72 ideas
20678 | The Scientific Revolution was the discovery of our own ignorance [Harari] |
Full Idea: The great discovery of the Scientific Revolution was that humans do not know the answers to their most important question. | |
From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 14 'Ignoramus') | |
A reaction: I think of that revolution as raising the bar in epistemology, but this idea gives a motivation for doing so. Why the discovery then, and not before? |
20686 | For millenia people didn't know how to convert one type of energy into another [Harari] |
Full Idea: For millenia people didn't know how to convert one type of energy into another, …and the only machine capable of performing energy conversion was the body. | |
From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 17 'Intro') | |
A reaction: Hence the huge and revolutionary importance of the steam engine and the electricity generator. |
1887 | You cannot divide anything into many parts, because after the first division you are no longer dividing the original [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: You cannot divide anything (such as the decad) into many parts, because as soon as you separate the first part, you are no longer dividing the original. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.215) |
1885 | Proof moves from agreed premises to a non-evident inference [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Dogmatists define proof as "an argument which, by means of agreed premises, reveals by way of deduction a nonevident inference". | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.135) |
12196 | A valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood' [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Philo (of Megara) says that a valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood,' as for instance the syllogism 'If it is day, I converse,' when in fact it is day and I am conversing. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.110) | |
A reaction: Russell endorses this, and Rumfitt quotes it as the classic case of denying that there is any modal aspect (such as 'logical necessity') involved in logical consequence. He labels it 'material or Philonian consequence'. |
1902 | Since Socrates either died when he was alive (a contradiction) or died when he was dead (meaningless), he didn't die [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If Socrates died, he died either when he lived or when he died; so he was either dead when he was alive, or he was twice dead when he was dead. So he didn't die. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.111) | |
A reaction: One of my favourites. Of all the mysteries facing us, the one that boggles me most is how anything can happen in the 'present' moment, if the present is just the overlap point between past and future. |
1889 | If an argument has an absurd conclusion, we should not assent to the absurdity, but avoid the absurd argument [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If an argument leads to confessedly absurd conclusions, we should not assent to the absurdity just because of the argument, but avoid the argument because of the absurdity. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.252) | |
A reaction: cf. G.E.Moore. Denying that you have a hand seems to be an absurdity, but I'm not sure if I can give a criterion for absurdity in such a case. One person's modus ponens is another person's modus tollens. |
1871 | Whether honey is essentially sweet may be doubted, as it is a matter of judgement rather than appearance [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Honey appears to sceptics to be sweet, but whether it is also sweet in its essence is for us a matter of doubt, since this is not an appearance but a judgement. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.20) |
1883 | How can the intellect know if sensation is reliable if it doesn't directly see external objects? [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Just as you can't know if a portrait of Socrates is good without seeing the man, so when the intellect gazes on sensations but not the external objects it cannot know whether they are similar. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.75) |
1890 | We distinguish ambiguities by seeing what is useful [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: It is the experience of what is useful in each affair that brings about the distinguishing of ambiguities. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.258) |
21515 | Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson] |
Full Idea: While coherence may lack the positive role many have assigned to it, ...incoherence plays an important negative role in our enquiries. | |
From: Erik J. Olsson (Against Coherence [2005], 10.1) | |
A reaction: [He cites Peirce as the main source for this idea] We can hardly by deeply impressed by incoherence if we have no sense of coherence. Incoherence is just one of many markers for theory failure. Missing the target, bad concepts... |
21514 | Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson] |
Full Idea: According to Lehrer, coherence should be understood in terms of the capacity to answer objections. | |
From: Erik J. Olsson (Against Coherence [2005], 9) | |
A reaction: [Keith Lehrer 1990] We can connect this with the Greek requirement of being able to give an account [logos], which is the hallmark of understanding. I take coherence to be the best method of achieving understanding. Any understanding meets Lehrer's test. |
21496 | Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson] |
Full Idea: Far from guaranteeing a high likelihood of truth by itself, testimonial agreement can apparently do so only if the circumstances are favourable as regards independence, prior probability, and individual credibility. | |
From: Erik J. Olsson (Against Coherence [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: This is Olson's main thesis. His targets are C.I.Lewis and Bonjour, who hoped that a mere consensus of evidence would increase verisimilitude. I don't see a problem for coherence in general, since his favourable circumstances are part of it. |
21499 | Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson] |
Full Idea: An enquirer who is fortunate enough to have at his or her disposal fully reliable information sources has no use for coherence, the need for which arises only in the context of less than fully reliable informations sources. | |
