65 ideas
23350 | A wise philosophers uses reason to cautiously judge each aspect of living [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: The sinews of a philosopher are desire that never fails in its achievement; aversion that never meets with what it would avoid; appropriate impulse; carefully considered purpose; and assent that is never precipitate. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.08.29) | |
A reaction: This is a very individual view of wisdom and the philosopher, whereas wisdom is often thought to have a social role. Is it not important for a philosopher to at least offer advice? |
23355 | The task of philosophy is to establish standards, as occurs with weights and measures [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Things are judged and weighed, when we have the standards ready. This is the task of philosophy: to examine and establish the standards. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.11.24) | |
A reaction: It is interesting that this gives philosophers a very specific social role, and also that it seems to identify epistemology as First Philosophy. Other disciplines, of course, establish their own standards without reference to philosophy. |
21394 | Philosophy is knowing each logos, how they fit together, and what follows from them [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: [Philosophical speculation] consists in knowing the elements of 'logos', what each of them is like, how they fit together, and what follows from them. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 4.08.14), quoted by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 4.1 | |
A reaction: [Said to echo Zeno] If you substitute understanding for 'logos' (plausibly), I think this is exactly the view of philosophy I would subscribe to. We want to understand each aspect of life, and we want those understandings to cohere with one another. |
20876 | Philosophy investigates the causes of disagreements, and seeks a standard for settling them [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: The start of philosophy is perception of the mutual conflict among people, and a search for its cause, plus the rejection and distrust of mere opinion, an investigation to see if opinion is right, and the discovery of some canon, like scales for weighing. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.11.13) | |
A reaction: So the number one aim of philosophy is epistemological, to find the criterion for true opinion. But it starts in real life, and would cease to trade if people would just agree. I think we should set the bar higher than that. |
23344 | Reason itself must be compounded from some of our impressions [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: What is reason itself? Something compounded from impressions of a certain kind. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.20.05) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the only escape from the dead end attempts to rationally justify reason. Making reason a primitive absolute is crazy metaphysics. |
23343 | Because reason performs all analysis, we should analyse reason - but how? [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Since it is reason that analyses and completes all other things, reason itself should not be left unanalysed. But by what shall it be analysed? ..That is why philosophers put logic first, just as when measuring grain we first examine the measure. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.17.01) | |
A reaction: The problem of the definitive metre rule in Paris. I say we have to test reason against the physical world, and the measure of reason is truth. Something has to be primitive, but reason is too vague for that role. Idea 23344 agrees with me! |
18986 | Truth is just a name for verification-processes [James] |
Full Idea: Truth for us is simply a collective name for verification-processes, just as 'health' is a name for other processes in life. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 6) | |
A reaction: So the slogan is 'truth is success in belief'? Suicide and racist genocide can be 'successful'. I would have thought that truth was the end of a process, rather than the process itself. |
18983 | In many cases there is no obvious way in which ideas can agree with their object [James] |
Full Idea: When you speak of the 'time-keeping function' of a clock, it is hard to see exactly what your ideas can copy. ...Where our ideas cannot copy definitely their object, what does agreement with that object mean? | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 6) | |
A reaction: This is a very good criticism of the correspondence theory of truth. It looks a lovely theory when you can map components of a sentence (like 'the pen is in the drawer') onto components of reality - but it has to cover the hard cases. |
18972 | Ideas are true in so far as they co-ordinate our experiences [James] |
Full Idea: Pragmatists say that ideas (which themselves are but parts of our experience) become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 2) | |
A reaction: I'm struck by the close similarity (at least in James) of the pragmatic view of truth and the coherence theory of truth (associated later with Blanshard). Perhaps the coherence theory is one version of the pragmatic account |
18973 | New opinions count as 'true' if they are assimilated to an individual's current beliefs [James] |
Full Idea: A new opinion counts as 'true' just in proportion as it gratifies the individual's desire to assimilate the novel in his experience to his beliefs in stock. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 2) | |
A reaction: Note the tell-tale locution 'counts as' true, rather than 'is' true. The obvious problem is that someone with a big stock of foolish beliefs will 'count as' true some bad interpretation which is gratifyingly assimilated to their current confusions. |
18984 | True ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify (and false otherwise) [James] |
Full Idea: True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 6) | |
