4 ideas
| 23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
| From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
| A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
| 18086 | Weierstrass eliminated talk of infinitesimals [Weierstrass, by Kitcher] |
| Full Idea: Weierstrass effectively eliminated the infinitesimalist language of his predecessors. | |
| From: report of Karl Weierstrass (works [1855]) by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 10.6 |
| 18092 | Weierstrass made limits central, but the existence of limits still needed to be proved [Weierstrass, by Bostock] |
| Full Idea: After Weierstrass had stressed the importance of limits, one now needed to be able to prove the existence of such limits. | |
| From: report of Karl Weierstrass (works [1855]) by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 4.4 | |
| A reaction: The solution to this is found in work on series (going back to Cauchy), and on Dedekind's cuts. |
| 16002 | The self is a combination of pairs of attributes: freedom/necessity, infinite/finite, temporal/eternal [Kierkegaard] |
| Full Idea: A human being is essentially spirit, but what is spirit? Spirit is to be a self. But what is the Self? In short, it is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity. | |
| From: Søren Kierkegaard (Sickness unto Death [1849], p.59) | |
| A reaction: The dense language of his first paragraph was to poke fun at fashionable Hegelian writing. The book gets very lucid afterwards! [SY] |