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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Could a computer ever understand?' and 'On 'Physics''

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7 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox

6007	If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
	Full Idea: The 'undetected' or 'veiled' paradox of Eubulides says: if you know your father, and don't know the veiled person before you, but that person is your father, you both know and don't know the same person.
	From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School
	A reaction: Essentially an uninteresting equivocation on two senses of "know", but this paradox comes into its own when we try to give an account of how linguistic reference works. Frege's distinction of sense and reference tried to sort it out (Idea 4976).

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox

6006	If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
	Full Idea: The liar paradox of Eubulides says 'if you state that you are lying, and state the truth, then you are lying'.
	From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School
	A reaction: (also Cic. Acad. 2.95) Don't say it, then. These kind of paradoxes of self-reference eventually lead to Russell's 'barber' paradox and his Theory of Types.

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')

6008	Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
	Full Idea: The 'sorites' paradox of Eubulides says: if you take one grain of sand from a heap (soros), what is left is still a heap; so no matter how many grains of sand you take one by one, the result is always a heap.
	From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School
	A reaction: (also Cic. Acad. 2.49) This is a very nice paradox, which goes to the heart of our bewilderment when we try to fully understand reality. It homes in on problems of identity, as best exemplified in the Ship of Theseus (Ideas 1212 + 1213).

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence

16664	Everything that exists is either a substance or an accident [Albert of Saxony]
	Full Idea: Everything that exists is either a substance or an accident.
	From: Albert of Saxony (On 'Physics' [1357], I.18), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 13.2
	A reaction: This seems to be the view of those who base their ontology on first-order classical logic. The more austere reading of that makes the accidents into sets of substances, so it's just substances. All the non-substance stuff cries out for recognition.

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things

16703	God could make a successive thing so that previous parts cease to exist [Albert of Saxony]
	Full Idea: Something can be conceived of as successive simpliciter, with respect to both its substance and its state. For example, if Socrates were continually made and made again by the First Cause, as the Seine flow, so nothing of what preexists remains.
	From: Albert of Saxony (On 'Physics' [1357], III.3), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.4
	A reaction: This is precisely the problem that modern stage theory faces, of knowing how to connect the stages together.

16699	Successive entities just need parts to succeed one another, without their existence [Albert of Saxony]
	Full Idea: For existence to hold of completely successive entities it is not required that their parts exist, but that one part succeed another, as a future part succeeds a past part.
	From: Albert of Saxony (On 'Physics' [1357], III.3 ad 2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.3
	A reaction: A nice move, but it doesn't quite solve it. How can non-existent things 'succeed one another'? It is worrying for metaphysics that some things have entirely different concepts of persistence from other things.

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness

4921	Quantum states in microtubules could bind brain activity to produce consciousness [Penrose]
	Full Idea: I propose that microtubules in nerve cells could give rise to a stable quantum state that would bind the activity of brain cells throughout the cerebrum and in doing so give rise to consciousness.
	From: Roger Penrose (Could a computer ever understand? [1998], p.329)
	A reaction: This seems to offer a physical theory to account for the 'unity' of the mind (which so impressed Descartes), but I don't quite see why being aware of things would ensue from some 'quantum binding'. I daresay 'quantum binding' occurs in the Sun.