14 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
15842 | An ad hominem refutation is reasonable, if it uses the opponent's assumptions [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: Judicious use of an opponent's assumptions is quite capable of producing a perfectly reasonable ad hominem refutation of the opponent's thesis. | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.6) |
15841 | Mereology began as a nominalist revolt against the commitments of set theory [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: Historically, the evolution of mereology was associated with the desire to find alternatives to set theory for those with nomimalist qualms about the commitment to abstract objects like sets. | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.2) | |
A reaction: Goodman, for example. It is interesting to note that the hardline nominalist Quine, pal of Goodman, eventually accepted set theory. It is difficult to account for things by merely naming their parts. |
15858 | Traditionally, the four elements are just what persists through change [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: Earth, air, fire and water, viewed as elements, are, by tradition, the leading candidates for being the things that persist through change. | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 4.4) | |
A reaction: Physics still offers us things that persist through change, as conservation laws. |
15848 | Mereology treats constitution as a criterion of identity, as shown in the axiom of extensionality [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: Mereologists do suppose that constitution is a criterion of identity. This view is enshrined in the Mereological axiom of extensionality; that objects with the same parts are identical. | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 3.1) | |
A reaction: A helpful explanation of why classical mereology is a very confused view of the world. It is at least obvious that a long wall and a house are different things, even if built of identical bricks. |
15837 | What exactly is a 'sum', and what exactly is 'composition'? [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: The difficulty with the claim that a whole is (just) the sum of its parts is what are we to understand by 'the sum'? ...If we say wholes are 'composites' of parts, how are we to understand the relation of composition? | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.1) |
15839 | If something is 'more than' the sum of its parts, is the extra thing another part, or not? [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: Holism inherits all the difficulties associated with the term 'sum' and adds one of its own, when it says a whole is 'more than' the sum of its parts. This seems to say it has something extra? Is this something extra a part? | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Most people take the claim that a thing is more than the sum of its parts as metaphorical, I would think (except perhaps emergentists about the mind, and they are wrong). |
15838 | The problem with the term 'sum' is that it is singular [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: For my money, the real problem with the term 'sum' is that it is singular. | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Her point is that the surface grammar makes you accept a unity here, with no account of what unifies it, or even whether there is a unity. Does classical mereology have a concept (as the rest of us do) of 'disunity'? |
411 | If we succeed in speaking the truth, we cannot know we have done it [Xenophanes] |
Full Idea: No man has seen certain truth, and no man will ever know about the gods and other things I mentioned; for if he succeeds in saying what is fully true, he himself is unaware of it; opinion is fixed by fate on all things. | |
From: Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE], B34), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 7.49.4 |
412 | If God had not created honey, men would say figs are sweeter [Xenophanes] |
Full Idea: If God had not created yellow honey, men would say that figs were sweeter. | |
From: Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE], B38), quoted by Herodian - On Peculiar Speech 41.5 |
1640 | The basic Eleatic belief was that all things are one [Xenophanes, by Plato] |
Full Idea: The Eleatic tribe, which had its beginnings from Xenophanes and still earlier, proceed on the grounds that all things so-called are one. | |
From: report of Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE]) by Plato - The Sophist 242d |
3055 | Xenophanes said the essence of God was spherical and utterly inhuman [Xenophanes, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Xenophanes taught that the essence of God was of a spherical form, in no respect resembling man. | |
From: report of Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.2.3 |
408 | Ethiopian gods have black hair, and Thracian gods have red hair [Xenophanes] |
Full Idea: Ethiopians have gods with snub noses and black hair, Thracians have gods with grey eyes and red hair. | |
From: Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE], B16), quoted by Clement - Miscellanies 7.22.1 |
407 | Mortals believe gods are born, and have voices and clothes just like mortals [Xenophanes] |
Full Idea: Mortals believe the gods to be created by birth, and to have raiment, voice and body like mortals'. | |
From: Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE], B14), quoted by Clement - Miscellanies 5.109.2 |