5 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
9117 | The smallest heap has four objects: three on the bottom, one on the top [Hart,WD, by Sorensen] |
Full Idea: Hart argues that the smallest heap consists of four objects: three on the bottom, one on the top. | |
From: report of William D. Hart (Hat-Tricks and Heaps [1992]) by Roy Sorensen - Vagueness and Contradiction Intro | |
A reaction: If the objects were rough bolders, you could get away with two on the bottom. He's wrong. No one would accept as a 'heap' four minute grains barely visible to the naked eye. No one would describe such a group of items in a supermarket as a heap. |
1394 | Can the mental elements of a 'bundle' exist on their own? [Carruthers] |
Full Idea: If the mind is merely a bundle of states and events, it must be logically possible for the various elements of the bundle to exist on their own. | |
From: Peter Carruthers (Introducing Persons [1986], 2.iii (A)) | |
A reaction: Depends how literally you take the bundle metaphor, and how much you are worried about 'logical' possibility (which only seems to mean imaginable). The answers to these questions do not have to be all-or-nothing. |
1395 | Why would a thought be a member of one bundle rather than another? [Carruthers] |
Full Idea: What makes it true that a particular thought or experience is a member of one bundle rather than another? | |
From: Peter Carruthers (Introducing Persons [1986], 2.iii (B)) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure if you can answer this nice question without mentioning values. The mental events in are in my bundle because they matter to me (because they are related to my body, for which I am responsible). Compare picking my possessions out of a pile. |
1396 | We identify persons before identifying conscious states [Carruthers] |
Full Idea: We can have no conception of the particularity of conscious states prior to, and independently of, a conception of a particularity of persons. | |
From: Peter Carruthers (Introducing Persons [1986], 2.iii (C)) | |
A reaction: agrees with Butler |