16616
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Substances 'substand' (beneath accidents), or 'subsist' (independently) [Eustachius]
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Full Idea:
It is proper to substance both to stretch out or exist beneath accidents, which is to substand, and to exist per se and not in another, which is to subsist.
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From:
Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (Summa [1609], I.1.3b.1.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 06.2
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A reaction:
This reflects Aristotle wavering between 'ousia' being the whole of a thing, or the substrate of a thing. In current discussion, 'substance' still wavers between a thing which 'is' a substance, and substance being the essence.
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16585
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Prime matter is free of all forms, but has the potential for all forms [Eustachius]
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Full Idea:
Everyone says that prime matter, considered in itself, is free of all forms and at the same time is open to all forms - or, that matter is in potentiality to all forms.
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From:
Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (Summa [1609], III.1.1.2.3), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.1
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A reaction:
This is the notorious doctrine developed to support the hylomorphic picture derived from Aristotle. No one could quite figure out what prime matter was, so it faded away.
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5655
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Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton]
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Full Idea:
For Bradley, the happiness of the individual is not to be understood in terms of his desires and needs, but rather in terms of his values - which is to say, in terms of those of his desires which he incorporates into his self.
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From:
report of F.H. Bradley (Ethical Studies [1876]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.16
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A reaction:
Good. Bentham will reduce the values to a further set of desires, so that a value is a complex (second-level?) desire. I prefer to think of values as judgements, but I like Scruton's phrase of 'incorporating into his self'. Kant take note (Idea 1452).
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