31 ideas
21515 | Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson] |
Full Idea: While coherence may lack the positive role many have assigned to it, ...incoherence plays an important negative role in our enquiries. | |
From: Erik J. Olsson (Against Coherence [2005], 10.1) | |
A reaction: [He cites Peirce as the main source for this idea] We can hardly by deeply impressed by incoherence if we have no sense of coherence. Incoherence is just one of many markers for theory failure. Missing the target, bad concepts... |
21514 | Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson] |
Full Idea: According to Lehrer, coherence should be understood in terms of the capacity to answer objections. | |
From: Erik J. Olsson (Against Coherence [2005], 9) | |
A reaction: [Keith Lehrer 1990] We can connect this with the Greek requirement of being able to give an account [logos], which is the hallmark of understanding. I take coherence to be the best method of achieving understanding. Any understanding meets Lehrer's test. |
21496 | Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson] |
Full Idea: Far from guaranteeing a high likelihood of truth by itself, testimonial agreement can apparently do so only if the circumstances are favourable as regards independence, prior probability, and individual credibility. | |
From: Erik J. Olsson (Against Coherence [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: This is Olson's main thesis. His targets are C.I.Lewis and Bonjour, who hoped that a mere consensus of evidence would increase verisimilitude. I don't see a problem for coherence in general, since his favourable circumstances are part of it. |
21499 | Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson] |
Full Idea: An enquirer who is fortunate enough to have at his or her disposal fully reliable information sources has no use for coherence, the need for which arises only in the context of less than fully reliable informations sources. | |
From: Erik J. Olsson (Against Coherence [2005], 2.6.2) | |
A reaction: I take this to be entirely false. How do you assess reliability? 'I've seen it with my own eyes'. Why trust your eyes? In what visibility conditions do you begin to doubt your eyes? Why do rational people mistrust their intuitions? |
21502 | A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson] |
Full Idea: The Input Objection says a pure coherence theory would seem to allow that a system of beliefs be justified in spite of being utterly out of contact with the world it purports to describe, so long as it is, to a sufficient extent, coherent. | |
From: Erik J. Olsson (Against Coherence [2005], 4.1) | |
A reaction: Olson seems impressed by this objection, but I don't see how a system could be coherently about the world if it had no known contact with the world. Olson seems to ignore meta-coherence, which evaluates the status of the system being studied. |
21512 | Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson] |
Full Idea: Any non-trivial extension of a belief system is less probable than the original system, but there are extensions that are more coherent than the original system. Hence more coherence does not imply a higher probability. | |
From: Erik J. Olsson (Against Coherence [2005], 6.4) | |
A reaction: [Olson cites Klein and Warfield 1994; compressed] The example rightly says the extension could have high internal coherence, but not whether the extension is coherent with the system being extended. |
21833 | Research suggest that we overrate conscious experience [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: The emerging consensus is that we probably overrate the power of conscious experience in our lives. Freud, of course, said the same thing for different reasons. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 3 'Ontology') | |
A reaction: [He cites Pockett, Banks and Gallagher 2006]. Freud was concerned with big deep secrets, but the modern view concerns ordinary decisions and perceptions. An important idea, which should incline us all to become Nietzscheans. |
21834 | Sensations may be identical to brain events, but complex mental events don't seem to be [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: There is still some hope for something like identity theory for sensations. But almost no one believes that strict identity theory will work for more complex mental states. Strict identity is stronger than type neurophysicalism. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 3 'Ontology') | |
A reaction: It is so hard to express the problem. What needs to be explained? How can one bunch of neurons represent many different things? It's not like computing. That just transfers the data to brains, where the puzzling stuff happens. |
23154 | We divide mankind into friend and foe, and cooperate with one and compete with the other [Russell] |
Full Idea: Instinctively we divide mankind into friends and foes - friends, towards whom we have a morality of co-operation; foes, towards whom we have that of competition. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 1) | |
A reaction: Interesting, because I have though of cooperation and competition as intrinsic features of people, internal to their nature, but this idea observes that it is more external, as two responses to two sharply distinct aspects of experience. |
21837 | Morality is normative because it identifies best practices among the normal practices [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Morality is 'normative' in the sense that it consists of the extraction of 'good' or 'excellent' practices from common practices. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 4 'Naturalism') | |
A reaction: I take normativity not be the mere labelling of certain things as 'good', but as a way of responding to that fact, with some sort of motivation. |
