Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Summa', 'How free does the will need to be?' and 'Theory of Knowledge (2nd ed 1977)'

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5 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance

16616	Substances 'substand' (beneath accidents), or 'subsist' (independently) [Eustachius]
	Full Idea: It is proper to substance both to stretch out or exist beneath accidents, which is to substand, and to exist per se and not in another, which is to subsist.
	From: Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (Summa [1609], I.1.3b.1.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 06.2
	A reaction: This reflects Aristotle wavering between 'ousia' being the whole of a thing, or the substrate of a thing. In current discussion, 'substance' still wavers between a thing which 'is' a substance, and substance being the essence.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism

16585	Prime matter is free of all forms, but has the potential for all forms [Eustachius]
	Full Idea: Everyone says that prime matter, considered in itself, is free of all forms and at the same time is open to all forms - or, that matter is in potentiality to all forms.
	From: Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (Summa [1609], III.1.1.2.3), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.1
	A reaction: This is the notorious doctrine developed to support the hylomorphic picture derived from Aristotle. No one could quite figure out what prime matter was, so it faded away.

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth

19569	We have a basic epistemic duty to believe truth and avoid error [Chisholm, by Kvanvig]
	Full Idea: Chisholm says our fundamental epistemic duties arise from the fundamental duty to (do one's best to) believe the truth and avoid error.
	From: report of Roderick Chisholm (Theory of Knowledge (2nd ed 1977) [1966]) by Jonathan Kvanvig - Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal 'Epistemic'
	A reaction: Since it strikes me as impossible to perceive something as being true, and yet still not believe it (except in moments of shock), I don't see why we need to introduce dubious claims about 'duty' here. Stupidity isn't a failure of duty.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility

20168	Blame usually has no effect if the recipient thinks it unjustified [Williams,B]
	Full Idea: One of the most obvious facts about blame is that in many cases it is effective only if the recipient thinks that it is justified.
	From: Bernard Williams (How free does the will need to be? [1985], 5)
	A reaction: The point of the blame might not be reform of the agent, but a public justification for punishment as deterrence, in which case who cares what the agent thinks? Is blame attribution of causes, or reasons to punish?

20167	Blame partly rests on the fiction that blamed agents always know their obligations [Williams,B]
	Full Idea: Blame rests, in part, on a fiction; the idea that ethical reasons, in particular the special kind of ethical reasons that are obligations, must, really, be available to the blamed agent.
	From: Bernard Williams (How free does the will need to be? [1985], 5)
	A reaction: In blaming someone, you may be telling them that they should know their obligations, rather than assuming that they do know them. How else can we give children a moral education?