Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ethical Studies', 'The Varieties of Necessity' and 'The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic'

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9 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic

18073	Dummett says classical logic rests on meaning as truth, while intuitionist logic rests on assertability [Dummett, by Kitcher]
	Full Idea: Dummett argues that classical logic depends on the choice of the concept of truth as central to the theory of meaning, while for the intuitionist the concept of assertability occupies this position.
	From: report of Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973]) by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 06.5
	A reaction: Since I can assert any nonsense I choose, this presumably means 'warranted' assertability, which is tied to the concept of proof in mathematics. You can reason about falsehoods, or about uninterpreted variables. Can you 'assert' 'Fx'?

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification

19057	Classical quantification is an infinite conjunction or disjunction - but you may not know all the instances [Dummett]
	Full Idea: Classical quantification represents an infinite conjunction or disjunction, and the truth-value is determined by the infinite sum or product of the instances ....but this presupposes that all the instances already possess determinate truth-values.
	From: Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973], p.246)
	A reaction: In the case of the universal quantifier, Dummett is doing no more than citing the classic empiricism objection to induction - that you can't make the universal claim if you don't know all the instances. The claim is still meaningful, though.

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity

9216	Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: The three sources of necessity - the identity of things, the natural order, and the normative order - have their own peculiar forms of necessity. The three main areas of human enquiry - metaphysics, science and ethics - each has its own necessity.
	From: Kit Fine (The Varieties of Necessity [2002], 6)
	A reaction: I would treat necessity in ethics with caution, if it is not reducible to natural or metaphysical necessity. Fine's proposal is interesting, but I did not find it convincing, especially in its view that metaphysical necessity doesn't intrude into nature.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony

9214	Unsupported testimony may still be believable [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: I may have good reason to believe some testimony, for example, even though the person providing the testimony has no good reason for saying what he does.
	From: Kit Fine (The Varieties of Necessity [2002], 5)
	A reaction: Thus small children, madmen and dreamers may occasionally get things right without realising it. I take testimony to be merely one more batch of evidence which has to be assessed in building the most coherent picture possible.

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions

19055	Stating a sentence's truth-conditions is just paraphrasing the sentence [Dummett]
	Full Idea: An ability to state the condition for the truth of a sentence is, in effect, no more than an ability to express the content of the sentence in other words.
	From: Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973], p.224)
	A reaction: Alternatively, if you give something other than a paraphrase of the sentence as its meaning (such as a proof of its truth), then you seem to have departed from your target sentence. Can we reduce and eliminate our sentences in this way?

19056	If a sentence is effectively undecidable, we can never know its truth conditions [Dummett]
	Full Idea: If a sentence is effectively undecidable, the condition which must obtain for it to be true is not one which we are capable of recognising whenever it obtains, or of getting ourselves in a position to do so.
	From: Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973], p.225)
	A reaction: The instances of 'undecidable' sentences are most clearly seen in mathematics, such as the Continuum Hypothesis or Goldbach's Conjecture, or anything involving vast infinite cardinals. But do you need precise truth-conditions for meaning?

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use

19054	Meaning as use puts use beyond criticism, and needs a holistic view of language [Dummett]
	Full Idea: If use constitutes meaning, it might seem that use is beyond criticism. ....But such an attitude can, ultimately, be supported onlly by the adoption of a holistic view of language.
	From: Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973], p.218)
	A reaction: Dummett goes on to say that the rejection of the holistic view of mathematical meaning leads to his preference for intuitionistic logic.

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness

5655	Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton]
	Full Idea: For Bradley, the happiness of the individual is not to be understood in terms of his desires and needs, but rather in terms of his values - which is to say, in terms of those of his desires which he incorporates into his self.
	From: report of F.H. Bradley (Ethical Studies [1876]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.16
	A reaction: Good. Bentham will reduce the values to a further set of desires, so that a value is a complex (second-level?) desire. I prefer to think of values as judgements, but I like Scruton's phrase of 'incorporating into his self'. Kant take note (Idea 1452).

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism

9215	Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: It would be harder to break P-and-Q implying P than the connection between cause and effect. This difference in strictness means it is more plausible that natural necessities include metaphysical necessities, than vice versa.
	From: Kit Fine (The Varieties of Necessity [2002], 6)
	A reaction: I cannot see any a priori grounds for the claim that causation is more easily disrupted than logic. It seems to be based on the strategy of inferring possibilities from what can be imagined, which seems to me to lead to wild misunderstandings.