21830 | For Darwinians, altruism is either contracts or genetics [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Two explanations came forward in the neo-Darwinian synthesis. Altruism is either 1) person-based reciprocal altruism, or 2) gene-based kin altruism. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 2 'Darwin') | |
A reaction: Flanagan obviously thinks there is also 'genuine psychological atruism'. Presumably we don't explain mathematics or music or the desire to travel as either contracts or genetics, so we have other explanations available. |
21835 | We need Eudaimonics - the empirical study of how we should flourish [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: It would be nice if I could advance the case for Eudaimonics - empirical enquiry into the nature, causes, and constituents of flourishing, …and the case for some ways of living and being as better than others. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 4 'Normative') | |
A reaction: Things seem to be moving in that direction. Lots of statistics about happiness have been appearing. |
23153 | Gradually loyalty to a creed increased, which could even outweigh nationality [Russell] |
Full Idea: At a later stage in the development of civilization, a new kind of loyalty began to be developed, based on identity of creed. …Its military strength was displayed in Islam …and later loyalities of Catholics or Protestants could outweigh nationality. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] The only examples of creed loyalty that come to mind are religious. With increased migration in the modern world the phenomenon of divided loyalties has grown. Can a political theory cope with divided loyalties? |
23152 | Increasingly war expands communities, and unifies them through fear [Russell] |
Full Idea: From early days down to modern times war has been the chief engine in enlarging the size of communities, and fear has increasingly replaced tribal solidarity as a source of social cohesion. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 1) | |
A reaction: It is a feature of modern nationalism to try to generate fear of various outsiders, even in times of peace. Most of us despise such things, but the underlying desire for greater national unity is not unworthy. What enemies would a world state have? |
23155 | In early societies the leaders needed cohesion, but the rest just had to obey [Russell] |
Full Idea: In historical societies such as ancient Egypt only a minority at the top of the social scale - the king, the aristocracy and the priests - needed any psychological mechanism towards social cohesion; all the rest merely obeyed. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 2) | |
A reaction: This is why even now I take obedience to be a key right-wing virtue, though it is usually reinforced through national myths and distorted proganda. Quasi-worship of the leader also seems to be a major ingredient. Obedience unifies armies. |
23156 | The economic and political advantages of great size seem to have no upper limit [Russell] |
Full Idea: Short of the whole planet there is no visible limit to the advantages of size, both in economic and in political organisation. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 2) | |
A reaction: Obviously there are also disadvantages, such as the vast distances, and the alienation of people far from the centre. I take economies of scale to be one of the advantages of socialist nationalisations. |
23157 | Government has a negative purpose, to prevent trouble, and a positive aim of realising our desires [Russell] |
Full Idea: Government has a negative function, to prevent private violence, to protect life and property, to enact criminal law and secure its enforcement. It also has a positive purpose, to facilitate the realisation of desires common to most of the citizens. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Interesting because the second purpose is rarely cited. Governments improve communications, facilitate trade, and encourage health and education services, which we all want. |
23151 | A monarch is known to everyone in the group, and can thus unite large groups [Russell] |
Full Idea: At a very early stage loyalty to a group must have been reinforced by loyalty to a leader. In a large tribe the king or chief may be known the everybody even when individuals are strangers. This makes possible increase in the size of the group. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 1) | |
A reaction: In this way humanity could move from hunter-gatherer groups to tribes or clans. In the UK even people who couldn't name the current Prime Minister are all fully aware of the monarch. In this way a merely constitutional monarch makes sense, |
23167 | Power should be with smaller bodies, as long as it doesn't restrict central powers [Russell] |
Full Idea: The general principle of delimiting powers should be to leave to smaller bodies all functions which do not prevent larger bodies from fulfilling their purpose. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 5) | |
A reaction: In recent years in the UK smaller local bodies have been severely reduced in power by central government. This is nominally in favour of individuals, but in practice seems to have strengthened the centre. Russell was keen on devolving powers. |
23163 | In an anarchy universities, research, books, and even seaside holidays, would be impossible [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is obvious that in a state of anarchy there could not be universities or scientific research or publication of books, or even such simple things as seaside holidays. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 5) | |
A reaction: A seaside holiday seems possible, though it obviously needs means of publicity, and of transport. Why is a private university impossible? The general thought seems to be that anything very complex would be impossible. Maybe. |