From: Erik J. Olsson (Against Coherence [2005], 2.6.2) | |
A reaction: I take this to be entirely false. How do you assess reliability? 'I've seen it with my own eyes'. Why trust your eyes? In what visibility conditions do you begin to doubt your eyes? Why do rational people mistrust their intuitions? |
21502 | A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson] |
Full Idea: The Input Objection says a pure coherence theory would seem to allow that a system of beliefs be justified in spite of being utterly out of contact with the world it purports to describe, so long as it is, to a sufficient extent, coherent. | |
From: Erik J. Olsson (Against Coherence [2005], 4.1) | |
A reaction: Olson seems impressed by this objection, but I don't see how a system could be coherently about the world if it had no known contact with the world. Olson seems to ignore meta-coherence, which evaluates the status of the system being studied. |
21512 | Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson] |
Full Idea: Any non-trivial extension of a belief system is less probable than the original system, but there are extensions that are more coherent than the original system. Hence more coherence does not imply a higher probability. | |
From: Erik J. Olsson (Against Coherence [2005], 6.4) | |
A reaction: [Olson cites Klein and Warfield 1994; compressed] The example rightly says the extension could have high internal coherence, but not whether the extension is coherent with the system being extended. |
1870 | The basis of scepticism is the claim that every proposition has an equal opposing proposition [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The main basic principle of the sceptic system is that of opposing to every proposition an equal proposition. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.12) |
1872 | The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.32) |
1882 | The necks of doves appear different in colour depending on the angle of viewing [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The necks of doves appear different in hue according to the differences in the angle of inclination. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.120) |
1881 | The same oar seems bent in water and straight when out of it [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The same oar seems bent when in the water but straight when out of the water. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.119) |
1873 | If we press the side of an eyeball, objects appear a different shape [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: When we press the eyeball at one side the forms, figures and sizes of the objects appear oblong and narrow. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.47) |
1874 | How can we judge between our impressions and those of other animals, when we ourselves are involved? [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: We cannot judge between our own impressions and those of other animals, because we ourselves are involved in the dispute. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.59) |
1880 | Some actions seem shameful when sober but not when drunk [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Actions which seem shameful to us when sober do not seem shameful when drunk. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.109) |
1879 | Sickness is perfectly natural to the sick, so their natural perceptions should carry some weight [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Health is natural for the healthy but unnatural for the sick, and sickness is unnatural for the healthy but natural for the sick, so we must give credence to the natural perceptions of the sick. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.103) |
1878 | Water that seems lukewarm can seem very hot on inflamed skin [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The same water which seems very hot when poured on inflamed spots seems lukewarm to us. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.101) |
1877 | If we had no hearing or sight, we would assume no sound or sight exists, so there may be unsensed qualities [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: A man with touch, taste and smell, but no hearing or sight, will assume nothing audible or visible exists, so maybe an apple has qualities which we have no senses to perceive. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.96) |
1876 | If we enjoy different things, presumably we receive different impressions [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The enjoyment of different things is an indication that we get varying impressions from the underlying objects. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.80) |
1910 | With us it is shameful for men to wear earrings, but among Syrians it is considered noble [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: It is a shameful thing with us for men to wear earrings, but among some of the barbarians, such as the Syrians, it is a token of nobility. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.203) |
1911 | Even if all known nations agree on a practice, there may be unknown nations which disagree [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Even among practices on which all known cultures are agreed, disagreement about them may possibly exist amongst some of the nations which are unknown to us. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.234) |
1886 | If you don't view every particular, you may miss the one which disproves your universal induction [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Induction cannot establish the universal by means of the particular, since limited particulars may omit crucial examples which disprove the universal, and infinite particulars are impossible to know. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.204) |
1884 | If we utter three steps of a logical argument, they never exist together [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If we say "If day exists, lights exists", and then "day exists", and then "light exists", then parts of the judgement never exist together, and so the whole judgement will have no real existence. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.109) |
20692 | Money does produce happiness, but only up to a point [Harari] |
