20 ideas
19306 | It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman] |
Full Idea: I am assuming the following principle: Clutter Avoidance - in reasoning, one should not clutter one's mind with trivialities. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Change in View: Principles of Reasoning [1986], 2) | |
A reaction: I like Harman's interest in the psychology of reasoning. In the world of Frege, it is taboo to talk about psychology. |
19304 | The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman] |
Full Idea: Rules of deduction are rules of deductive argument; they are not rules of inference or reasoning. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Change in View: Principles of Reasoning [1986], 1) | |
A reaction: And I have often noticed that good philosophing reasoners and good logicians are frequently not the same people. |
19307 | If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman] |
Full Idea: We sometimes discover our views are inconsistent and do not know how to revise them in order to avoid inconsistency without great cost. The best response may be to keep the inconsistency and try to avoid inferences that exploit it. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Change in View: Principles of Reasoning [1986], 2) | |
A reaction: Any decent philosopher should face this dilemma regularly. I assume non-philosophers don't compare the different compartments of their beliefs very much. Students of non-monotonic logics are trying to formalise such thinking. |
19309 | Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman] |
Full Idea: Although logic does not seem specially relevant to reasoning, immediate implication and immediate inconsistency do seem important for reasoning. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Change in View: Principles of Reasoning [1986], 2) | |
A reaction: Ordinary thinkers can't possibly track complex logical implications, so we have obviously developed strategies for coping. I assume formal logic is contructed from the basic ingredients of the immediate and obvious implications, such as modus ponens. |
19303 | Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman] |
Full Idea: Implication is cumulative, in a way that inference may not be. In argument one accumulates conclusions; things are always added, never subtracted. Reasoned revision, however, can subtract from one's view as well as add. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Change in View: Principles of Reasoning [1986], 1) | |
A reaction: This has caught Harman's attention, I think (?), because he is looking for non-monotonic reasoning (i.e. revisable reasoning) within a classical framework. If revision is responding to evidence, the logic can remain conventional. |
18767 | Free logics has terms that do not designate real things, and even empty domains [Anderson,CA] |
Full Idea: Free logics say 1) singular terms are allowed that do not designate anything that exists; sometimes 2) is added: the domain of discourse is allowed to be empty. Logics with both conditions are called 'universally free logics'. | |
From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.3) | |
A reaction: I really like the sound of this, and aim to investigate it. Karel Lambert's writings are the starting point. Maybe the domain of logic is our concepts, rather than things in the world, in which case free logic sounds fine. |
18763 | Basic variables in second-order logic are taken to range over subsets of the individuals [Anderson,CA] |
Full Idea: Under its now standard principal interpretation, the monadic predicate variables in second-order logic range over subsets of the domain on individuals. | |
From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 1.5) | |
A reaction: This is an interpretation in which properties are just sets of things, which is fine if you are a logician, but not if you want to talk about anything important. Still, we must play the game. Boolos introduced plural quantification at this point. |
18771 | Stop calling ∃ the 'existential' quantifier, read it as 'there is...', and range over all entities [Anderson,CA] |
Full Idea: Ontological quantifiers might just as well range over all the entities needed for the semantics. ...The minimal way would be to just stop calling '∃' an 'existential quantifier', and always read it as 'there is...' rather than 'there exists...'. | |
From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.6) | |
A reaction: There is no right answer here, but it seems to be the strategy adopted by most logicians, and the majority of modern metaphysicians. They just allow abstracta, and even fictions, to 'exist', while not being fussy what it means. Big mistake! |
18769 | Do mathematicians use 'existence' differently when they say some entity exists? [Anderson,CA] |
Full Idea: A cursory examination shows that mathematicians have no aversion to saying that this-or-that mathematical entity exists. But is this a different sense of 'existence'? | |
From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.6) | |
A reaction: For those of us like me and my pal Quine who say that 'exist' is univocal (i.e. only one meaning), this is a nice challenge. Quine solves it by saying maths concerns sets of objects. I, who don't like sets, am puzzled (so I turn to fictionalism...). |
18770 | We can distinguish 'ontological' from 'existential' commitment, for different kinds of being [Anderson,CA] |
Full Idea: There are sensible ways to maike a distinction between different kinds of being. ..One need not fear that this leads to a 'bloated ontology'. ...We need only distinguish 'ontological commitment' from 'existential commitment' | |
From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.6) | |
A reaction: He speaks of giving fictional and abstract entities a 'lower score' in existence. I think he means the 'ontological' commitment to be the stronger of the two. |
18766 | 's is non-existent' cannot be said if 's' does not designate [Anderson,CA] |
