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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Anarchy,State, and Utopia' and 'Epistemology Naturalized'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined

23367	Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
	Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
	From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
	A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique

1635	Mathematics reduces to set theory (which is a bit vague and unobvious), but not to logic proper [Quine]
	Full Idea: Mathematics reduces only to set theory, and not to logic proper… but set theory cannot claim the same firmness and obviousness as logic.
	From: Willard Quine (Epistemology Naturalized [1968], p.69-70)

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 9. Naturalised Epistemology

7627	You can't reduce epistemology to psychology, because that presupposes epistemology [Maund on Quine]
	Full Idea: There is something seriously misguided about Quine's project of reducing epistemology to psychology, since psychology, like any of the natural sciences, presupposes an epistemology.
	From: comment on Willard Quine (Epistemology Naturalized [1968]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.1
	A reaction: I wonder if epistemology presupposes psychology? Belief, for example, is a category of folk psychology, which could be challenged. There is a quiet battle going on between philosophy and science.

8871	We should abandon a search for justification or foundations, and focus on how knowledge is acquired [Quine, by Davidson]
	Full Idea: Quine is suggesting that philosophy should abandon the attempt to provide a foundation for knowledge, or otherwise justify it, and should instead give an account of how knowledge is acquired.
	From: report of Willard Quine (Epistemology Naturalized [1968]) by Donald Davidson - Epistemology Externalized p.193
	A reaction: If you are going to explain how 'knowledge' is acquired, you'd better know what knowledge is. My suspicion is that Quine would be quite happy (in the pragmatist tradition) to just focus on belief, and forget about knowledge entirely.

8826	If we abandon justification and normativity in epistemology, we must also abandon knowledge [Kim on Quine]
	Full Idea: Quine asks us to set aside the entire framework of justification-centered epistemology, ..and repudiate normativity. ..But then knowledge itself drops out of epistemology, for our concept of knowledge is inseparably tied to that of justification.
	From: comment on Willard Quine (Epistemology Naturalized [1968]) by Jaegwon Kim - What is 'naturalized epistemology'? p.305
	A reaction: Presumably this would not bother Quine, who wants to hand so-called 'epistemology' over to the psychologists. A psychological account of belief seems plausible. Presumably false beliefs could only be pragmatically characterised.

8827	Without normativity, naturalized epistemology isn't even about beliefs [Kim on Quine]
	Full Idea: If normativity is wholly excluded from naturalized epistemology it cannot even be thought of as being about beliefs.
	From: comment on Willard Quine (Epistemology Naturalized [1968]) by Jaegwon Kim - What is 'naturalized epistemology'? p.306
	A reaction: And if it doesn't refer to beliefs, it certainly doesn't refer to knowledge. One might try to subsume normativity under evolutionary pragmatic 'drives', or something. Quine's project would then become wildly speculative, and hence boring.

8899	Epistemology is a part of psychology, studying how our theories relate to our evidence [Quine]
	Full Idea: Epistemology falls into place as a chapter of psychology, and hence of natural science. ..We study meagre input and torrential output, to see how evidence relates to theory, and in what ways one's theory of nature transcends any available evidence.
	From: Willard Quine (Epistemology Naturalized [1968], p.83)
	A reaction: It depends what you are interested in. If you just want to know what makes humans tick, then Quine is your man, but if you want to know things in general, and want to know how to get it right, then the normative side of epistemology is unavoidable.

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning

8898	Inculcations of meanings of words rests ultimately on sensory evidence [Quine]
	Full Idea: All inculcation of meanings of words must rest ultimately on sensory evidence.
	From: Willard Quine (Epistemology Naturalized [1968], p.75)
	A reaction: This betrays Quine's behaviourist tendencies, and rules out introspection, definitions and inferences. Quine's conclusion is fairly total scepticism about meaning, but that is not surprising, given his external and meaningless starting point.

19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique

8900	In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity [Quine]
	Full Idea: Perhaps the controversial notion of analyticity can be dispensed with, in our definition of observation sentences, in favour of the straightforward attitude of community-wide acceptance.
	From: Willard Quine (Epistemology Naturalized [1968], p.86)
	A reaction: That might be a reasonable account of 'bachelors'. If the whole community accepts 'God exists', does that make it analytic? If a whole (small!) community claims to actually observe a ghost or a flying saucer, is that then analytic?

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value

18648	Freedom to live according to our own conception of the good is the ultimate value [Nozick, by Kymlicka]
	Full Idea: Nozick says that the freedom to lead our lives in accordance with our own conception of the good is the ultimate value, so important that it cannot be sacrificed for other social ideals (e.g. equality of opportunity).
	From: report of Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974]) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 4.2.b.ii
	A reaction: Clearly this ultimate value will not apply to children, so this view needs a sharp dislocation between children and adults. But some adults need a lot of looking after. Maybe we ALL need looking after (by one another)?

23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 2. Ideal of Pleasure

20585	If an experience machine gives you any experience you want, should you hook up for life? [Nozick]
	Full Idea: Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you any experience you desired ...such as writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. ...Should you plug into this machine for life?
	From: Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], 3 'Experience')
	A reaction: A classic though experiment which crystalises a major problem with hedonistic utilitarianism. My addition is a machine which maximises the pleasure of my family and friends, to save me the bother of doing it.

24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State

18643	A minimal state should protect, but a state forcing us to do more is unjustified [Nozick]
	Full Idea: A minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified; any more extensive state will violate persons' rights not to be forced to do certain things, and is unjustified.
	From: Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], Pref)
	A reaction: This has some plausibility for a huge modern state, where we don't know one another, but it would be a ridiculous attitude in a traditional village.

