15 ideas
17824 | The master science is physical objects divided into sets [Maddy] |
Full Idea: The master science can be thought of as the theory of sets with the entire range of physical objects as ur-elements. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Sets and Numbers [1981], II) | |
A reaction: This sounds like Quine's view, since we have to add sets to our naturalistic ontology of objects. It seems to involve unrestricted mereology to create normal objects. |
17825 | Set theory (unlike the Peano postulates) can explain why multiplication is commutative [Maddy] |
Full Idea: If you wonder why multiplication is commutative, you could prove it from the Peano postulates, but the proof offers little towards an answer. In set theory Cartesian products match 1-1, and n.m dots when turned on its side has m.n dots, which explains it. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Sets and Numbers [1981], II) | |
A reaction: 'Turning on its side' sounds more fundamental than formal set theory. I'm a fan of explanation as taking you to the heart of the problem. I suspect the world, rather than set theory, explains the commutativity. |
17826 | Standardly, numbers are said to be sets, which is neat ontology and epistemology [Maddy] |
Full Idea: The standard account of the relationship between numbers and sets is that numbers simply are certain sets. This has the advantage of ontological economy, and allows numbers to be brought within the epistemology of sets. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Sets and Numbers [1981], III) | |
A reaction: Maddy votes for numbers being properties of sets, rather than the sets themselves. See Yourgrau's critique. |
17828 | Numbers are properties of sets, just as lengths are properties of physical objects [Maddy] |
Full Idea: I propose that ...numbers are properties of sets, analogous, for example, to lengths, which are properties of physical objects. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Sets and Numbers [1981], III) | |
A reaction: Are lengths properties of physical objects? A hole in the ground can have a length. A gap can have a length. Pure space seems to contain lengths. A set seems much more abstract than its members. |
17827 | Sets exist where their elements are, but numbers are more like universals [Maddy] |
Full Idea: A set of things is located where the aggregate of those things is located, ...but a number is simultaneously located at many different places (10 in my hand, and a baseball team) ...so numbers seem more like universals than particulars. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Sets and Numbers [1981], III) | |
A reaction: My gut feeling is that Maddy's master idea (of naturalising sets by building them from ur-elements of natural objects) won't work. Sets can work fine in total abstraction from nature. |
17830 | Number theory doesn't 'reduce' to set theory, because sets have number properties [Maddy] |
Full Idea: I am not suggesting a reduction of number theory to set theory ...There are only sets with number properties; number theory is part of the theory of finite sets. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Sets and Numbers [1981], V) |
17823 | If mathematical objects exist, how can we know them, and which objects are they? [Maddy] |
Full Idea: The popular challenges to platonism in philosophy of mathematics are epistemological (how are we able to interact with these objects in appropriate ways) and ontological (if numbers are sets, which sets are they). | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Sets and Numbers [1981], I) | |
A reaction: These objections refer to Benacerraf's two famous papers - 1965 for the ontology, and 1973 for the epistemology. Though he relied too much on causal accounts of knowledge in 1973, I'm with him all the way. |
17829 | Number words are unusual as adjectives; we don't say 'is five', and numbers always come first [Maddy] |
Full Idea: Number words are not like normal adjectives. For example, number words don't occur in 'is (are)...' contexts except artificially, and they must appear before all other adjectives, and so on. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Sets and Numbers [1981], IV) | |
A reaction: [She is citing Benacerraf's arguments] |
9379 | A sentence is obvious if it is true, and any speaker of the language will instantly agree to it [Quine] |
Full Idea: A sentence is obvious if (a) it is true and (b) any speaker of the language is prepared, for any reason or none, to assent to it without hesitation, unless put off by being asked so obvious a question. | |
From: Willard Quine (Reply to Hellman [1975], p.206), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III | |
A reaction: This comes from someone who is keen to deny a priori knowledge, but what are we to make of the expostulations "It's obvious, you idiot!", and "Now I see it, it's obvious!", and "It seemed obvious, but I was wrong!"? |
21515 | Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson] |
Full Idea: While coherence may lack the positive role many have assigned to it, ...incoherence plays an important negative role in our enquiries. | |
From: Erik J. Olsson (Against Coherence [2005], 10.1) | |
A reaction: [He cites Peirce as the main source for this idea] We can hardly by deeply impressed by incoherence if we have no sense of coherence. Incoherence is just one of many markers for theory failure. Missing the target, bad concepts... |
21514 | Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson] |
Full Idea: According to Lehrer, coherence should be understood in terms of the capacity to answer objections. | |
From: Erik J. Olsson (Against Coherence [2005], 9) | |
A reaction: [Keith Lehrer 1990] We can connect this with the Greek requirement of being able to give an account [logos], which is the hallmark of understanding. I take coherence to be the best method of achieving understanding. Any understanding meets Lehrer's test. |
21496 | Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson] |
Full Idea: Far from guaranteeing a high likelihood of truth by itself, testimonial agreement can apparently do so only if the circumstances are favourable as regards independence, prior probability, and individual credibility. | |
From: Erik J. Olsson (Against Coherence [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: This is Olson's main thesis. His targets are C.I.Lewis and Bonjour, who hoped that a mere consensus of evidence would increase verisimilitude. I don't see a problem for coherence in general, since his favourable circumstances are part of it. |
21499 | Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson] |
Full Idea: An enquirer who is fortunate enough to have at his or her disposal fully reliable information sources has no use for coherence, the need for which arises only in the context of less than fully reliable informations sources. | |
From: Erik J. Olsson (Against Coherence [2005], 2.6.2) | |
A reaction: I take this to be entirely false. How do you assess reliability? 'I've seen it with my own eyes'. Why trust your eyes? In what visibility conditions do you begin to doubt your eyes? Why do rational people mistrust their intuitions? |
21502 | A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson] |
Full Idea: The Input Objection says a pure coherence theory would seem to allow that a system of beliefs be justified in spite of being utterly out of contact with the world it purports to describe, so long as it is, to a sufficient extent, coherent. | |
From: Erik J. Olsson (Against Coherence [2005], 4.1) | |
A reaction: Olson seems impressed by this objection, but I don't see how a system could be coherently about the world if it had no known contact with the world. Olson seems to ignore meta-coherence, which evaluates the status of the system being studied. |
21512 | Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson] |
Full Idea: Any non-trivial extension of a belief system is less probable than the original system, but there are extensions that are more coherent than the original system. Hence more coherence does not imply a higher probability. | |
From: Erik J. Olsson (Against Coherence [2005], 6.4) | |
A reaction: [Olson cites Klein and Warfield 1994; compressed] The example rightly says the extension could have high internal coherence, but not whether the extension is coherent with the system being extended. |