Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Go Figure: a Path through Fictionalism' and 'Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity'

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined

23367	Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
	Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
	From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
	A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding

17304	As causation links across time, grounding links the world across levels [Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: Grounding is something like metaphysical causation. Just as causation links the world across time, grounding links the world across levels. Grounding connects the more fundamental to the less fundamental, and thereby backs a certain form of explanation.
	From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], Intro)
	A reaction: Obviously you need 'levels' for this, which we should take to be structural levels.

17306	If ground is transitive and irreflexive, it has a strict partial ordering, giving structure [Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: By treating grounding as transitive (and irreflexive), one generates a strict partial ordering that induces metaphysical structure.
	From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], Intro)
	A reaction: Schaffer's paper goes on to attach the claim that grounding is transitive, but I didn't find his examples very convincing.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism

19494	Fictionalism allows that simulated beliefs may be tracking real facts [Yablo]
	Full Idea: The fictionalist offers the option that your simulated beliefs and assertions may be tracking a realm of genuine facts, or a realm of what you take to be facts.
	From: Stephen Yablo (Go Figure: a Path through Fictionalism [2001], 13)
	A reaction: This means that fictionalism does not have to be an error theory. That is, we aren't mistakenly believing something that we actually made up. Instead we are sensibly believing something we know to be not literally true. Love it.

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions

19493	Governing possible worlds theory is the fiction that if something is possible, it happens in a world [Yablo]
	Full Idea: The governing fiction of possible worlds theory says that whenever something is possible, there is a world where it happens.
	From: Stephen Yablo (Go Figure: a Path through Fictionalism [2001], 05)
	A reaction: This sounds like the only sensible attitude to possible worlds I can think of.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / b. Contrastive explanations

17308	Explaining 'Adam ate the apple' depends on emphasis, and thus implies a contrast [Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: Explaining why ADAM ate the apple is a different matter from explaining why he ATE the apple, and from why he ate THE APPLE. ...In my view the best explanations incorporate ....contrastive information.
	From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], 4.3.1)
	A reaction: But why are the contrasts Eve, or throwing it, or a pear? It occurs to me that this is wrong! The contrast is with anything else which could have gone in subject, verb or object position. It is a matter of categories, not of contrasts.

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature

17305	I take what is fundamental to be the whole spatiotemporal manifold and its fields [Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: I myself would prefer to speak of what is fundamental in terms of the whole spatiotemporal manifold and the fields that permeate it, with parts counting as derivative of the whole.
	From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], 4.1.1)
	A reaction: Not quite the Parmenidean One, since it has parts, but a nice try at updating the great man. Note the reference to 'fields', suggesting that this view is grounded in the physics rather than metaphysics. How many fields has it got?

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation

17307	Nowadays causation is usually understood in terms of equations and variable ranges [Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: The leading treatments of causation work within 'structural equation models', with events represented via variables each of which is allotted a range of permitted values, which constitute a 'contrast space'.
	From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], 4.3.1)
	A reaction: Like Woodward's idea that causation is a graph, this seems to be a matter of plotting or formalising correlations between activities, which is a very Humean approach to causation.