Full Idea: An interesting conclusion (from questionnaires) is that money does indeed bring happiness. But only up to a point, and beyond that point it has little significance. | |
From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 19 'Counting') | |
A reaction: The question is whether that flattening-off point is relative to those around us, or absolute, according to the needs of living. Though these two may not be separate. |
20663 | If a group is bound by gossip, the natural size is 150 people [Harari] |
Full Idea: Sociological research has shown that the maximum 'natural' size of a group bound by gossip is about 150 individuals. | |
From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 02 'Legend') | |
A reaction: On the other hand, most of us can learn the names of a group of about 450. Maybe the 'known' group and the 'gossip' group are equally significant. Not much use for a modern state, but of interest to communitarians. |
20677 | Since 1500 human population has increased fourteenfold, and consumption far more [Harari] |
Full Idea: In the year 1500 there were about 500 million Homo sapiens in the world. Today there are 7 billion. …Human population has increased fourteenfold, our production 240-fold, and energy consumption 115-fold. | |
From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 14 'Discovery') | |
A reaction: We really need to grasp how extraordinary this is. |
20688 | People 300m tons; domesticated animals 700m tons; larger wild animals 100m tons [Harari] |
Full Idea: The combined mass of homo sapiens is about 300 million tons; the mass of all domesticated farmyard animals is about 700 million tons; the mass of the surviving larger wild animals (from porcupines up) is less than 100 million tons. | |
From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 18 'Permanent') | |
A reaction: These really are figures that deserve much wider currency. Every school entrance hall needs a board with a few of the basic dramatic statistics about human life on Earth. |
20674 | The Nazi aim was to encourage progressive evolution, and avoid degeneration [Harari] |
Full Idea: The main ambition of the Nazis was to protect humankind from degeneration and encourage its progressive evolution. …Given the state of scientific knowledge in 1933, Nazi beliefs were hardly outside the pale. | |
From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 12 'Worship') | |
A reaction: It still sounds a fairly worthy ambition, close to the heart of educationalists everywhere. The problems start with the definition of 'degeneration' and 'progress'. |
20679 | We stabilise societies with dogmas, either of dubious science, or of non-scientific values [Harari] |
Full Idea: Modern attempts to stabilise the sociopolitical order either declare a scientific theory (such as racial theories for Nazis, or economic ones for Communists) to be an absolute truths, or declare non-scientific dogmas (such as liberal values) | |
From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 14 'Ignoramus') | |
A reaction: [compressed] |
20690 | The state fostered individualism, to break the power of family and community [Harari] |
Full Idea: States and markets use their growing power to weaken the bonds of family and community. They made an offer that couldn't be refused - 'become individuals' (over marriage, jobs and residence). The 'romantic individual' is not a rebel against the state. | |
From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 18 'Collapse') | |
A reaction: [compressed] See the film 'Breaking the Waves'. An interesting slant on the Romantic movement. See Wordsworth's 'Michael'. Capitalism needs shoppers with their own money, and a mobile workforce. |
20689 | In 1750 losing your family and community meant death [Harari] |
Full Idea: A person who lost her family and community around 1750 was as good as dead. | |
From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 18 'Collapse') | |
A reaction: This is a very good advert for liberal individualism, and marks the downside of 'too much community'. |
20682 | The main rule of capitalism is that all other goods depend on economic growth [Harari] |
Full Idea: The principle tenet of capitalism is that economic growth is the supreme good, or at least a proxy for it, because justice, freedom, and even happiness all depend on economic growth. | |
From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 16 'Growing') | |
A reaction: In this respect, the main opponent of captitalism is green politics, rather than marxism. |
20681 | The sacred command of capitalism is that profits must be used to increase production [Harari] |
Full Idea: In the new capitalist creed, the first and most sacred commandment is: The profits of production must be reinvested in increasing production. | |
From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 16 'Growing') | |
A reaction: In this sense, capitalism is less greedy than its predecessors. 17th century aristocratic monopolists simply spent the profits of their activities. See the gorgeous clothes then (and pyramids and palaces), and the quiet suits of capitalists. |
20683 | The progress of capitalism depends entirely on the new discoveries and gadgets of science [Harari] |
Full Idea: The history of capitalism is unintelligible without taking science into account. …The human economy has managed to keep on going only thanks to the fact that scientists come up with a new discovery or gadget every few years. | |
From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 16 'Growing') | |
A reaction: For example, the desperate but unconvincing attempts to persuade us of the novelty of new models of car. Built-in obsolescence is needed once a design becomes static. |
20687 | In capitalism the rich invest, and the rest of us go shopping [Harari] |
Full Idea: The supreme commandment of the rich is 'invest!', and the supreme commandment of the rest of us is 'buy!' | |
From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 17 'Age') | |
A reaction: Hence not only do the rich get much richer, while most of us remain roughly where we were, but there is a huge gulf between the investors and the non-investors. Encouraging small investors is a step forward. |
20685 | No market is free of political bias, and markets need protection of their freedoms [Harari] |
Full Idea: There is no such thing as a market free of all political bias, …and markets by themselves offer no protection against fraud, theft and violence. | |
From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 16 'Cult') | |
