18 ideas
| 22864 | Philosophy is the study and criticsm of cultural beliefs, to achieve new possibilities [Dewey] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy is criticism of the influential beliefs that underlie culture, tracking them to their generating conditions and results, and considering their mutual compatibility. This terminates in a new perspective, which leads to new possibilities. | |
| From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 6:19), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey Intro | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This would make quite a good manifesto for French thinkers of the 1960s. Foucault could hardly disagree. An excellent idea. |
| 7661 | Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (How to Make our Ideas Clear [1878], p.38) | |
| A reaction: At least this affirms that truth is an ideal about which we dream, and is not confined merely to what we can actually know. But it rules out anything beyond the reach of all investigation, which seems a misconception of truth. What could angels know? |
| 17832 | Zermelo showed that the ZF axioms in 1930 were non-categorical [Zermelo, by Hallett,M] |
| Full Idea: Zermelo's paper sets out to show that the standard set-theoretic axioms (what he calls the 'constitutive axioms', thus the ZF axioms minus the axiom of infinity) have an unending sequence of different models, thus that they are non-categorical. | |
| From: report of Ernst Zermelo (On boundary numbers and domains of sets [1930]) by Michael Hallett - Introduction to Zermelo's 1930 paper p.1209 | |
| A reaction: Hallett says later that Zermelo is working with second-order set theory. The addition of an Axiom of Infinity seems to have aimed at addressing the problem, and the complexities of that were pursued by Gödel. |
| 13028 | Replacement was added when some advanced theorems seemed to need it [Zermelo, by Maddy] |
| Full Idea: Zermelo included Replacement in 1930, after it was noticed that the sequence of power sets was needed, and Replacement gave the ordinal form of the well-ordering theorem, and justification for transfinite recursion. | |
| From: report of Ernst Zermelo (On boundary numbers and domains of sets [1930]) by Penelope Maddy - Believing the Axioms I §1.8 | |
| A reaction: Maddy says that this axiom suits the 'limitation of size' theorists very well, but is not so good for the 'iterative conception'. |
| 22873 | Liberalism should improve the system, and not just ameliorate it [Dewey] |
| Full Idea: Liberalism must become radical in the sense that, instead of using social power to ameliorate the evil consequences of the existing system, it shall use social power to change the system. | |
| From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 11:287), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 4 'Dewey' | |
| A reaction: Conservative liberals ask what people want, and try to give it to them. Radical liberals ask what people actually need, and try to make it possible. The latter is bound to be a bit paternalistic, but will probably create a better world. |
| 17626 | The antinomy of endless advance and of completion is resolved in well-ordered transfinite numbers [Zermelo] |
| Full Idea: Two opposite tendencies of thought, the idea of creative advance and of collection and completion (underlying the Kantian 'antinomies') find their symbolic representation and their symbolic reconciliation in the transfinite numbers based on well-ordering. | |
| From: Ernst Zermelo (On boundary numbers and domains of sets [1930], §5) | |
| A reaction: [a bit compressed] It is this sort of idea, from one of the greatest set-theorists, that leads philosophers to think that the philosophy of mathematics may offer solutions to metaphysical problems. As an outsider, I am sceptical. |
| 22869 | Knowledge is either the product of competent enquiry, or it is meaningless [Dewey] |
| Full Idea: Knowledge, as an abstract term, is a name for the product of competent enquiries. Apart from this relation, its meaning is so empty that any content or filling may be arbitrarily poured into it. | |
| From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 12:16), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 2 'Knowledge' | |
| A reaction: What is the criterion of 'competent'? Danger of tautology, if competent enquiry is what produces knowledge. |
| 19089 | Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the objects of our conceptions to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (How to Make our Ideas Clear [1878], EP i.132), quoted by Albert Atkin - Peirce 2 'early' | |
| A reaction: This is his 1878 version, which was fine-tuned later in life. He seems to have extended his principle to include possibilities, as well as the mere objects. That is, he moved beyond mere nominalism. |
| 7660 | We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: A belief has just three properties: first, it is something that we are aware of; second, it appeases the irritation of doubt; and, third, it involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action, or, say for short, a habit. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (How to Make our Ideas Clear [1878], p.28) | |
| A reaction: Peirce probably believed that Bismarck breathed oxygen, but was unaware of his belief, and no one ever dreamed of acting on such a belief, unless Bismarck was gasping for air. |
| 22867 | The quest for certainty aims for peace, and avoidance of the stress of action [Dewey] |
