Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Mathematics: Form and Function' and 'Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus''

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3 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
     From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
     A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Aristotelian logic cannot express 'Everyone loves someone' [White,RM]
     Full Idea: There is no way within Aristotelian logic that you can give a proper expression for the logical form of such a proposition as 'Everyone loves someone'.
     From: Roger M. White (Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus' [2006], 1 'Frege')
     A reaction: This needs a combination of two different quantifiers.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
ZFC could contain a contradiction, and it can never prove its own consistency [MacLane]
     Full Idea: We have at hand no proof that the axioms of ZFC for set theory will never yield a contradiction, while Gödel's second theorem tells us that such a consistency proof cannot be conducted within ZFC.
     From: Saunders MacLane (Mathematics: Form and Function [1986], p.406), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics
     A reaction: Maddy quotes this, while defending set theory as the foundation of mathematics, but it clearly isn't the most secure foundation that could be devised. She says the benefits of set theory do not need guaranteed consistency (p.30).