27 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
18543 | Do aesthetic reasons count as reasons, if they are rejectable without contradiction? [Scruton] |
Full Idea: The judgement of beauty makes a claim about its object, and can be supported by reasons. But the reasons do not compel the judgement and can be rejected without contradiction. So are they reasons or aren't they? | |
From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 1) | |
A reaction: I suspect that what he is really referring to is evidence rather than reasons. |
18542 | Defining truth presupposes that there can be a true definition [Scruton] |
Full Idea: How can you define truth, without already assuming the distinction between a true definition and a false one? | |
From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 1) | |
A reaction: Don't say we have to accept truth as yet another primitive! Philosophers are out of business if all the basic concepts are primitive. The axiomatic approach to truth is an alternative - by specifying how the primitive should be used. |
7786 | Propositional logic handles negation, disjunction, conjunction; predicate logic adds quantifiers, predicates, relations [Girle] |
Full Idea: Propositional logic can deal with negation, disjunction and conjunction of propositions, but predicate logic goes beyond it to deal with quantifiers, predicates and relations. | |
From: Rod Girle (Modal Logics and Philosophy [2000], 1.1) | |
A reaction: This is on the first page of an introduction to the next stage, which is to include modal notions like 'must' and 'possibly'. |
7798 | There are three axiom schemas for propositional logic [Girle] |
Full Idea: The axioms of propositional logic are: A→(B→A); A→(B→C)→(A→B)→(A→C) ; and (¬A→¬B)→(B→A). | |
From: Rod Girle (Modal Logics and Philosophy [2000], 6.5) |
7799 | Proposition logic has definitions for its three operators: or, and, and identical [Girle] |
Full Idea: The operators of propositional logic are defined as follows: 'or' (v) is not-A implies B; 'and' (ampersand) is not A-implies-not-B; and 'identity' (three line equals) is A-implies-B and B-implies-A. | |
From: Rod Girle (Modal Logics and Philosophy [2000], 6.5) |
7797 | Axiom systems of logic contain axioms, inference rules, and definitions of proof and theorems [Girle] |
Full Idea: An axiom system for a logic contains three elements: a set of axioms; a set of inference rules; and definitions for proofs and theorems. There are also definitions for the derivation of conclusions from sets of premises. | |
From: Rod Girle (Modal Logics and Philosophy [2000], 6.5) |
7794 | There are seven modalities in S4, each with its negation [Girle] |
Full Idea: In S4 there are fourteen modalities: no-operator; necessarily; possibly; necessarily-possibly; possibly-necessarily; necessarily-possibly-necessarily; and possibly-necessarily-possibly (each with its negation). | |
From: Rod Girle (Modal Logics and Philosophy [2000], 3.5) | |
A reaction: This is said to be 'more complex' than S5, but also 'weaker'. |
7793 | ◊p → □◊p is the hallmark of S5 [Girle] |
Full Idea: The critical formula that distinguishes S5 from all others is: ◊p → □◊p. | |
From: Rod Girle (Modal Logics and Philosophy [2000], 3.3) | |
A reaction: If it is possible that it is raining, then it is necessary that it is possible that it is raining. But if it is possible in this world, how can that possibility be necessary in all possible worlds? |
7795 | S5 has just six modalities, and all strings can be reduced to those [Girle] |
Full Idea: In S5 there are six modalities: no-operator; necessarily; and possibly (and their negations). In any sequence of operators we may delete all but the last to gain an equivalent formula. | |
From: Rod Girle (Modal Logics and Philosophy [2000], 3.5) | |
A reaction: Such drastic simplification seems attractive. Is there really no difference, though, between 'necessarily-possibly', 'possibly-possibly' and just 'possibly'? Could p be contingently possible in this world, and necessarily possible in another? |
7787 | Possible worlds logics use true-in-a-world rather than true [Girle] |
Full Idea: In possible worlds logics a statement is true-in-a-world rather than just true. | |
From: Rod Girle (Modal Logics and Philosophy [2000], 1.1) | |
A reaction: This sounds relativist, but I don't think it is. It is the facts which change, not the concept of truth. So 'donkeys can talk' may be true in a world, but not in the actual one. |
7788 | Modal logic has four basic modal negation equivalences [Girle] |
Full Idea: The four important logical equivalences in modal logic (the Modal Negation equivalences) are: ¬◊p↔□¬p, ◊¬p↔¬□p, □p↔¬◊¬p, and ◊p↔¬□¬p. | |
From: Rod Girle (Modal Logics and Philosophy [2000], 1.2) | |
A reaction: [Possibly is written as a diamond, necessarily a square] These are parallel to a set of equivalences between quantifiers in predicate logic. They are called the four 'modal negation (MN) equivalences'. |
7796 | Modal logics were studied in terms of axioms, but now possible worlds semantics is added [Girle] |
Full Idea: Modal logics were, for a long time, studied in terms of axiom systems. The advent of possible worlds semantics made it possible to study them in a semantic way as well. | |
From: Rod Girle (Modal Logics and Philosophy [2000], 6.5) |
7789 | Necessary implication is called 'strict implication'; if successful, it is called 'entailment' [Girle] |
Full Idea: Necessary implication is often called 'strict implication'. The sort of strict implication found in valid arguments, where the conjunction of the premises necessarily implies the conclusion, is often called 'entailment'. | |
From: Rod Girle (Modal Logics and Philosophy [2000], 1.2) | |
A reaction: These are basic concept for all logic. |
7790 | If an argument is invalid, a truth tree will indicate a counter-example [Girle] |
Full Idea: The truth trees method for establishing the validity of arguments and formulas is easy to use, and has the advantage that if an argument or formula is not valid, then a counter-example can be retrieved from the tree. | |
From: Rod Girle (Modal Logics and Philosophy [2000], 1.4) |
7800 | Analytic truths are divided into logically and conceptually necessary [Girle] |
Full Idea: It has been customary to see analytic truths as dividing into the logically necessary and the conceptually necessary. | |
From: Rod Girle (Modal Logics and Philosophy [2000], 7.3) | |