A reaction: The immediate question is why you should label something as 'false' simply on the grounds that you can't corroborate it. Proving the falsity is a stronger position than the ignorance James seems happy with. 'Assimilate' implies coherence. |
18987 | A 'thing' is simply carved out of reality for human purposes [James] |
Full Idea: What shall we call a 'thing' anyhow? It seems quite arbitrary, for we carve out everything, just as we carve out constellations, to suit our human purposes. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 7) | |
A reaction: James wrote just before the discovery of galaxies, which are much more obviously 'things' than constellations like the Plough are! This idea suggests a connection between pragmatism and the nihilist view of objects of Van Inwagen and co. |
18981 | 'Substance' is just a word for groupings and structures in experience [James] |
Full Idea: 'Substance' appears now only as another name for the fact that phenomena as they come are actually grouped and given in coherent forms. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 4) | |
A reaction: This is the strongly empirical strain in James's empiricism. This sounds like a David Lewis comment on the Humean mosaic of experience. We Aristotelians at least believe that the groups run much deeper than the surface of experience. |
23359 | We can't believe apparent falsehoods, or deny apparent truths [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: It is impossible to assent to an apparent falsehood, or to deny an apparent truth. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 3.07.15) | |
A reaction: The way some philosophers write you would think that most beliefs just result from private whims or social fashion. That happens, of course, but most beliefs result from direct contact with reality. |
18974 | Truth is a species of good, being whatever proves itself good in the way of belief [James] |
Full Idea: Truth is one species of good, and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from good, and co-ordinate with it. The true is whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 2) | |
A reaction: The trouble is that false optimism can often often be what is 'good in the way of belief'. That said, I think quite a good way to specify 'truth' is 'success in belief', but I mean intrinsically successful, not pragmatically successful. |
23356 | Self-evidence is most obvious when people who deny a proposition still have to use it [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: It is about the strongest proof one could offer of a proposition being evident, that even he who contradicts it finds himself having to make use of it. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.20.01) | |
A reaction: Philosophers sometimes make fools of themselves by trying, by the use of elaborate sophistry, to demolish propositions which are self-evidently true. Don't be one of these philosophers! |
18989 | Pragmatism accepts any hypothesis which has useful consequences [James] |
Full Idea: On pragmatic principles we cannot reject any hypothesis if consequences useful to life flow from it. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 8) | |
A reaction: Most governments seem to find lies more useful than the truth. Maybe most children are better off not knowing the truth about their parents. It might be disastrous to know the truth about what other people are thinking. Is 'useful but false' meaningful? |
18971 | Theories are practical tools for progress, not answers to enigmas [James] |
Full Idea: Theories are instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we can rest. We don't lie back upon them, we move forward, and, on occasion, make nature over again by their aid. Pragmatism unstiffens all our theories, limbers them up and sets each one to work. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 2) | |
A reaction: This follows his criticism of the quest for 'solving names' - big words that give bogus solutions to problems. James's view is not the same as 'instrumentalism', though he would probably sympathise with that view. The defines theories badly. |
18985 | True thoughts are just valuable instruments of action [James] |
Full Idea: The possession of true thoughts means everywhere the possession of invaluable instruments of action. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 6) | |
A reaction: It looks to me like we should distinguish 'active' and 'passive' instrumentalism. The passive version says there is no more to theories and truth than what instruments record. James's active version says truth is an instrument for doing things well. |
18982 | Pragmatism says all theories are instrumental - that is, mental modes of adaptation to reality [James] |
Full Idea: The pragmatist view is that all our theories are instrumental, are mental modes of adaptation to reality, rather than revelations or gnostic answers to some divinely instituted world enigma. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 5) | |
A reaction: This treats instrumentalism as the pragmatic idea of theories as what works (and nothing more), with, presumably, no interest in grasping something called 'reality'. Presumably instrumentalism might have other motivations - such as fun. |
23329 | We make progress when we improve and naturalise our choices, asserting their freedom [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Progress is when any of you turns to his own faculty of choice, working at it and perfecting it, so as to bring it fully into harmony with nature; elevated, free, unrestrained, unhindered, faithful, self-respecting. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.04.18) | |
A reaction: [See also Disc.3.5.7] Rationality is the stoic concept of being in 'harmony with nature'. It appears (from reading Frede) that this may be the FIRST EVER reference to free will. Note the very rhetorical way in which it is presented. |
