Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ethical Studies', 'Summa' and 'Contextualism Defended'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


6 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Substances 'substand' (beneath accidents), or 'subsist' (independently) [Eustachius]
     Full Idea: It is proper to substance both to stretch out or exist beneath accidents, which is to substand, and to exist per se and not in another, which is to subsist.
     From: Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (Summa [1609], I.1.3b.1.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 06.2
     A reaction: This reflects Aristotle wavering between 'ousia' being the whole of a thing, or the substrate of a thing. In current discussion, 'substance' still wavers between a thing which 'is' a substance, and substance being the essence.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Prime matter is free of all forms, but has the potential for all forms [Eustachius]
     Full Idea: Everyone says that prime matter, considered in itself, is free of all forms and at the same time is open to all forms - or, that matter is in potentiality to all forms.
     From: Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (Summa [1609], III.1.1.2.3), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.1
     A reaction: This is the notorious doctrine developed to support the hylomorphic picture derived from Aristotle. No one could quite figure out what prime matter was, so it faded away.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
Contextualism says sceptical arguments are true, relative to their strict context [Cohen,S]
     Full Idea: Contextualism explains the appeal of sceptical arguments by allowing that the claims of the sceptic are true, relative to the very strict context in which they are made.
     From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended [2005], p.57)
     A reaction: This strikes me a right. I've always thought that global scepticism must be conceded if we are being very strict indeed about justification, but also that it is ridiculous to be that strict. So the epistemological question is 'How strict should we be?'
Knowledge is context-sensitive, because justification is [Cohen,S]
     Full Idea: The context-sensitivity of knowledge is inherited from one of its components, i.e. justification.
     From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended [2005], p.68)
     A reaction: I think this is exactly right - that there is nothing relative or contextual about what is actually true, or what someone believes, but knowleddge is wholly relative because it rests on shifting standards of justification.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
There aren't invariant high standards for knowledge, because even those can be raised [Cohen,S]
     Full Idea: The problem for invariantism is that competent speakers, under sceptical pressure, tend to deny that we know even the most conspicuous facts of perception, the clearest memories etc.
     From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended [2005], p.58)
     A reaction: This is aimed at Idea 12892. This seems to me a strong response to the rather weak invariantist case (that there is 'really and truly' only one invariant standard for knowledge). Full strength scepticism about everything demolishes all knowledge.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton]
     Full Idea: For Bradley, the happiness of the individual is not to be understood in terms of his desires and needs, but rather in terms of his values - which is to say, in terms of those of his desires which he incorporates into his self.
     From: report of F.H. Bradley (Ethical Studies [1876]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.16
     A reaction: Good. Bentham will reduce the values to a further set of desires, so that a value is a complex (second-level?) desire. I prefer to think of values as judgements, but I like Scruton's phrase of 'incorporating into his self'. Kant take note (Idea 1452).