7 ideas
| 23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
| From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
| A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
| 10496 | Monothetic categories have fixed defining features, and polythetic categories do not [Ellen] |
| Full Idea: Many categories are 'monothetic' (the defining set of features is always unique), and others are 'polythetic' (single features being neither essential to group membership nor sufficient to allocate an item to a group). | |
| From: Roy Ellen (Anthropological Studies of Classification [1996], p.33) | |
| A reaction: This seems a rather important distinction which hasn't made its way into philosophy, where there is a horrible tendency to oversimplify, with the dream of a neat and unified picture. But see Goodman's 'Imperfect Community' problem (Idea 7957). |
| 10497 | In symbolic classification, the categories are linked to rules [Ellen] |
| Full Idea: Symbolic classification occurs when we use some things as a means of saying something about other things. ..They enhance the significance of some categories, so that categories imply rules and rules imply categories. | |
| From: Roy Ellen (Anthropological Studies of Classification [1996], p.35) | |
| A reaction: I'm afraid the anthropologists seem to have more of interest to say about categories than philosophers do. Though maybe we couldn't do anthropology if philosophers had made us more self-conscious about categories. Teamwork! |
| 10495 | Continuous experience sometimes needs imposition of boundaries to create categories [Ellen] |
| Full Idea: Because parts of our experience of the world are complexly continuous, it is occasionally necessary to impose boundaries to produce categories at all. | |
| From: Roy Ellen (Anthropological Studies of Classification [1996], p.33) | |
| A reaction: I like it. Ellen says that people tend to universally cut nature somewhere around the joints, but we can't cope with large things, so the sea tends to be labelled in sections, even though most of the world's seas are continuous. |
| 14286 | In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false [Stalnaker] |
| Full Idea: Consider a possible world in which A is true and otherwise differs minimally from the actual world. 'If A, then B' is true (false) just in case B is true (false) in that possible world. | |
| From: Robert C. Stalnaker (A Theory of Conditionals [1968], p.34), quoted by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 4.1 | |
| A reaction: This is the first proposal to give a possible worlds semantics for conditional statements. Edgington observes that worlds which are nearby for me may not be nearby for you. |
| 14285 | A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs [Stalnaker] |
| Full Idea: A possible world is the ontological analogue of a stock of hypothetical beliefs. | |
| From: Robert C. Stalnaker (A Theory of Conditionals [1968], p.34), quoted by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 4.1 | |
| A reaction: Sounds neat and persuasive. What is the ontological analogue of a stock of hopes? Heaven! |
| 10498 | Classification is no longer held to be rooted in social institutions [Ellen] |
| Full Idea: The view that all classification finds its roots in social institutions is now generally considered untenable. | |
| From: Roy Ellen (Anthropological Studies of Classification [1996], p.36) | |
| A reaction: And about time too. Ellen (an anthropologist) inevitably emphasises the complexity of the situation, but endorses the idea that people everywhere largely cut nature at the joints. |