A reaction: I suspect that this neglected distinction is important in discussions of Quine's elimination of the analytic/synthetic distinction. Was Quine too influenced by what is logically necessary, which might shift with a change of axioms? |
7801 | Possibilities can be logical, theoretical, physical, economic or human [Girle] |
Full Idea: Qualified modalities seem to form a hierarchy, if we say that 'the possibility that there might be no hunger' is possible logically, theoretically, physically, economically, and humanly. | |
From: Rod Girle (Modal Logics and Philosophy [2000], 7.3) | |
A reaction: Girle also mentions conceptual possibility. I take 'physically' to be the same as 'naturally'. I would take 'metaphysically' possible to equate to 'theoretically' rather than 'logically'. Almost anything might be logically possible, with bizarre logic. |
7792 | A world has 'access' to a world it generates, which is important in possible worlds semantics [Girle] |
Full Idea: When one world generates another then it has 'access' to the world it generated. The accessibility relation between worlds is very important in possible worlds semantics. | |
From: Rod Girle (Modal Logics and Philosophy [2000], 3.2) | |
A reaction: This invites the obvious question what is meant by 'generates'. |
18546 | The pleasure taken in beauty also aims at understanding and valuing [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Like the pleasure in friendship, the pleasure in beauty is curious: it aims to understand its object, and to value what it finds. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 1) | |
A reaction: At least he is trying to pin down the way in which aesthetic pleasure is phenomenologically different from other kinds of pleasure. |
18550 | Art gives us imaginary worlds which we can view impartially [Scruton] |
Full Idea: One aim of art is to present imaginary worlds, towards which we can adopt, as part of the integral aesthetic attitude, a posture of impartial concern. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 5) | |
A reaction: It connects to the pleasure of watching people when they don't know they are being watched (such as watching the street from a restaurant window). Scruton's suggestion makes art resemble examples in philosophy. Cf the Frege-Geach problem in ethics. |
18544 | Maybe 'beauty' is too loaded, and we should talk of fittingness or harmony [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Maybe we can understand the 'beauty' of a building better if we describe it in another and less loaded way, as a form of fittingness or harmony. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 1) | |
A reaction: Almost everyone accepts the word 'beauty' for some things, such as a beautiful face, or goal, or steak. I remember a female interviewer writing that, reluctantly, the only appropriate word she could find for Nureyev's face was 'beautiful'. |
18553 | Beauty shows us what we should want in order to achieve human fulfilment [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Beauty speaks to us of human fulfilment: not of things that we want, but of things that we ought to want, because human nature requires them. Such, at least, is my belief. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 7) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure how this works with a beautiful natural landscape. And what should I see that I ought to desire after viewing a great Rembrandt self-portrait? That I don't want to end up looking as bleak as that? Hm. Lofty words. |
18556 | Beauty is rationally founded, inviting meaning, comparison and self-reflection [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Beauty is rationally founded; it challenges us to find meaning in its object, to make critical comparisons, and to examine our own lives and emotions in the light of what we find. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 9) | |
A reaction: This is the Kantian tradition, and I'm not finding it very persuasive. It seems to place the value of beauty in what we do with it afterwards, and he seems to make beauty a necessary stepping stone to virtue. I see beauty as more sui generis. |
18548 | Natural beauty reassures us that the world is where we belong [Scruton] |
Full Idea: The experience of natural beauty is not a sense of 'how nice!' or 'how pleasant!' It contains a reassurance that this world is a right and fitting place to be - a home in which our human powers and prospects find confirmation. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 2) | |
A reaction: To call it a 'reassurance' and 'confirmation' sounds like theism, anthropomorphism, or the pathetic fallacy. That said, this is certainly a heart-warming idea, and hence must contain a grain of truth. |
18551 | Croce says art makes inarticulate intuitions conscious; rival views say the audience is the main concern [Scruton] |
Full Idea: The Croce model is of an inarticulate inner state (an 'intuition') becoming articulate and conscious through artistic expression. The rival model is fitting thing together so as to create links which resonate in the audience's feelings. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 5) | |
A reaction: The first model tells you nothing about how the artist imagines the audience reacting. The second model tells you nothing about what matters personally to the artist. A good theory must do both! |
18541 | Beauty (unlike truth and goodness) is questionable as an ultimate value [Scruton] |
Full Idea: The status of beauty as an ultimate value is questionable, in the way that the status of truth and goodness are not. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 1) | |
A reaction: We suspect that a love of beauty may be a bit parochial, where it is hard to conceive of living creatures anywhere in the cosmos who don't value the other two. |
18554 | Prostitution is wrong because it hardens the soul, since soul and body are one [Scruton] |
Full Idea: The condemnation of prostitution was not just puritan bigotry; it was a recognition of a profound truth, that you and your body are not two things but one, and by selling the body you harden your soul. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 7) | |
A reaction: No one, I imagine, who condones or even enthuses about prostitution would hope that their own daughter followed the profession, so there is something wrong with it. But must an enthusiastic and cheerful prostitute necessarily have a hard soul? |