Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Freedom and Action' and 'Entity and Identity'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined

23367	Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
	Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
	From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
	A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta

16980	We need a logical use of 'object' as predicate-worthy, and an 'ontological' use [Strawson,P]
	Full Idea: There is a good case for a conservative reform of the word 'object'. Objects in the 'logical' sense would be all predicate-worthy identifiabilia whatever. Objects in the 'ontological' sense would form one ontological category among many others.
	From: Peter F. Strawson (Entity and Identity [1978], I n4)
	A reaction: This ambiguity has caused me no end of confusion (and irritation!). I wish philosophers wouldn't hijack perfectly good English words and give them weird meanings. Nice to have a distinguished fellow like Strawson make this suggestion.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences

16979	It makes no sense to ask of some individual thing what it is that makes it that individual [Strawson,P]
	Full Idea: For no object is there a unique character or relation by which it must be identified if it is to be identified at all. This is why it makes no sense to ask, impersonally and in general, of some individual object what makes it the individual object it is.
	From: Peter F. Strawson (Entity and Identity [1978], I)
	A reaction: He links this remark with the claim that there is no individual essence, but he seems to view an individual essence as indispensable to recognition or individuation of the object, which I don't see. Recognise it first, work out its essence later.

20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory

20062	If a desire leads to a satisfactory result by an odd route, the causal theory looks wrong [Chisholm]
	Full Idea: If someone wants to kill his uncle to inherit a fortune, and having this desire makes him so agitated that he loses control of his car and kills a pedestrian, who turns out to be his uncle, the conditions of the causal theory seem to be satisfied.
	From: Roderick Chisholm (Freedom and Action [1966]), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 6 'Deviant'
	A reaction: This line of argument has undermined all sorts of causal theories that were fashionable in the 1960s and 70s. Explanation should lead to understanding, but a deviant causal chain doesn't explain the outcome. The causal theory can be tightened.

20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation

20054	There has to be a brain event which is not caused by another event, but by the agent [Chisholm]
	Full Idea: There must be some event A, presumably some cerebral event, which is not caused by any other event, but by the agent.
	From: Roderick Chisholm (Freedom and Action [1966], p.20), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 4 'Agent'
	A reaction: I'm afraid this thought strikes me as quaintly ridiculous. What kind of metaphysics can allow causation outside the natural nexus, yet occuring within the physical brain? This is a relic of religious dualism. Let it go.