65 ideas
421 | Men who love wisdom must be inquirers into very many things indeed [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: Men who love wisdom must be inquirers into very many things indeed. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B035), quoted by Clement - Miscellanies 5.140.5 | |
A reaction: …which invites the question 'Is there anything that a wisdom-seeker should NOT be interested in?' |
1491 | Everyone has the potential for self-knowledge and sound thinking [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: Everyone has the potential for self-knowledge and sound thinking. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B116), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.05.06 | |
A reaction: This is true. When people are labelled as incapable of philosophy (e.g. by Plato), it is just that they are slow developers. |
5863 | Reason is eternal, but men are foolish [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: Although reason exists forever, men are foolish. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE]), quoted by Aristotle - The Art of Rhetoric 1407b | |
A reaction: The despair of all philosophers (e.g. Plato) who think reason is the easiest thing in the world, and stares everyone in the face, and yet people seem to spurn this supreme gift from the gods. They needed the optimism of the career teacher. |
414 | Logos is common to all, but most people live as if they have a private understanding [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: Although the universal law (logos) is common to all, the majority live as if they had understanding peculiar to themselves. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B002), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 7.133.4- | |
A reaction: Heraclitus mentions 'logos' in just three fragments - this one, and Idea 15660 and Idea 424. |
416 | Beautiful harmony comes from things that are in opposition to one another [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: That which is in opposition is in concert, and from things that differ comes the beautiful harmony. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B008), quoted by Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics 1155b04 |
425 | A thing can have opposing tensions but be in harmony, like a lyre [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: They do not understand how that which differs with itself is in agreement: harmony consists of opposing tensions, like that of the bow and the lyre. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B051), quoted by Hippolytus - Refutation of All Heresies 9.9.2 | |
A reaction: Like squabbling couples who resent outside intervention. The remark suggests the virtues of 'dialectic', and may get to the heart of what philosophy is. |
1312 | If everything is and isn't then everything is true, and a midway between true and false makes everything false [Aristotle on Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: The remark of Heraclitus that all things are and are not effectively renders all assertions true, and that of Anaxagoras that there is an intermediary between assertion and negation makes all assertions false. | |
From: comment on Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1012a | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 416. Heraclitus is discussing truth-value 'gluts', as in paraconsistent logic, and Anaxagoras is discussing truth-value 'gaps', as in three-valued Kleene logic. |
10373 | Logical form can't dictate metaphysics, as it may propose an undesirable property [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Logical form should not have the last word in metaphysics, since it might predicate a property that we have theoretical reason to reject. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.3.1) | |
A reaction: These kind of warnings need to be sounded all the time, to prevent logicians and language experts from pitching their tents in the middle of metaphysics. They are welcome guests only, |
10367 | There is only one fact - the True [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: It can be argued that if all facts are logically equivalent, then there is only one fact - the True. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [he cites Davidson's 'Causal Relations', who cites Frege] This is the sort of bizarre stuff you end up with if you start from formal logic and work out to the world, instead of vice versa. |
15658 | The hidden harmony is stronger than the visible [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: The hidden harmony is stronger (or 'better') than the visible. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B055), quoted by Hippolytus - Refutation of All Heresies 9.9.5 | |
A reaction: 'An unapparent connection [harmonia] is stronger than an apparent one' is Curd's translation. I'm taking this for essentialism. It is the basic idea of the essentialising child (see Gelman). The hidden explains the apparent. |
13782 | Everything gives way, and nothing stands fast [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: Everything gives way, and nothing stands fast. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Cratylus 402a | |
A reaction: This is as good a summary of the Heraclitus view of things as any, and Plato appears to present it as a verbatim quotation. |
11853 | A mixed drink separates if it is not stirred [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: The mixed drink, of wine, cheese and barley, separates if it is not stirred. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B125) | |
A reaction: Wiggins quotes this, because it seems to be Heraclitus struggling to decide what sortal his drink falls under. I take it to be a problem of vagueness, since separation and mixing occur along a continuum, like a sorites. |
427 | It is not possible to step twice into the same river [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: It is not possible to step twice into the same river. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B091), quoted by Plutarch - 24: The E at Delphi 392b10- |
11091 | You can bathe in the same river twice, but not in the same river stage [Quine on Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: You can bathe in the same river twice, but not in the same river stage. | |
From: comment on Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE]) by Willard Quine - Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis 1 | |
A reaction: This seems to make Quine a 'perdurantist', committed to time-slices of objects, rather than whole objects enduring through change. |
