Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Repetition' and 'De Natura Corporis'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
     From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
     A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
Subjective truth can only be sustained by repetition [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
     Full Idea: If subjective truth is to be more than momentary, it has to be repeated continually.
     From: report of Søren Kierkegaard (Repetition [1843]) by Clare Carlisle - Kierkegaard: a guide for the perplexed 4
     A reaction: This might apply to more traditional concepts of truth, if they are to be part of life, rather than remaining in books.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
As well as extension, bodies contain powers [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Over and above what can be deduced from extension, we must add and recognise in bodies certain notions or forms that are immaterial, so to speak, or independent of extension, which you can call powers [potentia], by which speed is adjusted to magnitude.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (De Natura Corporis [1678], A6.4.1980), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3
     A reaction: He boldly asserts that the powers are 'immaterial', but is then forced to qualify it (as he often does) with 'so to speak'. The notion that bodies just have extension (occupy space) comes from Descartes, and is firmly opposed by Leibniz.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 8. Eternal Recurrence
Life is a repetition when what has been now becomes [Kierkegaard]
     Full Idea: When one says that life is a repetition one affirms that existence which has been now becomes.
     From: Søren Kierkegaard (Repetition [1843], p.49), quoted by Clare Carlisle - Kierkegaard: a guide for the perplexed 4
     A reaction: Not sure I understand this, but it seems very close to Nietzsche's Eternal Recurrence.