Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Rationality' and 'Confessions of a Philosopher'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined

23367	Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
	Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
	From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
	A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).

12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory

23304	The ancient Memorists said virtually all types of thinking could be done simply by memory [Sorabji]
	Full Idea: The ancient medical Memorists said that ordinary thinking, inferring, reflecting, believing, assuming, examining, generalising and knowing can all be done simply on the basis of memory.
	From: Richard Sorabji (Rationality [1996], 'Inference')
	A reaction: The think there is a plausible theory that all neurons do is remember, and are mainly distinguished by the duration of their memories. We might explain these modes of thinking in terms of various combinations of the fast and the slow.

23303	Stoics say true memory needs reflection and assent, but animals only have perceptual recognition [Sorabji]
	Full Idea: Stoics say memory proper involves reflection and assent. Animal memory, by contrast, is not memory proper, but mere perceptual recognition. The horse remembers the road when he is on it, but not when he is in the stable.
	From: Richard Sorabji (Rationality [1996], 'Other')
	A reaction: An interesting distinction. Do I remember something if I can never recall it, and yet recognise it when it reappears, such as a person I knew long ago? 'Memory' is ambiguous, between lodged in the mind, and recallable. Unfair to horses, this.

16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection

3102	Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee]
	Full Idea: As a child it was incomprehensible to me that I did not experience going to sleep, and never remembered it. When my sister said 'Nobody remembers that', I just thought 'How does she know?'
	From: Bryan Magee (Confessions of a Philosopher [1997], Ch.I)
	A reaction: This is actually evidence for something - that we do not have some sort of personal identity which is separate from consciousness, so that "I am conscious" would literally mean that an item has a property, which it can lose.