2064 | If flux is continuous, then lack of change can't be a property, so everything changes in every possible way [Plato on Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: According to Heracliteans, since things must be changing, and since lack of change can't be a property of anything, then everything is always undergoing change of every kind. | |
From: comment on Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B030) by Plato - Theaetetus 182a |
430 | Senses are no use if the soul is corrupt [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: The eyes and ears are bad witnesses for men if they have barbarian souls. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B107), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Mathematicians 7.126 |
1500 | When we sleep, reason closes down as the senses do [Heraclitus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Since when we sleep the senses are closed, mind is separated from its surroundings and loses the power of memory. When we wake the mind re-contacts the world, and regains the power of reason. | |
From: report of Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], A16) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 7.130 |
417 | Donkeys prefer chaff to gold [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: Donkeys prefer chaff to gold. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B009), quoted by Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics 1176a07 |
426 | Sea water is life-giving for fish, but not for people [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: Sea-water is the purest and the most polluted: for fish it is drinkable and life-giving; for men, not drinkable and destructive. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B061), quoted by Hippolytus - Refutation of All Heresies 9.10.5 |
431 | Health, feeding and rest are only made good by disease, hunger and weariness [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: Disease makes health pleasant and good, hunger makes satisfaction good, weariness makes rest good. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B111), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.1.178 |
1757 | The Electra: she knows this man, but not that he is her brother [Eucleides, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The 'Electra': Electra knows that Orestes is her brother, but not that this man is Orestes, so she knows and does not know her brother simultaneously. | |
From: report of Eucleides (fragments/reports [c.410 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Eu.4 | |
A reaction: Hence we distinguish 'know of', 'know that' and 'know how'. Hence Russell makes 'knowledge by acquaintance' fundamental, and descriptions come later. |
429 | To God (though not to humans) all things are beautiful and good and just [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: To God, all things are beautiful, good and just; but men have assumed some things to be unjust, others just. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B102), quoted by Porphyry - Notes on Homer Il.4.4 | |
A reaction: The idea that all things are actually 'just' strikes me as nonsense. I also don't think I can get my head round the idea that everything is actually good and beautiful. Must try harder. |
12294 | Good and evil are the same thing [Heraclitus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Heraclitus said that good and evil are the same thing. | |
From: report of Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], 58/102) by Aristotle - Topics 159b32 | |
A reaction: Heaven knows what he meant by this, though it sounds suspiciously like moral nihilism. Maybe Heraclitus was not a very nice man. Or is the thought a more sophisticated one, in line with Nietzsche's remarks about cultural morality? |
419 | If one does not hope, one will not find the unhoped-for, since nothing leads to it [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: If one does not hope, one will not find the unhoped-for, since there is no trail leading to it and no path. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B018), quoted by Clement - Miscellanies 2.17.4 | |
A reaction: The best remark about hope I have ever encountered. Usually they are empty platitudes. |
3028 | The chief good is unity, sometimes seen as prudence, or God, or intellect [Eucleides] |
Full Idea: The chief good is unity, which is known by several names, for at one time people call it prudence, at another time God, at another intellect, and so on. | |
From: Eucleides (fragments/reports [c.410 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.9.2 | |
A reaction: So the chief good is what unites and focuses our moral actions. Kant calls that 'the will'. |
415 | If happiness is bodily pleasure, then oxen are happy when they have vetch to eat [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: If happiness lay in bodily pleasures, we would call oxen happy when they find vetch to eat. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B004), quoted by Albertus Magnus - On Vegetables 6.401 | |
A reaction: But surely oxen are happy when they find some good vetch? Presumably, though, they are not 'eudaimon'. What is the complete fulfilment of life for an ox? |
5155 | It is hard to fight against emotion, but harder still to fight against pleasure [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: It is hard to fight against emotion, but harder still to fight against pleasure. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B085), quoted by Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics 1105a08 | |
A reaction: 'Emotion' is the Greek word 'thumos'. "The only way to get rid of a temptation is to yield to it", said Oscar Wilde. Heraclitus underestimates how very good many modern people are at dieting. |
433 | For man character is destiny [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: For man character is destiny. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B119), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.40.23 | |
A reaction: This is the extreme opposite of Sartre's existentialist claim that we can entirely change ourselves. Personally I am with Heraclitus, though I don't see why our destined character shouldn't be modified (e.g. by education). |
422 | The people should fight for the law as if for their city-wall [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: The people should fight for the law as if for their city-wall. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B044), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.2 | |