24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism

18642	Individual rights are so strong that the state and its officials must be very limited in power [Nozick]
	Full Idea: Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights). So strong and far-reaching are these rights that they raise the question of what, if anything, the state and its officials may do.
	From: Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], Pref)
	A reaction: This claim appears to be an axiom, but I'm not sure that the notion of 'rights' make any sense unless someone is granting the rights, where the someone is either a strong individual, or the community (perhaps represented by the state).

24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality

18644	States can't enforce mutual aid on citizens, or interfere for their own good [Nozick]
	Full Idea: A state may not use its coercive apparatus for the purposes of getting some citizens to aid others, or in order to prohibit activities to people for their own good or protection.
	From: Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], Pref)
	A reaction: You certainly can't apply these principles to children, so becoming an 'adult' seems to be a very profound step in Nozick's account. At what age must we stop interfering with people for their own good. If the state is prohibited, are neighbours also?

24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique

22661	My Anarchy, State and Utopia neglected our formal social ties and concerns [Nozick on Nozick]
	Full Idea: The political philosophy represented in Anarchy, State and Utopia ignored the importance of joint and official symbolic statement and expression of our social ties and concern, and hence (I have written) is inadequate.
	From: comment on Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], p.32) by Robert Nozick - The Nature of Rationality p.32
	A reaction: In other words, it was far too individualistic, and neglected community, even though it has become the sacred text for libertarian individualism. Do any Nozick fans care about this recantation?

25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market

18641	If people hold things legitimately, just distribution is simply the result of free exchanges [Nozick, by Kymlicka]
	Full Idea: If we assume that everyone is entitled to the goods they currently possess (their 'holdings'), then a just distribution is simply whatever distribution results from people's free exchanges.
	From: report of Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974]) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 4.1.b
	A reaction: If people's current 'legitimate' holdings are hugely unequal, it seems very unlikely that the ensuing exchanges will be 'free' in the way that Nozick envisages.

25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights

20539	Property is legitimate by initial acquisition, voluntary transfer, or rectification of injustice [Nozick, by Swift]
	Full Idea: Nozick identified three ways in which people can acquire a legitimate property holding: initial acquisition, voluntary transfer, and rectification (of unjust transfers).
	From: report of Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974]) by Adam Swift - Political Philosophy (3rd ed) 1 'Nozick'
	A reaction: I think it is a delusion to look for justice in the ownership of property. You can't claim justice for buying property if the money to do it was acquired unjustly. And what rights over those who live on the land come with the 'ownership'?

18645	Nozick assumes initial holdings include property rights, but we can challenge that [Kymlicka on Nozick]
	Full Idea: Nozick assumes that the initial distribution of holdings includes full property-rights over them, ..but our preferred theory may not involve distributing such particular rights to particular people. ...The legitimacy of such rights is what is in question.
	From: comment on Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974]) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 4.1.c
	A reaction: [somewhat compressed] All of these political philosophies seem to have questionable values (such as freedom or equality) built into their initial assumptions.

20521	Can I come to own the sea, by mixing my private tomato juice with it? [Nozick]
	Full Idea: If I own a can of tomato juice and spill it in the sea so that its molecules mingle evenly throughout the sea, do I thereby come to own the sea?
	From: Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], p.175)
	A reaction: This is a reductio of Locke's claim that I can own land by 'mixing' my labour with it. At first glance, mixing something with something would seem to have nothing to do with ownership.

18646	How did the private property get started? If violence was involved, we can redistribute it [Kymlicka on Nozick]
	Full Idea: How did these natural resources, which were not initially owned by anyone, come to be part of someone's private property? ...The fact that the initial acquisition often involved force means there is no moral objection to redistributing existing wealth.
	From: comment on Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974]) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 4.2.b
	A reaction: [He cites G.A. Cphen 1988 for the second point] Put like this, Nozick's theory just looks like the sort of propaganda which is typically put out by the winners. Is there an implicit threat of violent resistance in his advocacy of individual rights?

18647	If property is only initially acquired by denying the rights of others, Nozick can't get started [Kymlicka on Nozick]
	Full Idea: If there is no way that people can appropriate unowned resources for themselves without denying other people's claim to equal consideration, then Nozick's right of transfer never gets off the ground.
	From: comment on Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974]) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 4.2.b.i
	A reaction: The actual history of these things is too complex to judge. Early peoples desperately wanted a lord to rule over them, and their lord's ownership of the land implied the people's right to live there. See Anglo-Saxon poetry.

21737	Unowned things may be permanently acquired, if it doesn't worsen the position of other people [Nozick]
	Full Idea: One may acquire a permanent bequeathable property right in a previously unowned thing, as long as the position of others no longer at liberty to use the thing is not thereby worsened.
	From: Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], p.178), quoted by G.A. Cohen - Are Freedom and Equality Compatible? 2
	A reaction: Cohen attacks this vigorously. His main point is that Nozick has a very narrow view of what the acquisition should be compared with. There are many alternatives. Does being made unable to improve something 'worsen' a person's condition?

21738	Maybe land was originally collectively owned, rather than unowned? [Cohen,GA on Nozick]
	Full Idea: Why should we not regard land as originally collectively owned rather than, as Nozick takes for granted, owned by no one?
	From: comment on Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], p.178) by G.A. Cohen - Are Freedom and Equality Compatible? 2
	A reaction: Did native Americans and Australians collectively own the land? Lots of peoples, I suspect, don't privately own anything, because the very concept has never occured to them (and they have no legal system).