23342 | Freedom is acting by choice, with no constraint possible [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: He is free for whom all things happen in accordance with his choice, and whom no one can constrain. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.12.09) | |
A reaction: Presumable this means that constraint is absolutely impossible, even by Zeus, and not just contingent possibility, when no one sees me raid the fridge. |
23330 | Freedom is making all things happen by choice, without constraint [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: He is free for whom all things happen in accordance with his choice, and whom no one can constrain. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.12.09) | |
A reaction: The idea of 'free' will seems to have resulted from a wide extension of the idea of constraint, with global determinism lurking in the background. |
23332 | Zeus gave me a nature which is free (like himself) from all compulsion [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Zeus placed my good nature in my own power, and gave it to me as he has it himself, free from all hindrance, compulsion and restraint. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 3.03.10) | |
A reaction: Although Frede traces the origin of free will to the centrality of choice in moral life (and hence to the elevation of its importance), this remark shows that there is a religious aspect to it. Zeus is supreme, and obviously has free will. |
23331 | Not even Zeus can control what I choose [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: You can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus himself can get the better of my choice. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.01.23) | |
A reaction: This is the beginnings of the idea of free will. It is based on the accurate observation that the intrinsic privacy of a mind means that no external force can be assured of controlling its actions. Epictetus failed to think of internal forces. |
23338 | You can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus can control my power of choice [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: What are you saying, man? Fetter me? You will fetter my leg; but not even Zeus himself can get the better of my choice. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.01.23) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the beginning of the idea of 'absolute' freedom, which is conjured up to preserve perfect inegrity and complete responsibility. Obviously you can be prevented from doing what you choose, so this is not compatibilism. |
20875 | If we could foresee the future, we should collaborate with disease and death [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: The philosophers are right to say that if the honorable and good person knew what was going to happen, he would even collaborate with disease, death and lameness. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.10.05) | |
A reaction: The 'philosophers' must be the earlier stoics, founders of his school. |
23347 | If I know I am fated to be ill, I should want to be ill [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: If I really knew that it was ordained for me to be ill at this moment, I would aspire to be so. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.06.10) | |
A reaction: The rub, of course, is that it is presumably impossible to know what is fated. Book 2.7 is on divination. I don't see any good in a mortally ill person desiring, for that reason alone, to die. Rage against the dying of the light, I say. |
18975 | We return to experience with concepts, where they show us differences [James] |
Full Idea: Concepts for the pragmatist are things to come back into experience with, things to make us look for differences. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 3) | |
A reaction: That's good. I like both halves of this. Experience gives us the concepts, but then we 'come back' into experience equipped with them. Presumably animals can look for differences, but concepts enhance that hugely. Know the names of the flowers. |
6387 | A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Whatever else it embraces, a theory of meaning must include an account of truth - a statement of the conditions under which an arbitrary sentence of the language is true. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Reality without Reference [1977], p.132) | |
A reaction: It is a moot point whether we can define meaning if we assume truth, or if we can define truth by assuming meaning. Tarski seems to presuppose meaning when he defines truth (Idea 2345). I like Davidson's taking of truth as basic. |
6391 | A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson] |
Full Idea: A theory of truth lets us answer the underlying question how communication by language is possible. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Reality without Reference [1977], p.137) | |
A reaction: If, instead, you explain communication by understood intentions (á la Grice), you have to say more about what sort of intentions are meant. If you use reference, you still have more to say about the meaning of sentences. Davidson looks good. |
6388 | Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The essential question is whether reference is the, or at least one, place where there is direct contact between linguistic theory and events, actions, or objects described in nonlinguistic terms. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Reality without Reference [1977], p.134) | |
A reaction: How do you 'describe objects in nonlinguistic terms'? The causal theory of reference (e.g. Idea 4957) is designed to plug language straight into the world via reference. It simplifies things nicely, but I don't quite believe it. |
6390 | With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson] |
Full Idea: I defend a version of the holistic approach, and urge that we must give up the concept of reference as basic to an empirical theory of language. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Reality without Reference [1977], p.136) | |