A reaction: This may be the first recorded assertion of the rule of law, and hence of the separation of powers. We still have plenty of people who reject this principle. |
614 | Heraclitus said sometimes everything becomes fire [Heraclitus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Heraclitus claimed that from time to time everything becomes fire. | |
From: report of Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1067a |
424 | Reason tells us that all things are one [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: When you have listened, not to me but to the law (logos), it is wise to agree that all things are one. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B050), quoted by Hippolytus - Refutation of All Heresies 9.9.1 |
5096 | Heraclitus says that at some time everything becomes fire [Heraclitus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Heraclitus says that at some time everything becomes fire. | |
From: report of Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 204b37 | |
A reaction: Modern cosmology says that Heraclitus was right (pretty much). If we say 'energy' instead of 'fire' (which may be what he meant), then he is absolutely spot-on. |
17539 | The sayings of Heraclitus are still correct, if we replace 'fire' with 'energy' [Heraclitus, by Heisenberg] |
Full Idea: If we replace Heraclitus's word 'fire' by the word 'energy' we can almost repeat his statements word for word from our modern point of view. | |
From: report of Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE]) by Werner Heisenberg - Physics and Philosophy 04 | |
A reaction: My problem has always been that I have no idea what 'energy' is, so I'm none the wiser. |
3054 | Heraclitus said fire could be transformed to create the other lower elements [Heraclitus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Heraclitus taught that fire when densified becomes liquid, and becoming concrete, becomes also water; again, that the water when concrete is turned to earth, and this is the road down. | |
From: report of Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.1.6 |
15660 | Logos is the source of everything, and my theories separate and explain each nature [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: All things come into being according to this Law ('logos'), ...and I expound theories (words) and processes (actions) separating each thing according to its nature and explaining how it is made. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B001), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Mathematicians 7.133 | |
A reaction: I like the fact that things are separated according to their natures (particulars!), and not that natures are somehow bestowed on individuals. |
10359 | In causation there are three problems of relata, and three metaphysical problems [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: The questions about causation concern their relata (in space-time, how fine-grained, how many?) and the metaphysics (distinguish causal sequences from others, the direction of causation, selecting causes among pre-conditions?). | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], Intro) | |
A reaction: A very nice map (which has got me thinking about restructuring this database). I can't think of a better way to do philosophy than this (let's hear it for analysis - but the greatest role models for the approach are Aristotle and Aquinas). |
10372 | Causation may not be transitive; the last event may follow from the first, but not be caused by it [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: It is not clear whether causation is transitive. For example, if a boulder roll's towards a hiker's head, causing the hiker to duck, which causes the hiker to survive, it does not seem that the rolling boulder causes the survival of the hiker. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.2) | |
A reaction: Maybe survival is not an event or an effect. How many times have I survived in my life? We could, though, say that the hiker strained a muscle as he or she ducked. But then it is unclear whether the boulder caused the muscle-strain. |
10374 | There are at least ten theories about causal connections [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Theories of causal connection are: nomological subsumption, statistical correlation, counterfactual dependence, agential manipulability, contiguous change, energy flow, physical processes, property transference, primitivism and eliminativism. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.3.1) | |
A reaction: Schaffer reduces these to probability and process. I prefer the latter. The first two are wrong, the third right but superficial, the fourth wrong, the fifth, sixth and seventh on the right lines, the eighth wrong, the ninth tempting, and the last wrong. |
10366 | Causation transcends nature, because absences can cause things [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: The main argument for causation being transcendent (rather than being immanent in nature) is that absences can be involved in causal relations. Thus a rock-climber is caused to survive by not falling. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.1) | |
A reaction: I don't like that. The obvious strategy is to redescribe the events. Even being hit with a brick could be described as an 'absence of brick-prevention'. So not being hit by a brick can be described as 'presence of brick prevention'. |
10377 | Causation may not be a process, if a crucial part of the process is 'disconnected' [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: One problem case for the process view of causation is 'disconnection'. If a brick breaks a window by being fired from a catapult, a latch is released which was preventing the catapult from firing, so the 'process' is just internal to the catapult. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.1) | |
A reaction: Schaffer says the normal reply is to deny that the catch-releasing is genuinely causal. I would have thought we should go more fine-grained, and identify linked components of the causal process. |
10378 | A causal process needs to be connected to the effect in the right way [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: A problem case for the process view of causation is 'misconnection'. A process may be connected to an effect, without being causal, as when someone watches an act of vandalism in dismay. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.1) | |
A reaction: This is a better objection to the process view than Idea 10377. If I push a window with increasing force until it breaks, the process is continuous, but it suddenly becomes a cause. |