A reaction: Is this in theory, or in practice? In Sicily the free market has been a tool of the mafia. |
20693 | Freedom may work against us, as individuals can choose to leave, and make fewer commitments [Harari] |
Full Idea: The freedom we value so highly may work against us. We can choose our spouses, friends and neighbours, but they can choose to leave us. With the individual wielding unprecedented power to decide her own path, we find it ever harder to make commitments. | |
From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 19 'Counting') | |
A reaction: This is the worry of the communitarian. I take freedom to be a great social virtue - but an overrated one. |
20691 | Real peace is the implausibility of war (and not just its absence) [Harari] |
Full Idea: Real peace is not the mere absence of war. Real peace is the implausibility of war. | |
From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 18 'Pax') | |
A reaction: I have a nasty feeling that war only becomes implausible because it hasn't happened for a long time. War looked implausible for Britain in 1890. War certainly now looks implausible in western Europe. |
20684 | Financing is increasingly through credit rather than taxes; people prefer investing to taxation [Harari] |
Full Idea: The European conquest of the world was increasingly financed through credit rather than taxes. …Nobody wants to pay taxes, but everyone is happy to invest. | |
From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 16 'Columbus') | |
A reaction: This is presumably the mechanism that drives the unstoppable increase of the gulf between the rich and the poor in modern times. With investment, the rich get richer. |
20675 | The more you know about history, the harder it becomes to explain [Harari] |
Full Idea: A distinguishing mark of history is that the better you know a historical period, the harder it becomes to explain why things happened one way and not another. | |
From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 13 'Hindsight') | |
A reaction: Presumaby that means it resembles statistics. Each individual reading is perplexing, but some patterns emerge on the large scale. |
20676 | History teaches us that the present was not inevitable, and shows us the possibilities [Harari] |
Full Idea: We study history not to know the future but to widen our horizons, to understand that our present situation is neither natural nor inevitable, and the we consequently have many more possibilities before us than we can imagine. | |
From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 13 'Hindsight') | |
A reaction: On the whole winners forget history, and losers are branded through and through with it. If you don't know history, you can never understand the latter group. |
1894 | Some say that causes are physical, some say not [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Some affirm cause to be corporeal, some incorporeal. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.14) |
1897 | Knowing an effect results from a cause means knowing that the cause belongs with the effect, which is circular [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: To know an effect belongs to a cause, we must also know that that cause belongs to that effect, and this is circular. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.21) |
1898 | Cause can't exist before effect, or exist at the same time, so it doesn't exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If cause neither subsists before its effect, nor subsists along with it, nor does the effect precede the cause, it would seem that it has no substantial existence at all. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.27) |
1896 | If there were no causes then everything would have been randomly produced by everything [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If causes were non-existent everything would have been produced by everything, and at random. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.18) |
1895 | Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The majority say causes are immediate (when they are directly proportional to effects), or associate (making an equal contribution to effects), or cooperant (making a slight contribution). | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.15) |
1899 | Does the original self-mover push itself from behind, or pull itself from in front? [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Self-movement must move in some particular direction, but if it pushes it will be behind itself, and if it pulls it will be in front of itself. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.68) | |
A reaction: This is the same as Aquinas's First Way of proving God's existence. |
1900 | If time and place are infinitely divided, it becomes impossible for movement ever to begin [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If bodies, and the places and times when they are said to move, are divided into infinity, motion will not occur, it being impossible to find anything which will initiate the first movement. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.76) |
1901 | If all atoms, times and places are the same, everything should move with equal velocity [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If objects are reducible to atoms, and each thing passes in an atomic time with its own first atom into an atomic point of space, then all moving things are of equal velocity. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.77) |
1903 | If motion and rest are abolished, so is time [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Since time does not seem to subsist without motion or even rest, if motion is abolished, and likewise rest, time is abolished. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.141) |
1904 | Time must be unlimited, but past and present can't be non-existent, and can't be now, so time does not exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: There can't be a time when there was no time, so time is not limited; but unlimited time means past and present are non-existent (so time is limited to the present), or they exist (which means they are present). Time does not exist. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.142) |