Full Idea: The paradox of negative existentials says that if 's' does not designate something, then the sentence 's is non-existent' is untrue. | |
From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.1) | |
A reaction: This only seems be a problem for logicians. Everyone else can happily say 'my coffee is non-existent'. |
18768 | We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA] |
Full Idea: Parmenides was correct - one cannot speak of that which is not, even to say that it is not. But one can speak of concepts and say of them that they do not correspond to anything real. | |
From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.5) | |
A reaction: [This summarises Alonso Church, who was developing Frege] This sounds like the right thing to say about non-existence, but then the same principle must apply to assertions of existence, which will also be about concepts and not things. |
18765 | Individuation was a problem for medievals, then Leibniz, then Frege, then Wittgenstein (somewhat) [Anderson,CA] |
Full Idea: The medieval philosophers and then Leibniz were keen on finding 'principles of individuation', and the idea appears again in Frege, to be taken up in some respects by Wittgenstein. | |
From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 1.6) | |
A reaction: I take a rather empirical approach to this supposed problem, and suggest we break 'individuation' down into its component parts, and then just drop the word. Discussions of principles of individuations strike me as muddled. Wiggins and Lowe today. |
18764 | The notion of 'property' is unclear for a logical version of the Identity of Indiscernibles [Anderson,CA] |
Full Idea: In the Identity of Indiscernibles, one speaks about properties, and the notion of a property is by no means clearly fixed and formalized in modern symbolic logic. | |
From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 1.5) | |
A reaction: The unclarity of 'property' is a bee in my philosophical bonnet, in speech, and in metaphysics, as well as in logic. It may well be the central problem in our attempts to understand the world in general terms. He cites intensional logic as promising. |
19305 | The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman] |
Full Idea: The Gambler's Fallacy says if black has come up ten times in a row, red must be highly probable next time. It overlooks how the impact of an initial run of one color can become more and more insignificant as the sequence gets longer. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Change in View: Principles of Reasoning [1986], 1) | |
A reaction: At what point do you decide that the roulette wheel is fixed, rather than that you have fallen for the Gambler's Fallacy? Interestingly, standard induction points to the opposite conclusion. But then you have prior knowledge of the wheel. |
19310 | High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman] |
Full Idea: Propositions that are individually highly probable can have an immediate implication that is not. The fact that one can assign a high probability to P and also to 'if P then Q' is not sufficient reason to assign high probability to Q. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Change in View: Principles of Reasoning [1986], 3) | |
A reaction: He cites Kyburg's Lottery Paradox. It is probable that there is a winning ticket, and that this ticket is not it. Thus it is NOT probable that I will win. |
19308 | We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it [Harman] |
Full Idea: Moore's Paradox: one is strongly disposed not to believe both P and that one does not believe that P, while realising that these propositions are perfectly consistent with one another. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Change in View: Principles of Reasoning [1986], 2) | |
A reaction: [Where in Moore?] A very nice example of a powerful principle of reasoning which can never be captured in logic. |
19311 | In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman] |
Full Idea: The key issue in belief revision is whether one needs to keep track of one's original justifications for beliefs. What I am calling the 'foundations' theory says yes; what I am calling the 'coherence' theory says no. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Change in View: Principles of Reasoning [1986], 4) | |
A reaction: I favour coherence in all things epistemological, and this idea seems to match real life, where I am very confident of many beliefs of which I have forgotten the justification. Harman says coherentists need the justification only when they doubt a belief. |
19312 | Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman] |
Full Idea: Coherence in a view consists in connections of intelligibility among the elements of the view. Among other things these included explanatory connections, which hold when part of one's view makes it intelligible why some other part should be true. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Change in View: Principles of Reasoning [1986], 7) | |
A reaction: Music to my ears. I call myself an 'explanatory empiricist', and embrace a coherence theory of justification. This is the framework within which philosophy should be practised. Harman is our founder, and Paul Thagard our guru. |
5655 | Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton] |
Full Idea: For Bradley, the happiness of the individual is not to be understood in terms of his desires and needs, but rather in terms of his values - which is to say, in terms of those of his desires which he incorporates into his self. | |
From: report of F.H. Bradley (Ethical Studies [1876]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.16 | |
A reaction: Good. Bentham will reduce the values to a further set of desires, so that a value is a complex (second-level?) desire. I prefer to think of values as judgements, but I like Scruton's phrase of 'incorporating into his self'. Kant take note (Idea 1452). |