A reaction: He proposes to connect language to the world via the concept of truth, rather than of reference. It is a brilliant idea, and is the key issue in philosophy of language. I go back to animals, which seem to care about situations rather than things. |
6389 | To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson] |
Full Idea: It is inconceivable that one should be able to explain the relationship between 'Kilimanjiro' and Kilimanjiro without first explaining the role of the word in sentences; hence there is no chance of explaining reference directly in nonlinguistic terms. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Reality without Reference [1977], p.135) | |
A reaction: I point at the mountain, and a local says 'Kilimanjiro'? There is a 'gavagai'-type problem with that. The prior question might be 'what is it about this word that enables it to have a role in sentences?' Unlike whimpering or belching. |
23325 | Epictetus developed a notion of will as the source of our responsibility [Epictetus, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: The notion of will in Epictetus is clearly developed to pinpoint the source of our responsibility for our actions and to identify precisely what it is that makes them our own doings. | |
From: report of Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56]) by Michael Frede - A Free Will 3 | |
A reaction: So the key move is that responsibility needs a 'source', rather than being a generalisation about how our actions arise. The next step is demand an 'ultimate' source, and this leads to the idea that this new will is 'free'. This will can be good or bad. |
20873 | Tragedies are versified sufferings of people impressed by externals [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Tragedies are nothing but the sufferings of people who are impressed by externals, performed in the right sort of meter. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.04.26) | |
A reaction: The externals are things like honour, position and wealth. Wonderfully dismissive! |
23364 | Homer wrote to show that the most blessed men can be ruined by poor judgement [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Did not Homer write to show us that the noblest, the strongest, the richest, the handsomest of men may nevertheless be the most unfortunate and wretched, if they do not hold the judgements that they ought to hold? | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 4.10.36) | |
A reaction: This seems to be right. He clearly wrote about the greatest and most memorable events of recent times, but not just to record triumphs, because almost every hero (in the Iliad, at least) ends in disaster. |
23340 | We consist of animal bodies and god-like reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: We have these two elements mingled within us, a body in common with the animals, and reason and intelligence in common with the gods. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.03.03) | |
A reaction: This is what I call Human Exceptionalism, but note that it doesn't invoke a Christian soul or spiritual aspect. This separation of reason goes back at least to Plato. High time we stopped thinking this way. Animals behave very sensibly. |
23358 | Every species produces exceptional beings, and we must just accept their nature [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: In every species nature produces some exceptional being, in oxen, in dogs, in bees, in horses. We do not say to them 'Who are you?' It will tell you 'I am like the purple in the robe. Do not expect me to be like the rest, or find fault with my nature'. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 3.01.23) | |
A reaction: This idea began with Aristotle's 'great soul', and presumably culminates in Nietzsche, who fills in more detail. In the modern world such people are mostly nothing but trouble. |
23339 | I will die as becomes a person returning what he does not own [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: When the time comes, then I will die - as becomes a person who gives back what is not his own. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.01.32) | |
A reaction: There is a tension between his demand that he have full control of his choices, and this humility that says his actual life is not his own. The things which can't be controlled, though, are 'indifferents' so life and death are indifferent. |
23345 | Don't be frightened of pain or death; only be frightened of fearing them [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: It is not pain or death that is to be feared, but the fear of pain or death. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.01.13) | |
A reaction: These two cases are quite different, I would say. I'm much more frightened of pain than I am of the fear of pain, and the opposite view seems absurd. About death, though, I think this is right. Mostly I'm with Spinoza: think about life, not death. |
23357 | Knowledge of what is good leads to love; only the wise, who distinguish good from evil, can love [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Whoever has knowledge of good things would know how to love them; and how could he who cannot distinguish good things from evil still have to power to love? It follows that the wise man alone has the power to love. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.22.03) | |
A reaction: A rather heartwarming remark, but hard to assess for its truth. Evil people are unable to love? Not even love a cat, or their favourite car? We would never call someone wise if they lacked love. |
23363 | The evil for everything is what is contrary to its nature [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Where is the paradox if we say that what is evil for everything is what is contrary to its nature? | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 4.01.125) | |
A reaction: A very Greek view. For humans, it must rely on the belief that human nature is essentially good. If I am sometimes grumpy and annoying, why is that not part of my nature? |
