Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Freedom and Action' and 'The Idea of the Brain'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined

23367	Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
	Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
	From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
	A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain

23226	There is a single mouse neuron which has 862 inputs and 626 outputs [Cobb]
	Full Idea: Researchers have recently described a single inhibitory neuron in a region called the visual thalamus of the mouse - it has 862 input synapses and 626 output synapses.
	From: Matthew Cobb (The Idea of the Brain [2020], 11)
	A reaction: This is the kind of fact which philosophers of mind must be aware of when offering accounts of thought which are in danger of being simplistic.

23216	The brain is not passive, and merely processing inputs; it is active, and intervenes in the world [Cobb]
	Full Idea: A number of scientists are now realising that, by viewing the brain as a computer that passively responds ot inputs and processes data, we forget that it is an active organ, part of the body intervening in the world.
	From: Matthew Cobb (The Idea of the Brain [2020], Intro)
	A reaction: I like any idea which reminds us that nature is intrinsically active, and not merely passive. Laws are in nature, not imposed on it. My preferred ontology, based on powers as fundamental, applies to the brain, as well as to physics. No free will needed.

20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory

20062	If a desire leads to a satisfactory result by an odd route, the causal theory looks wrong [Chisholm]
	Full Idea: If someone wants to kill his uncle to inherit a fortune, and having this desire makes him so agitated that he loses control of his car and kills a pedestrian, who turns out to be his uncle, the conditions of the causal theory seem to be satisfied.
	From: Roderick Chisholm (Freedom and Action [1966]), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 6 'Deviant'
	A reaction: This line of argument has undermined all sorts of causal theories that were fashionable in the 1960s and 70s. Explanation should lead to understanding, but a deviant causal chain doesn't explain the outcome. The causal theory can be tightened.

20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation

20054	There has to be a brain event which is not caused by another event, but by the agent [Chisholm]
	Full Idea: There must be some event A, presumably some cerebral event, which is not caused by any other event, but by the agent.
	From: Roderick Chisholm (Freedom and Action [1966], p.20), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 4 'Agent'
	A reaction: I'm afraid this thought strikes me as quaintly ridiculous. What kind of metaphysics can allow causation outside the natural nexus, yet occuring within the physical brain? This is a relic of religious dualism. Let it go.