| Full Idea: The quest for certainty is a quest for a peace which is assured, an object which is unqualified by risk and the shadow of fear which action costs. | |
| From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 4:7), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 2 'Intro' | |
| A reaction: This is a characteristic pragmatist account. I think Dewey and Peirce offer us the correct attitude to certainty. It is just not available to us, and can only be a delusion. That doesn't mean we don't know anything, however! |
| 22870 | No belief can be so settled that it is not subject to further inquiry [Dewey] |
| Full Idea: The attainment of settled beliefs is a progressive matter; there is no belief so settled as not to be exposed to further inquiry. | |
| From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 12:16), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 2 'Knowledge' | |
| A reaction: A nice pragmatist mantra, but no scientists gets a research grant to prove facts which have been securely established for a very long time. It is neurotic to keep returning to check that you have locked your front door. Dewey introduced 'warranted'. |
| 22866 | Mind is never isolated, but only exists in its interactions [Dewey] |
| Full Idea: Mind is primarily a verb. ...Mind never denotes anything self-contained, isolated from the world of persons and things, but is always used with respect to situations, events, objects, persons and groups. | |
| From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 10:267), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 1 'emerge' | |
| A reaction: I strongly agree with the idea that mind is a process, not a thing. Certain types of solitary introspection don't seem to quite fit his account, but in general he is right. |
| 14906 | Non-positivist verificationism says only take a hypothesis seriously if it is scientifically based and testable [Ladyman/Ross on Peirce] |
| Full Idea: With Peirce, we endorse a non-positivist version of verificationism - no hypothesis should be taken seriously if apparently beyond our capacity to investigate, and serious metaphysics must concern at least two plausible scientific hypotheses. | |
| From: comment on Charles Sanders Peirce (How to Make our Ideas Clear [1878]) by J Ladyman / D Ross - Every Thing Must Go 1.3 | |
| A reaction: [compressed] They say this is NOT a theory about meaning, as 'The Big Bang was caused by Elvis' is perfectly meaningful. Verificationism always seems to rule out bold speculation. Don't say 'take string theory seriously', if we can't test it? |
| 22872 | Liberals aim to allow individuals to realise their capacities [Dewey] |
| Full Idea: Liberalism is committed to …the liberation of individuals so that realisation of their capacities may be the law of their life. | |
| From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 11:41), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 4 'Dewey' | |
| A reaction: Capacity expression as the main aim of politics is precisely the idea developed more fully in modern times by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. It strikes me as an excellent proposal. Does it need liberalism, or socialism? |
| 22880 | The things in civilisation we prize are the products of other members of our community [Dewey] |
| Full Idea: The things in civilisation we most prize are not of ourselves. They exist by grace of the doings and sufferings of the continuous human community in which we are a link | |
| From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 9:57), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 7 'Reconstruct' | |
| A reaction: Dewey defends liberalism, but he has strong communitarian tendencies. What is the significance of an enduring community losing touch with its own achievements? |
| 22879 | 'God' is an imaginative unity of ideal values [Dewey] |
| Full Idea: 'God' represents a unification of ideal values that is essentially imaginative in origin. | |
| From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 9:29), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 7 'Construct' | |
| A reaction: This seems to have happened when a flawed God like Zeus is elevated to be the only God, and is given supreme power and wisdom. |
| 22877 | We should try attaching the intensity of religious devotion to intelligent social action [Dewey] |
| Full Idea: One of the few experiments in the attachment of emotion to ends that mankind has not tried is that of devotion (so intense as to be religious) to intelligence as a force in social action. | |
| From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 9:53), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 7 'Intro' | |
| A reaction: An interesting thought that religious emotions such as devotion are so distinctive that they can be treated as valuable, even in the absence of belief. He seems to be advocating Technocracy. |
| 22878 | Religions are so shockingly diverse that they have no common element [Dewey] |
| Full Idea: There is only a multitude of religions …and the differences between them are so great and so shocking that any common element that can be extracted is meaningless. | |
| From: John Dewey (The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston) [1930], 9:7), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 7 'Construct' | |
| A reaction: Religion is for Dewey what a game was for Wittgenstein, as an anti-essentialist example. I would have thought that they all involved some commitment to a realm of transcendent existence. |