16 ideas
| 23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
| From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
| A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
| 22752 | Reasoning is impossible without a preconception [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: It is not possible either to seek or to doubt without a preconception. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Ethicists (one book) [c.180], II.22) | |
| A reaction: [Sextus quotes this from 'the sapient Epicurus'] I think this may be a message across the centuries to Hegel, who attempted this impossible feat. My picture of philosophy is a continual shift of the preconceptions, to explore thoroughly. |
| 13030 | Extensionality: ∀x ∀y (∀z (z ∈ x ↔ z ∈ y) → x = y) [Kunen] |
| Full Idea: Axiom of Extensionality: ∀x ∀y (∀z (z ∈ x ↔ z ∈ y) → x = y). That is, a set is determined by its members. If every z in one set is also in the other set, then the two sets are the same. | |
| From: Kenneth Kunen (Set Theory [1980], §1.5) |
| 13032 | Pairing: ∀x ∀y ∃z (x ∈ z ∧ y ∈ z) [Kunen] |
| Full Idea: Axiom of Pairing: ∀x ∀y ∃z (x ∈ z ∧ y ∈ z). Any pair of entities must form a set. | |
| From: Kenneth Kunen (Set Theory [1980], §1.6) | |
| A reaction: Repeated applications of this can build the hierarchy of sets. |
| 13033 | Union: ∀F ∃A ∀Y ∀x (x ∈ Y ∧ Y ∈ F → x ∈ A) [Kunen] |
| Full Idea: Axiom of Union: ∀F ∃A ∀Y ∀x (x ∈ Y ∧ Y ∈ F → x ∈ A). That is, the union of a set (all the members of the members of the set) must also be a set. | |
| From: Kenneth Kunen (Set Theory [1980], §1.6) |
| 13037 | Infinity: ∃x (0 ∈ x ∧ ∀y ∈ x (S(y) ∈ x) [Kunen] |
| Full Idea: Axiom of Infinity: ∃x (0 ∈ x ∧ ∀y ∈ x (S(y) ∈ x). That is, there is a set which contains zero and all of its successors, hence all the natural numbers. The principal of induction rests on this axiom. | |
| From: Kenneth Kunen (Set Theory [1980], §1.7) |
| 13038 | Power Set: ∀x ∃y ∀z(z ⊂ x → z ∈ y) [Kunen] |
| Full Idea: Power Set Axiom: ∀x ∃y ∀z(z ⊂ x → z ∈ y). That is, there is a set y which contains all of the subsets of a given set. Hence we define P(x) = {z : z ⊂ x}. | |
| From: Kenneth Kunen (Set Theory [1980], §1.10) |
| 13034 | Replacement: ∀x∈A ∃!y φ(x,y) → ∃Y ∀X∈A ∃y∈Y φ(x,y) [Kunen] |
| Full Idea: Axiom of Replacement Scheme: ∀x ∈ A ∃!y φ(x,y) → ∃Y ∀X ∈ A ∃y ∈ Y φ(x,y). That is, any function from a set A will produce another set Y. | |
| From: Kenneth Kunen (Set Theory [1980], §1.6) |
| 13039 | Foundation:∀x(∃y(y∈x) → ∃y(y∈x ∧ ¬∃z(z∈x ∧ z∈y))) [Kunen] |
| Full Idea: Axiom of Foundation: ∀x (∃y(y ∈ x) → ∃y(y ∈ x ∧ ¬∃z(z ∈ x ∧ z ∈ y))). Aka the 'Axiom of Regularity'. Combined with Choice, it means there are no downward infinite chains. | |
| From: Kenneth Kunen (Set Theory [1980], §3.4) |
| 13036 | Choice: ∀A ∃R (R well-orders A) [Kunen] |
| Full Idea: Axiom of Choice: ∀A ∃R (R well-orders A). That is, for every set, there must exist another set which imposes a well-ordering on it. There are many equivalent versions. It is not needed in elementary parts of set theory. | |
| From: Kenneth Kunen (Set Theory [1980], §1.6) |
| 13029 | Set Existence: ∃x (x = x) [Kunen] |
| Full Idea: Axiom of Set Existence: ∃x (x = x). This says our universe is non-void. Under most developments of formal logic, this is derivable from the logical axioms and thus redundant, but we do so for emphasis. | |
| From: Kenneth Kunen (Set Theory [1980], §1.5) |
| 13031 | Comprehension: ∃y ∀x (x ∈ y ↔ x ∈ z ∧ φ) [Kunen] |
| Full Idea: Comprehension Scheme: for each formula φ without y free, the universal closure of this is an axiom: ∃y ∀x (x ∈ y ↔ x ∈ z ∧ φ). That is, there must be a set y if it can be defined by the formula φ. | |
| From: Kenneth Kunen (Set Theory [1980], §1.5) | |
| A reaction: Unrestricted comprehension leads to Russell's paradox, so restricting it in some way (e.g. by the Axiom of Specification) is essential. |
| 13040 | Constructibility: V = L (all sets are constructible) [Kunen] |
| Full Idea: Axiom of Constructability: this is the statement V = L (i.e. ∀x ∃α(x ∈ L(α)). That is, the universe of well-founded von Neumann sets is the same as the universe of sets which are actually constructible. A possible axiom. | |
| From: Kenneth Kunen (Set Theory [1980], §6.3) |
| 22754 | Saying the good is useful or choiceworth or happiness-creating is not the good, but a feature of it [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Asserting that the good is 'the useful', or 'what is choiceworthy for its own sake', or 'that which contributes to happiness', does not teach us what good is but states its accidental property. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Ethicists (one book) [c.180], II.35) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a pretty accurate statement of Moore's famous Open Question argument. I read it in an Aristotelian way - that that quest is always for the essential nature of the thing itself, not for its role or function or use. |
| 22755 | Like a warming fire, what is good by nature should be good for everyone [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Just as fire which is warmth-giving by nature warms all men, and does not chill some of them, so what is good by nature ought to be good for all, and not good for some but not good for others. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Ethicists (one book) [c.180], II.69) | |
| A reaction: This is going to confine the naturally good to the basics of life, which we all share. Is a love of chess a natural good? It seems to capture an aspect of human nature, without appealing to everyone. Sextus says nothing is good for everyone. |
| 22756 | If a desire is itself desirable, then we shouldn't desire it, as achieving it destroys it [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: If the desire for wealth or health is desirable, we ought not to purse wealth or health, lest by acquiring them we cease to desire them any longer. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Ethicists (one book) [c.180], II.81) | |
| A reaction: He is investigating whether desires can be desirable, and if so which ones. Roots of this are in Plato's 'Gorgias' on drinking water. Similar to 'if compassion is the highest good then we need lots of suffering'. Desire must be a means, not an end. |