23168 | A state is essential, to control greedy or predatory impulses [Russell] |
Full Idea: The control of greedy or predatory impulses is imperatively necessary, and therefore States …are needed for survival. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 5) | |
A reaction: The anarchist replies that the corruption of this benevolent state is precisely the problem they are trying to avoid. Perhaps the emphasis should be on the rule of law, rather than on people holding centralised power. |
23166 | In democracy we are more aware of being governed than of our tiny share in government [Russell] |
Full Idea: In a democracy you have a 20 millionth share in the government of others, but only a 20 millionth share in the government of yourself. You are therefore much more conscious of being governed than of governing. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 5) | |
A reaction: Nice. Add to that the fact that your share in governing others only occurs at election time. In between we are powerless spectators, but we are still governed. |
23160 | Being a slave of society is hardly better than being a slave of a despot [Russell] |
Full Idea: A society in which each is the slave of all is only a little better than one in which each is the slave of a despot. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 4) | |
A reaction: This seems to apply quite accurately to the position of those state employees who have the lowest status and wages. Society as a whole exploits them, so it is hard to point the finger at their oppressors. |
23162 | Managers are just as remote from workers under nationalisation as under capitalism [Russell] |
Full Idea: Nationalisation leaves managers and officials almost as remote from the workers as they are under a capitalist regime. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 4) | |
A reaction: Russell's solution is workplace democracy. Presumably that could be imposed on a nationalised industry much more easily than on a profit-driven private capitalist industry. |
23165 | Socialists say economic justice needs some state control of industries, and of foreign trade [Russell] |
Full Idea: Economic justice is held by Socialists (rightly, in my opinion) to involve state ownership of key industries and considerable regulation of foreign trade. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 5) | |
A reaction: This must be to obtain greater control over the profits of industry, and also to prevent trade become too exploitative of weaker foreign nations. Britain had a socialist government when this book was written. |
21831 | Alienation is not finding what one wants, or being unable to achieve it [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: What Marx called 'alienation' is the widespread condition of not being able to discover what one wants, or not being remotely positioned to achieve. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 2 'Expanding') | |
A reaction: I took alienation to concern people's relationship to the means of production in their trade. On Flanagan's definition I would expect almost everyone aged under 20 to count as alienated. |
23158 | Slavery began the divorce between the work and the purposes of the worker [Russell] |
Full Idea: The introduction of slavery began the divorce between the purpose of the work and the purposes of the worker. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 4) | |
A reaction: Worth saying, because marxists tend to blame more recent capitalism for creating this problem (of 'alienation'). There are many degrees of slavery. |
23161 | Slaves can be just as equal as free people [Russell] |
Full Idea: There is equality where all are slaves, as well as where all are free. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 4) | |
A reaction: A nice observation, though a person is only a slave if someone controls them, so it is not strictly true. |
23159 | Scarce goods may be denied entirely, to avoid their unequal distribution [Russell] |
Full Idea: There is a risk that, in the pursuit of equality, good things which there is difficulty in distributing evenly may not be admitted to be good. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 4) | |
A reaction: Lovely sentence. The clarity and economy with which he expresses an intricate idea. Why can't you philosophers all write like that? This is not just the unequal distribution of scarce goods, but a subtler problem. The finest wines, for example. |
23164 | Modern justice is seen as equality, apart from modest extra rewards for exceptional desert [Russell] |
Full Idea: Justice has come to be interpreted as equality, except where exceptional merit is thought to deserve an exceptional but still moderate reward. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 5) | |
A reaction: Kekes rebels against this modern distortion of justice, which traditionally means everyone getting what they deserve - good or bad. The modern egalitarian view seems to be a rebellion against the harsh interpretation of the older view. |
21832 | Buddhists reject God and the self, and accept suffering as key, and liberation through wisdom [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Buddhism rejected the idea of a creator God, and the unchanging self [atman]. They accept the appearance-reality distinction, reward for virtue [karma], suffering defining our predicament, and that liberation [nirvana] is possible through wisdom. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 3 'Buddhism') | |
A reaction: [Compressed] Flanagan is an analytic philosopher and a practising Buddhist. Looking at a happiness map today which shows Europeans largely happy, and Africans largely miserable, I can see why they thought suffering was basic. |