10382 | Causation can't be a process, because a process needs causation as a primitive [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: It might be that if causation is said to be a process, then a process is nothing more than a causal sequence, so that causation is primitive. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2) | |
A reaction: This again is tempting (as well as the primitivist view of probabilistic causation). If one tries to define a process as mere chronology, then the causal and accidental are indistinguishable. I take the label 'primitive' to be just our failure. |
10375 | At least four rivals have challenged the view that causal direction is time direction [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: The traditional view that the direction of causation is the direction of time has been challenged, by the direction of forking, by overdetermination, by independence, and by manipulation, which all seem to be one-directional features. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.3.1) | |
A reaction: Personally I incline to the view that time is prior, and fixes the direction of causation. I'm not sure that 'backward causation' can be stated coherently, even if it is metaphysically or naturally possible. |
10389 | Causal order must be temporal, or else causes could be blocked, and time couldn't be explained [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Reasons for causal order being temporal order are that otherwise the effect might occur but the cause then get prevented, ..and that they must be the same, because the temporal order can only be analysed in terms of the causal order. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.2) | |
A reaction: If one took both time and causation as primitive, then the second argument would be void. The first argument, though, sounds pretty overwhelming to me. |
10390 | Causal order is not temporal, because of time travel, and simultanous, joint or backward causes [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Reasons for denying that causal order is temporal order are that time travel seems possible, that cause and effect can be simultaneous, because joint effects have temporal order without causal connection, and because backward causation may exist. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.2) | |
A reaction: The possibility of time travel and backward causation can clearly be doubted, and certainly can't be grounds for one's whole metaphysics. The other two need careful analysis, but I think they can be answered. Causation is temporal. |
10380 | Causation is primitive; it is too intractable and central to be reduced; all explanations require it [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Primitivism arises from our failure to reduce causation, but also from causation being too central to reduce. The probability and process accounts are said to be inevitably circular, as they cannot be understood without reference to causation. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2) | |
A reaction: This is very tempting. The primitive view, though, must deal with the direction problem, which may suggest that time is even more primitive. Can we have a hierarchy of primitiveness? To be alive is to be causal. |
10385 | If causation is just observables, or part of common sense, or vacuous, it can't be primitive [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: The three main objections to causation being primitive are that causation can't be anything more than what we observe, or that such a primitive is too spooky to be acceptable, or that primitivism leads to elimination of causation. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2) | |
A reaction: [summarised] I don't like the first (Humean) view. I suspect that anything which we finally decide has to be primitive (time, for example) is going to be left looking 'spooky', and I suspect that eliminativism is just Humeanism in disguise. |
10388 | Causation is utterly essential for numerous philosophical explanations [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Causation can't be eliminated if it is needed to explain persistence, explanation, disposition, perception, warrant, action, responsibility, mental functional role, conceptual content, and reference. It's elimination would be catastrophic. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2) | |
A reaction: [compressed list] I think I am going to vote for the view that causation is one of the primitives in the metaphysics of nature, so I have to agree with this. Most of the listed items, though, are controversial, so eliminativists are not defeated. |
10387 | The notion of causation allows understanding of science, without appearing in equations [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: The concepts of 'event', 'law', 'cause' and 'explanation' are nomic concepts which serve to allow a systematic understanding of science; they do not themselves appear in the equations. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2) | |
A reaction: This is a criticism of Russell's attempt to eliminate causation from science. It shows that there has to be something we can call 'metascience', which is the province of philosophers, since scientists don't have much interest in it. |
10384 | If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Causation seems to be primitive if the same laws and patterns of events might embody three different possible causes, as when two magicians cast the same successful spell, each with a 50% chance of success, and who was successful is unclear. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2) | |
A reaction: I'm cautious when the examples involve magic. It implies that the process that leads to the result will be impossible to observe, but if magic never really happens, then the patterns of events will always be different. |
10386 | If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: The view that causation is primitive can be defended against Humean critics by saying that causation can be directly observed in the will or our bodies, or that it can be inferred as the best explanation. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2) | |
A reaction: I like both views, and have just converted myself to the primitivist view of causation! I can't know the essence of a tree, because I am not a tree, but I can know the essence of causation. The Greek fascination with explaining movement is linked. |
10361 | Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly) [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Events are relatively coarse-grained, unlike facts; so the event of John's saying 'hello' seems to be the same event as John's saying 'hello' loudly, while they seem to be different facts. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1) | |