23328 | The essences of good and evil are in dispositions to choose [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: The essence of the good is a certain disposition of our choice, and essence of evil likewise. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.29.01) | |
A reaction: This is the origin of Kant's famous view, that the only true good is a good will. This is the alternative to good character or good states of affairs as the good. It points towards the modern more legalistic view of morality, as concerning actions. |
23362 | All human ills result from failure to apply preconceptions to particular cases [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: The cause of all human ills is that people are incapable of applying their general preconceptions to particular cases. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 4.01.42) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure whether 'preconceptions' is meant pejoratively (as unthinking, and opposed to true principles). This sounds like modern particularism (e.g. Jonathan Dancy) to the letter. |
23353 | We have a natural sense of honour [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: What faculty do you mean? - Have we not a natural sense of honour? - We have. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.10.22) | |
A reaction: This seems unlikely, given the lower status that honour now has with us, compared to two hundred years ago. But there may be a natural sense of status, and of humiliation and shame. |
23354 | If someone harms themselves in harming me, then I harm myself by returning the harm [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Since he has harmed himself by wronging me, shall not I harm myself by harming him? | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.10.26) | |
A reaction: I am very keen on this idea. See Hamlet's remarks to Polonius about 'honour and dignity'. The best strategy for achieving moral excellence is to focus on our own characters, rather than how to act, and to respond to others. |
23324 | In the Discourses choice [prohairesis] defines our character and behaviour [Epictetus, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: In Epictetus's 'Discourses' the notion of choice [prohairesis] plays perhaps the central role. It is our prohairesis which defines us a person, as the sort of person we are; it is our prohairesis which determines how we behave. | |
From: report of Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56]) by Michael Frede - A Free Will 3 | |
A reaction: Frede is charting the gradual move in Greek philosophy from action by desire, reason and habit to action by the will (which then turns out to be 'free'). Character started as dispositions and ended as choices. |
23361 | Health is only a good when it is used well [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Is health a good and sickness an evil? No. Health is good when used well, and bad when used ill. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 3.20.04) | |
A reaction: Although I like the idea that health is a natural value, which bridges the gap from facts to values (as a successful function), there is no denying that the health of very evil people is not something the rest of us hope for. |
23346 | A person is as naturally a part of a city as a foot is part of the body [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Just as the foot in detachment is no longer a foot, so you in detachment are not longer a man. For what is a man? A part of a city, first. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.05.26) | |
A reaction: It is, of course, not true that a detached foot ceases to be a foot (and an isolated human is still a human). This an extreme version of the Aristotelian idea that we are essentially social. It is, though, the sort of view favoured by totalitarianism. |
23351 | We are citizens of the universe, and principal parts of it [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: You are a citizen of the universe, and a part of it; and no subservient, but a principal part of it. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.10.03) | |
A reaction: He got this view from Diogenes of Sinope, one of his heroes. What community you are a part of seems to be a choice as much as a fact. Am I British or a European? |
20874 | A citizen is committed to ignore private advantage, and seek communal good [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: The commitment of the citizen is to have no private advantage, not to deliberate about anything as though one were a separate part. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.10.04) | |
A reaction: This is the modern problem of whether democratic voters are choosing for themselves or for the community. I think we should make an active effort at every election to persuade voters to aim for the communal good. Cf Rawls. |
23352 | A citizen should only consider what is good for the whole society [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: The calling of a citizen is to consider nothing in terms of personal advantage, never to deliberate on anything as though detached from the whole, but be like our hand or foot. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.10.04) | |
A reaction: Fat chance of that in an aggressively capitalist society. I've always voted for what I thought was the common good, and was shocked to gradually realise that many people only vote for what promotes their own interests. Heigh ho. |
22604 | Punishing a criminal for moral ignorance is the same as punishing someone for being blind [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: You should ask 'Ought not this man to be put to death, who is deceived in things of the greatest importance, and is blinded in distinguishing good from evil?' …You then see how inhuman it is, and the same as 'Ought not this blind man to be put to death?' | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.18.6-7) | |
