9463
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Classical logic is bivalent, has excluded middle, and only quantifies over existent objects [Jacquette]
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Full Idea:
Classical logic (of Whitehead, Russell, Gödel, Church) is a two-valued system of propositional and predicate logic, in which all propositions are exclusively true or false, and quantification and predication are over existent objects only.
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From:
Dale Jacquette (Intro to I: Classical Logic [2002], p.9)
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A reaction:
All of these get challenged at some point, though the existence requirement is the one I find dubious.
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7627
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You can't reduce epistemology to psychology, because that presupposes epistemology [Maund on Quine]
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Full Idea:
There is something seriously misguided about Quine's project of reducing epistemology to psychology, since psychology, like any of the natural sciences, presupposes an epistemology.
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From:
comment on Willard Quine (Epistemology Naturalized [1968]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.1
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A reaction:
I wonder if epistemology presupposes psychology? Belief, for example, is a category of folk psychology, which could be challenged. There is a quiet battle going on between philosophy and science.
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8871
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We should abandon a search for justification or foundations, and focus on how knowledge is acquired [Quine, by Davidson]
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Full Idea:
Quine is suggesting that philosophy should abandon the attempt to provide a foundation for knowledge, or otherwise justify it, and should instead give an account of how knowledge is acquired.
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From:
report of Willard Quine (Epistemology Naturalized [1968]) by Donald Davidson - Epistemology Externalized p.193
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A reaction:
If you are going to explain how 'knowledge' is acquired, you'd better know what knowledge is. My suspicion is that Quine would be quite happy (in the pragmatist tradition) to just focus on belief, and forget about knowledge entirely.
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8899
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Epistemology is a part of psychology, studying how our theories relate to our evidence [Quine]
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Full Idea:
Epistemology falls into place as a chapter of psychology, and hence of natural science. ..We study meagre input and torrential output, to see how evidence relates to theory, and in what ways one's theory of nature transcends any available evidence.
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From:
Willard Quine (Epistemology Naturalized [1968], p.83)
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A reaction:
It depends what you are interested in. If you just want to know what makes humans tick, then Quine is your man, but if you want to know things in general, and want to know how to get it right, then the normative side of epistemology is unavoidable.
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5655
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Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton]
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Full Idea:
For Bradley, the happiness of the individual is not to be understood in terms of his desires and needs, but rather in terms of his values - which is to say, in terms of those of his desires which he incorporates into his self.
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From:
report of F.H. Bradley (Ethical Studies [1876]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.16
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A reaction:
Good. Bentham will reduce the values to a further set of desires, so that a value is a complex (second-level?) desire. I prefer to think of values as judgements, but I like Scruton's phrase of 'incorporating into his self'. Kant take note (Idea 1452).
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