Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Rationality' and 'Letter to G.H. Schaller'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined

23367	Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
	Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
	From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
	A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).

12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory

23304	The ancient Memorists said virtually all types of thinking could be done simply by memory [Sorabji]
	Full Idea: The ancient medical Memorists said that ordinary thinking, inferring, reflecting, believing, assuming, examining, generalising and knowing can all be done simply on the basis of memory.
	From: Richard Sorabji (Rationality [1996], 'Inference')
	A reaction: The think there is a plausible theory that all neurons do is remember, and are mainly distinguished by the duration of their memories. We might explain these modes of thinking in terms of various combinations of the fast and the slow.

23303	Stoics say true memory needs reflection and assent, but animals only have perceptual recognition [Sorabji]
	Full Idea: Stoics say memory proper involves reflection and assent. Animal memory, by contrast, is not memory proper, but mere perceptual recognition. The horse remembers the road when he is on it, but not when he is in the stable.
	From: Richard Sorabji (Rationality [1996], 'Other')
	A reaction: An interesting distinction. Do I remember something if I can never recall it, and yet recognise it when it reappears, such as a person I knew long ago? 'Memory' is ambiguous, between lodged in the mind, and recallable. Unfair to horses, this.

16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will

4871	A thing is free if it acts only by the necessity of its own nature [Spinoza]
	Full Idea: I say that a thing is free, which exists and acts solely by the necessity of its own nature.
	From: Baruch de Spinoza (Letter to G.H. Schaller [1674], 1674.10)
	A reaction: Of course, this isn't 'freedom' at all, but it seems to exactly right as an account of so-called freedom. In the case of a human being the 'necessity of our own nature' is character, and virtue and vice are the expressions of the necessities of character.