Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Dispositional Modality' and 'On Certainty'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
23367 Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
     From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
     A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
17535 Dispositionality has its own distinctive type of modality [Mumford/Anjum]
     Full Idea: We contend that dispositionality involves a non-alethic, sui generis, irreducible modality.
     From: S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum (Dispositional Modality [2011], 1)
     A reaction: This is a lovely bold proposal, and seems to be supported by Werner Heisenberg, in Idea 17534.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
3597 Foundations need not precede other beliefs [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (On Certainty [1951], §152), quoted by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch.14
     A reaction: A nice metaphor for the way in which axioms are derived. It is also close to Quine's metaphor of the 'net' of understanding, with the centre area 'standing fast'. Not neat and tidy, though.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
3596 Total doubt can't even get started [Wittgenstein, by Williams,M]
     Full Idea: Wittgenstein remarked that if you tried to doubt everything, you would not get as far as doubting anything.
     From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (On Certainty [1951]) by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch.14
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
4721 If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (On Certainty [1951], §114)
     A reaction: A wonderfully challenging aphorism. I suspect that it is true, but not really a problem. We all know the meaning of 'Loch Ness Monster', as long as we don't get too fussy. And for local objects I am happy that I know the facts.