19377
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A monad and its body are living, so life is everywhere, and comes in infinite degrees [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Each monad, together with a particular body, makes up a living substance. Thus, there is not only life everywhere, joined to limbs or organs, but there are also infinite degrees of life in the monads, some dominating more or less over others.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], 4)
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A reaction:
Two key ideas: that each monad is linked to a body (which is presumably passive), and the infinite degrees of life in monads. Thus rocks consist of monads, but at an exceedingly low degree of life. They are stubborn and responsive.
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19353
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'Perception' is basic internal representation, and 'apperception' is reflective knowledge of perception [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
We distinguish between 'perception', the internal state of the monad representing external things, and 'apperception', which is consciousness, or the reflective knowledge of this internal state, not given to all souls, nor at all times to a given soul.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], §4)
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A reaction:
The word 'apperception' is standard in Kant. I find it surprising that modern analytic philosophers don't seem to use it when they write about perception. It strikes me as useful, but maybe specialists have a reason for avoiding it.
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5061
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Animals are semi-rational because they connect facts, but they don't see causes [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
There is a connexion between the perceptions of animals, which bears some resemblance to reason: but it is based only on the memory of facts or effects, and not at all on the knowledge of causes.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], §5)
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A reaction:
This amounts to the view that animals can do Humean induction (where you see regularities), but not Leibnizian induction (where you see necessities). I say all minds perceive patterns, but only humans can think about the patterns they have perceived.
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5655
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Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton]
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Full Idea:
For Bradley, the happiness of the individual is not to be understood in terms of his desires and needs, but rather in terms of his values - which is to say, in terms of those of his desires which he incorporates into his self.
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From:
report of F.H. Bradley (Ethical Studies [1876]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.16
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A reaction:
Good. Bentham will reduce the values to a further set of desires, so that a value is a complex (second-level?) desire. I prefer to think of values as judgements, but I like Scruton's phrase of 'incorporating into his self'. Kant take note (Idea 1452).
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