Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ethical Studies', 'Recent Work on Consciousness' and 'Aristotelian commentaries'

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6 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification

16751	Unity by aggregation, order, inherence, composition, and simplicity [Conimbricense, by Pasnau]
	Full Idea: The Coimbrans have five degrees of unity: by aggregation (stones), by order (an army), per accidens (inherence), per se composite unity (connected), and per se unity of simple things.
	From: report of Collegium Conimbricense (Aristotelian commentaries [1595], Phys I.9.11.2) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.3
	A reaction: [my summary of Pasnau's summary] Take some stones, then order them, then glue them together, then melt them together. The unity of inherence is a different type of unity from these stages. This is a hylomorphic view.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary

16720	Secondary qualities come from temperaments and proportions of primary qualities [Conimbricense]
	Full Idea: Colors, flavours, smells, and other secondary qualities arise from the various temperaments and proportions of the primary qualities.
	From: Collegium Conimbricense (Aristotelian commentaries [1595], I.10.4 Gen&C), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 21.2
	A reaction: This is a bit more subtle than merely mixing the primary qualities. What about the powers of the primary qualities? Presumably that is the 'temperaments'?

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy

7522	A full neural account of qualia will give new epistemic access to them, beyond private experience [Churchlands]
	Full Idea: When the hidden neurophysiological structure of qualia (if there is any) gets revealed by unfolding research, then we will automatically gain a new epistemic access to qualia, beyond each person's native and exclusive capacity for internal discrimination.
	From: Churchland / Churchland (Recent Work on Consciousness [1997])
	A reaction: Carefully phrased and hard to deny, but something is impenetrable. What experience does an insect have when it encounters ultra-violet light? Nothing remotely interesting about their qualia is likely to emerge from the study of insect brains.

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia

7521	It is question-begging to assume that qualia are totally simple, hence irreducible [Churchlands]
	Full Idea: One of the crucial premises of the antireductionists - concerning the intrinsic, nonrelational, metaphysical simplicity of our sensory qualia - is a question-begging and unsupported assumption.
	From: Churchland / Churchland (Recent Work on Consciousness [1997])
	A reaction: This is a key point for reductionists, with emphasis on the sheer numbers of connections involved in a simple quale (I estimate a billion involved in one small patch of red).

7523	The qualia Hard Problem is easy, in comparison with the co-ordination of mental states [Churchlands]
	Full Idea: The so-called Hard Problem (of qualia) appears to be one of the easiest, in comparison with the problems of short-term memory, fluid and directable attention, the awake state vs sleep, and the unity of consciousness.
	From: Churchland / Churchland (Recent Work on Consciousness [1997])
	A reaction: Most of their version of the Hard Problems centre on personal identity, and the centralised co-ordination of mental events. I am inclined to agree with them. Worriers about qualia should think more about the complexity of systems of neurons.

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness

5655	Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton]
	Full Idea: For Bradley, the happiness of the individual is not to be understood in terms of his desires and needs, but rather in terms of his values - which is to say, in terms of those of his desires which he incorporates into his self.
	From: report of F.H. Bradley (Ethical Studies [1876]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.16
	A reaction: Good. Bentham will reduce the values to a further set of desires, so that a value is a complex (second-level?) desire. I prefer to think of values as judgements, but I like Scruton's phrase of 'incorporating into his self'. Kant take note (Idea 1452).