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All the ideas for 'Ethical Studies', 'Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas' and 'Letters to Thomasius'

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7 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions

19426	'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: A 'nominal' definition is nothing more than an enumeration of the sufficient distinguishing characteristics.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.284)
	A reaction: Not wholly clear. Are these actual distinguishing characteristics, or potential ones? Could DNA be part of a human's nominal definition (for an unidentified corpse, perhaps).

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects

13432	The essence of a circle is the equality of its radii [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: The essence of a circle consists in the equality of all lines drawn from its centre to its circumference.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Thomasius [1669], 1669)
	A reaction: Compare Locke in Idea 13431 and Spinoza in Idea 13073 on the essence of geometrical figures. A key question is whether the essence is in the simplest definition, or in a complex and wide-ranging account, e.g. including conic sections for circles.

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge

19424	Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Knowledge is either obscure or clear; clear ideas are either indistinct or distinct; distinct ideas are either adequate or inadequate, symbolic or intuitive; perfect knowledge is that which is both adequate and intuitive.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283)
	A reaction: This is Leibniz's expansion of Descartes's idea that knowledge rests on 'clear and distinct conceptions'. The ultimate target seems to be close to an Aristotelian 'real definition', which is comprehensive and precise. Does 'intuitive' mean coherent?

18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas

19427	True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: An idea is true if what it represents is possible; false if the representation contains a contradiction.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.287)
	A reaction: Odd in the analytic tradition to talk of a single idea or concept (rather than a proposition or utterance) as being 'true'. But there is clearly a notion of valid or legitimate or useful concepts here. Hilbert said true just meant non-contradictory.

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness

5655	Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton]
	Full Idea: For Bradley, the happiness of the individual is not to be understood in terms of his desires and needs, but rather in terms of his values - which is to say, in terms of those of his desires which he incorporates into his self.
	From: report of F.H. Bradley (Ethical Studies [1876]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.16
	A reaction: Good. Bentham will reduce the values to a further set of desires, so that a value is a complex (second-level?) desire. I prefer to think of values as judgements, but I like Scruton's phrase of 'incorporating into his self'. Kant take note (Idea 1452).

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause

19425	In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: In the schools the four causes are lumped together as material, formal, efficient, and final causes, but they have no clear definitions, and I would call such a judgment 'obscure'.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283)
	A reaction: He picks this to illustrate what he means by 'obscure', so he must feel strongly about it. Elsewhere Leibniz embraces efficient and final causes, but says little of the other two. This immediately become clearer as the Four Modes of Explanation.

27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement

12696	Bodies are recreated in motion, and don't exist in intervening instants [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: I have demonstrated that whatever moves is continuously created and that bodies are nothing at any time between the instants in motion.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Thomasius [1669], 1669.04), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1
	A reaction: Leibniz is a little over-confident about what he has 'demonstrated', but I think (from this remark) that he would not have been displeased with quantum theory, and the notion of a 'quantum leap' and a 'Planck time'. A 'conatus' is a 'smallest motion'.