A reaction: The example seems good support for facts, since saying 'hello' loudly could have quite different effects from just saying 'hello'. I also incline temperamentally towards a fine-grained account, because it is more reductivist. |
10360 | Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: The standard view make causal relata events (Davidson, Kim, Lewis), but there is considerable support for facts (Bennett, Mellor), and occasional support for features (Dretske), tropes (Campbell), states of affairs (Armstrong), and situations and aspects. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1) | |
A reaction: An event is presumed to be concrete, while a fact is more abstract (a proposition, perhaps). I'm always drawn to 'processes' (because they are good for discussing the mind), so an event, as a sort of natural process, looks good. |
10362 | One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*' [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: The view that there are two causal relata is widely assumed but seldom defended. But the account based on 'effectual difference' says the form is 'c causes e rather than e*'. One might defend four relata, in 'c rather than c* causes e rather than e*'. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This doesn't sound very plausible to me. How do you decide which is e*? If I lob a brick into the crowd, it hits Jim rather than - who? |
10368 | If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Theorists who reject both events and facts as causal relata do so because the relata must be immanent in nature, and thus not facts, but also fine-grained and thus not events. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.2) | |
A reaction: Kim, however, offers a fine-grained account of events (as |
10383 | The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation! [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: The primitivist about causation might say that the notion of an event (or other relata) cannot be understood without reference to causation, because properties themselves are individuated by their causal role. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2) | |
A reaction: Having enthusiastically embraced the causal view of properties (see Shoemaker and Ellis), I suddenly realise that I seem required to embrace primitivism about causation, which I hadn't anticipated! I've no immediate problem with that. |
10393 | Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: The main argument against saying that there is no basis for selecting the one cause of an event is that our selections are too predictable to be without a basis. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.3) | |
A reaction: The problem is that we CAN, if we wish, whimsically pick out any pre-condition of an event for discussion (e.g. the railways before WW1). I would say that sensitivity to nature leads us to a moderately correct selection of 'the' cause. |
10394 | Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Another argument against the view that there is no basis for selecting 'the' cause is that we have no concept of causation without such a selection. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.3) | |
A reaction: Good. Otherwise we could only state the conditions preceding an event, and then every event that occurred at any given moment in a region would have the same cause. How can 'the' cause be necessary, and yet capricious? |
10376 | The actual cause may make an event less likely than a possible more effective cause [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: If Pam threw the brick that broke the window, then Bob (who refrained) might be a more reliable vandal, so that Pam's throw might have made the shattering less likely, so probability-raising is not necessary for causation. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1) | |
A reaction: That objection looks pretty conclusive to me. I take the probabilistic view to be a non-starter. |
10381 | All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive: nomological - to distinguish laws from generalizations; statistical - to decide background; counterfactual - decide background; agent intervention - to understand intervention. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2) | |
A reaction: I don't need much convincing that the probabilistic view is wrong. To just accept causation as primitive seems an awful defeat for philosophy. We should be able to characterise it, even if we cannot know its essence. |
12269 | All things are in a state of motion [Heraclitus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: All things are in a state of motion. | |
From: report of Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE]) by Aristotle - Topics 104b22 | |
A reaction: This seems right, I would say. It seems to make a 'process' the fundamental category of ontology, rather than an 'object'. |
420 | The cosmos is eternal not created, and is an ever-living and changing fire [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: This cosmos, which is the same for all, was not created by any one of the gods or of mankind, but it was ever and is and shall be ever-living fire, kindled and quenched in measure. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B030), quoted by Clement - Miscellanies 5.1.103 |
1499 | Heraclitus says intelligence draws on divine reason [Heraclitus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: According to Heraclitus we become intelligent by drawing on divine reason. | |
From: report of Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], A16) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 7.129 |
15659 | Purifying yourself with blood is as crazy as using mud to wash off mud [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: They purify themselves by staining themselves with other blood, as if one were to step into mud to wash off mud. But a man would be thought mad if any of his fellow-men should perceive him acting thus. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B005), quoted by Origen - Against Celsus 7.62 |
1501 | In their ignorance people pray to statues, which is like talking to a house [Heraclitus] |
Full Idea: In their ignorance of the true nature of gods and heroes people pray to these statues, which is like someone holding a conversation with a house. | |
From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B005), quoted by Anon (Pyth) - Theosophia Tubigensis 68 |