14 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Stalnaker holds that there could have been people who do not actually exist, but he denies that there are things that could have been those people. That is, he denies the unrestricted validity of the Barcan Formula. | |
From: report of Robert C. Stalnaker (Counterparts and Identity [1987]) by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 6.2 | |
A reaction: And quite right too, I should have thought. As they say, Jack Kennedy and Marilyn Monroe might have had a child, but the idea that we should accept some entity which might have been that child but wasn't sounds like nonsense. Except as fiction….. |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: I defend a version of counterpart theory that is quite different from Lewis's version, as it is tied to actualism (all that exists is part of the actual world) rather than possibilism (possible things may exist without actually existing). | |
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Counterparts and Identity [1987], 1) | |
A reaction: This could be the theory I am after. I am sympathetic to both actualism and to counterpart theory. Off to the woodshed…. |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: Nothing can be in two places at once. If other possible worlds are really other universes, then clearly, you and I cannot be in them if we are here in this one. | |
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Counterparts and Identity [1987], 2) | |
A reaction: This can be sensibly expressed without possible worlds. I can't embody my other possibilities while I am embodying this one (I'm too busy). Insofar as possible worlds are a good framework, they are just a precise map of common sense. |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: Counterparts involve the thesis that domains of different possible worlds are disjoint: possible individuals exist in at most one possible world. This seems to suggest extreme essentialism, where nothing could differ from how it is. | |
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Counterparts and Identity [1987], 2) | |
A reaction: He quotes Salmon (1981:236) as saying counterpart theory is particularly inflexible essentialism. This is a long way from my use of 'essentialism'. The problem is just the extent to which my counterpart is 'the same' as me. |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: Semantic values in extensional semantics are extensions, like individuals for terms, and sets for predicates. In modal semantics we have intensions, functions from worlds to appropriate extensions. | |
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Counterparts and Identity [1987], 2) | |
A reaction: It seems obvious that the meaning of a word like 'giraffe' must include possible giraffes, as well as actual and deceased giraffes. |
3282 | The general form of moral reasoning is putting yourself in other people's shoes [Nagel] |
Full Idea: I believe the general form of moral reasoning is to put yourself in other people's shoes. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §9) |
3278 | An egalitarian system must give priority to those with the worst prospects in life [Nagel] |
Full Idea: What makes a system egalitarian is the priority it gives to the claims of those whose overall life prospects put them at the bottom. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §6) |
3275 | Equality was once opposed to aristocracy, but now it opposes public utility and individual rights [Nagel] |
Full Idea: Egalitarianism was once opposed to aristocratic values, but now it is opposed by adherents of two non-aristocratic values: utility (increase benefit, even if unequally) and individual rights (which redistribution violates). | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §2) |
3281 | The ideal of acceptability to each individual underlies the appeal to equality [Nagel] |
Full Idea: The ideal of acceptability to each individual underlies the appeal to equality. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §8) |
3277 | In judging disputes, should we use one standard, or those of each individual? [Nagel] |
Full Idea: In assessing equality of claims, it must be decided whether to use a single, objective standard, or whether interests should be ranked by the person's own estimation. Also should they balance momentary or long-term needs? | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §6) |
3274 | Equality can either be defended as good for society, or as good for individual rights [Nagel] |
Full Idea: The communitarian defence of equality says it is good for society as a whole, whereas the individualistic defence defends equality as a correct distributive principle. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §2) |
3273 | Equality nowadays is seen as political, social, legal and economic [Nagel] |
Full Idea: Contemporary political debate recognises four types of equality: political, social, legal and economic. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §1) | |
A reaction: Meaning equality of 1) power and influence, 2) status and respect, 3) rights and justice, 4) wealth. |
3276 | A morality of rights is very minimal, leaving a lot of human life without restrictions or duties [Nagel] |
Full Idea: The morality of rights tends to be a limited, even minimal, morality. It leaves a great deal of human life ungoverned by moral restrictions or requirements. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §5) |