly as allowing your crops to die. |
1636 | Wickedness is an illness of the soul [Plato] |
Full Idea: Wickedness is a sedition and illness of the soul. | |
From: Plato (The Sophist [c.359 BCE], 228b) |
8765 | All is vanity, saith the Preacher [Anon (Ecc)] |
Full Idea: Vanity of vanities, saith the Preacher, vanity of vanities; all is vanity. | |
From: Anon (Ecc) (21: Book of Ecclesiastes [c.200 BCE], 01.02) | |
A reaction: If we are swamped by vanity, then there is presumably no hope for the other virtues. A more balanced view would say that we should aim for a mean on the scale of self-esteem, which probably requires an effort to be objective about ourselves. |
8768 | Books are endless, and study is wearisome [Anon (Ecc)] |
Full Idea: Of making many books there is no end; and much study is weariness of the flesh. | |
From: Anon (Ecc) (21: Book of Ecclesiastes [c.200 BCE], 12.12) | |
A reaction: Does anyone share my occasional sinking heart on entering a large library or bookshop? I truly believe that there is nothing better in the world than books. And yet, and yet... |
1638 | Didactic education is hard work and achieves little [Plato] |
Full Idea: With a lot of effort the admonitory species of education accomplishes little. | |
From: Plato (The Sophist [c.359 BCE], 230a) |