1905 | How can time be divisible if we can't compare one length of time with another? [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Time is clearly divisible (into past, present and future), but it can't be, because a divisible thing is measured by some part of itself (divisions of length), but the two parts must coincide to make the measurement (e.g. present must coincide with past). | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.143) |
1891 | How can we agree on the concept of God, unless we agree on his substance or form or place? [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: How shall we be able to reach a conception of God when we have no agreement about his substance or his form or his place of abode? | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.3) |
1892 | The existence of God can't be self-evident or everyone would have agreed on it, so it needs demonstration [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The existence of God is not pre-evident, for if it was the dogmatists would have agreed about it, whereas their disagreements show it is non-evident, and in need of demonstration. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.6) |
20671 | In order to explain both order and evil, a single evil creator is best, but no one favours that [Harari] |
Full Idea: Monotheism explains order but not evil, and dualist religion explains evil but not order. One logical solution is a single omnipotent God who created the universe, and is evil - but nobody in history has had much stomach for that belief. | |
From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 12 'Battle') | |
A reaction: Eh? Is there not also good, which also needs explaining? And there is some chaos to be explained too. Hume offers the best explanations. An inexperienced god, a team of squabbling gods, a god with shifting moods…. Study the facts first. |
20664 | Animism is belief that every part of nature is aware and feeling, and can communicate [Harari] |
Full Idea: Animism is the belief that almost every place, every animal, every plant and every natural phenomenon has awareness and feelings, and can communicated direct with humans. | |
From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 03 'Talking') | |
A reaction: So does this count as a 'supernatural' belief system? It seems not, if the awareness is integral to the natural feature, and dies with it. Panpsychism is not supernatural either. A problem for anyone trying to define Naturalism. |
20666 | Most polytheist recognise one supreme power or law, behind the various gods [Harari] |
Full Idea: Polytheism does not necessarily dispute the existence of a single power or law governing the entire universe. Most poytheist and even animist religions recognised such a supreme power that stands behind all the different gods, demons and holy rocks. | |
From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 12 'Benefits') | |
A reaction: Presumably this one supreme power was always taken to be too remote for communication or worship. Are the other gods seen as slaves, or friends, or ambassadors of the Supreme One? |
20667 | Polytheism is open-minded, and rarely persecutes opponents [Harari] |
Full Idea: Polytheism is inherently open-minded, and rarely persecutes 'heretics' and 'infidels'. | |
From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 12 'Benefits') | |
A reaction: The Old Testament tells of the Jews turning on local pagans, and India was presumably tolerant Hindus encountering less tolerant Muslims. Then there's Christians in Africa. Dreadful bunch, the monotheists. Romans killed very few Christians. |
20665 | Mythologies are usual contracts with the gods, exchanging devotion for control of nature [Harari] |
Full Idea: Much of ancient mythology is a legal contract in which humans promise everlasting devotion to the gods in exchange for mastery over plants and animals. | |
From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 12 'Silencing') | |
A reaction: [He cites the first book of Genesis] So how readily do you swith allegiance, if someone else's gods are more successful? Why be loyal a loser. It should be like shopping - but I bet it wasn't. |
20669 | Dualist religions see everything as a battleground of good and evil forces [Harari] |
Full Idea: Polytheism gave birth to monotheism, and to dualistic religions. Dualism explains that the entire universe is a battleground between good and evil forces, and everything that happens is part of that struggle. | |
From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 12 'Battle') | |
A reaction: Presumably we are supposed to support the good guys, so the gods are not equals. God v Satan seems the right model, but Satan has to be beyond God's control, or else the problem of evil has to be solved. Empedocles held something like this. |
20670 | Dualist religions say the cosmos is a battleground, so can’t explain its order [Harari] |
Full Idea: Dualist religions solve the problem of evil, but are unnerved by the Problem of Order. …If Good and Evil battle for control of the world, who enforces the laws governing this cosmic war? | |
From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 12 'Battle') | |
A reaction: You might explain it if one side was persistently winning, which is roughly God v Satan. |
20673 | Manichaeans and Gnostics: good made spirit, evil made flesh [Harari] |
Full Idea: Manichaeans and Gnostics argued that the good god created the spirit and the soul, whereas matter and bodes are the creation of the evil god. | |
From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 12 'Battle') | |
A reaction: Hm. What motivated the evil god to do that? The evil god's achievement looks a lot more impressive. |
20668 | Monotheism appeared in Egypt in 1350 BCE, when the god Aten was declared supreme [Harari] |
Full Idea: The first monotheist religion known to us appeared in Egypt c.1350 BCE, when Pharaoh Akenaten declared that one of minor deities of the Egyptian pantheon, the god Aten, was in fact the supreme power ruling the universe. | |
From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 12 'God') | |
A reaction: Zeus seems to have started like a tribal chief, and eventually turned into something like God. |
1893 | If God foresaw evil he would presumably prevent it, and if he only foresees some things, why those things? [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If God had forethought for all, there would be no evil in the world, yet they say the world is full of evil. And if he forethinks some things, why those and not others? | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.9) |