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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Sentences' and 'The Fragmentation of Reason'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
     From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
     A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Radical pragmatists abandon the notion of truth [Stich, by Lowe]
     Full Idea: Some radical pragmatists, such as Stich, are ready to abandon the notion of truth.
     From: report of Stephen P. Stich (The Fragmentation of Reason [1990]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.3 n18
     A reaction: Such a proposal strikes me as silly (unless the vacuum left by truth can be filled by something better than just the test of whether 'it works'). It currently strikes me that pragmatism has a sane wing (led by Peirce), and a mad wing.
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logicians acknowledge too few things, while others acknowledge too many [Fitzralph]
     Full Idea: Those who have been well trained in logic err in recognising too few things, whereas others who are ignorant of logic ascribe to every statement a new entity, postulating more entities than God has ever established as real.
     From: Richard Fitzralph (Sentences [1328], II.1.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 22.3
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Stich accepts eliminativism (labelled 'pragmatism') about rationality and normativity [Stich, by Engel]
     Full Idea: Stich accepts a form of eliminativism (which he calls 'pragmatism') about rationality and normativity generally.
     From: report of Stephen P. Stich (The Fragmentation of Reason [1990]) by Pascal Engel - Truth §5.3
     A reaction: This seems to be the correct position for a Humean empiricist connectionist. Presumably he has some good reasons for eliminating rationality.