4 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
9184 | We can't presume that all interesting concepts can be analysed [Williamson] |
Full Idea: We have no prior reason to suppose that philosophically significant concepts have interesting analyses into necessary and sufficient conditions. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Review of Bob Hale's 'Abstract Objects' [1988]) | |
A reaction: We might think that they are either analysable or primitive, and that failure of analysis invites us to take a concept as primitive. But maybe God can analyse it and we can't. |
9183 | Platonism claims that some true assertions have singular terms denoting abstractions, so abstractions exist [Williamson] |
Full Idea: The Fregean argument for platonism is that some true assertions contain singular terms which denote abstract objects if they denote anything; since the assertions are true, the singular terms denote. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Review of Bob Hale's 'Abstract Objects' [1988]) | |
A reaction: I am perplexed that anyone would rest their view of reality on such an argument. The obvious comparison would be with true remarks about blatantly fictional characters, or blatantly invented concepts such as 'checkmate'. |
6386 | In no important way can psychology be reduced to the physical sciences [Davidson] |
Full Idea: There is no important sense in which psychology can be reduced to the physical sciences. | |
From: Donald Davidson (The Material Mind [1973], p.259) | |
A reaction: In no 'important' way can the beauty of the Lake District be reduced to geology - but it is geology. 'Important' to whom? To a metaphysician, I would say psychology does reduce to physics, and that is important, but it is not important to a psychologist. |