A reaction: This is the doctrine of Socrates, that evil is ignorance (and weakness of will [akrasia] is impossible). Epictetus wants us to reason with the man, but what should be do if reasoning fails and he persists in his crimes? |
23349 | Asses are born to carry human burdens, not as ends in themselves [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: An ass is surely not born as an end in itself? No, but because we had need of a back that is able to carry burdens. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.08.07) | |
A reaction: This is the absurd human exceptionalism which plagues our thinking. It would be somewhat true of animals which are specifically bred for human work, such as large cart horses. |
23341 | God created humans as spectators and interpreters of God's works [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: God has introduced man into the world as a spectator of himself and of his works: and not only as a spectator of them, but an interpreter of them as well. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.06.19) | |
A reaction: This idea (which strikes me as bizarre) was picked up directly by the Christians. I can't imagine every Johnson wanting to creating their own Boswell. If you think we are divinely created, you have to propose some motive for it, I suppose. |
18980 | If there is a 'greatest knower', it doesn't follow that they know absolutely everything [James] |
Full Idea: The greatest knower of them all may yet not know the whole of everything, or even know what he does know at one single stroke: - he may be liable to forget. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 4) | |
A reaction: And that's before you get to the problem of how the greatest knower could possibly know whether or not they knew absolutely everything, or whether there might be some fact which was irremediably hidden from them. |
18978 | It is hard to grasp a cosmic mind which produces such a mixture of goods and evils [James] |
Full Idea: We can with difficulty comprehend the character of a cosmic mind whose purposes are fully revealed by the strange mixture of good and evils that we find in this actual world's particulars. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 3) | |
A reaction: And, of course, what counts as 'goods' or 'evils' seems to have a highly relative aspect to it. To claim that really it is all good is massive hope based on flimsy evidence. |
23348 | Both god and the good bring benefits, so their true nature seems to be the same [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: God brings benefits; but the good also brings benefit. It would seem, then, that where the true nature of god is, there too is the true nature of good. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.08.01) | |
A reaction: An enthymeme, missing the premise that there can only be one source of benefit (which sounds unlikely). Does god bring anything other than benefits? And does the good? I think this is an idea from later platonism. |
18991 | If the God hypothesis works well, then it is true [James] |
Full Idea: On pragmatistic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 8) | |
A reaction: The truth of God's existence certainly is a challenging test case for the pragmatic theory of truth, and James really bites the bullet here. Pragmatism may ultimately founder on the impossibility of specifying what 'works satisfactorily' means. |
18977 | The wonderful design of a woodpecker looks diabolical to its victims [James] |
Full Idea: To the grub under the bark the exquisite fitness of the woodpecker's organism to extract him would certainly argue a diabolical designer. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 3) | |
A reaction: What an elegant sentence! The huge problem for religious people who accept (probably reluctantly) evolution by natural selection is the moral nature of the divine being who could use such a ruthless method of design. |
18979 | Things with parts always have some structure, so they always appear to be designed [James] |
Full Idea: The parts of things must always make some definite resultant, be it chaotic or harmonious. When we look at what has actually come, the conditions must always appear perfectly designed to ensure it. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 3) | |
A reaction: In so far as the design argument is an analogy with human affairs, we can't deny that high levels of order suggest an organising mind, and mere chaos suggests a coincidence of unco-ordinated forces. |
18976 | Private experience is the main evidence for God [James] |
Full Idea: I myself believe that the evidence for God lies primarily in inner personal experience. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 3) | |
A reaction: There is not much you can say to someone who claims incontrovertible evidence which is utterly private to themselves. Does total absence of private religious experience count as evidence on the subject? |
18990 | Nirvana means safety from sense experience, and hindus and buddhists are just afraid of life [James] |
Full Idea: Nirvana means safety from the everlasting round of adventures of which the world of sense consists. The hindoo and the buddhist for this is essentially their attitude, are simply afraid, afraid of more experience, afraid of life. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 8) | |
A reaction: Wonderfully American! From what I have seen of eastern thought, including Taoism, I agree with James, in general. There is a rejection of knowledge and of human life which I find shocking. I suspect it is a defence mechanism for downtrodden people. |
23360 | Each of the four elements in you is entirely scattered after death [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Whatever was in you of fire, departs into fire; what was of earth, into earth; what of air, into air; what of water, into water. There is no Hades, nor Acheron. | |
From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 3.13.15) | |
A reaction: This sort of remark may explain why so few of the great Stoic texts (such as those of Chrysippus) survived the Christian era. |