7082
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Nature requires causal explanations, but society requires clarification by reasons and motives [Weber, by Critchley]
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Full Idea:
Weber coined the distinction between explanation and clarification, saying that natural phenomena require causal explanation, while social phenomena require clarification by giving reasons or offering possible motives for how things are.
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From:
report of Max Weber (works [1905]) by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro Ch.7
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A reaction:
This is music to the ears of property dualists and other non-reductivists, but if you go midway in the hierarchy of animals (a mouse, say) the distinction blurs. Weber probably hadn't digested Darwin, whose big impact came around 1905.
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22155
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We are disenchanted because we rely on science, which ignores values [Weber, by Boulter]
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Full Idea:
Weber contends that modern western civilisation is 'disenchanted' because our society's method of arriving at beliefs about the world, that is, the sciences, is unable to address questions of value.
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From:
report of Max Weber (works [1905]) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 6
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A reaction:
This idea, made explicit by Hume's empirical attitude to values, is obviously of major importance. For we Aristotelians values are a self-evident aspect of nature. Boulter says philosophy has added to the disenchantment. I agree.
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5655
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Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton]
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Full Idea:
For Bradley, the happiness of the individual is not to be understood in terms of his desires and needs, but rather in terms of his values - which is to say, in terms of those of his desires which he incorporates into his self.
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From:
report of F.H. Bradley (Ethical Studies [1876]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.16
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A reaction:
Good. Bentham will reduce the values to a further set of desires, so that a value is a complex (second-level?) desire. I prefer to think of values as judgements, but I like Scruton's phrase of 'incorporating into his self'. Kant take note (Idea 1452).
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8364
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We can imagine controlling floods by controlling rain, but not vice versa [Wright,GHv]
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Full Idea:
Given our present knowledge of the laws of nature, we can imagine ways of controlling floods by controlling rainfall, but not the other way round. That is should be so, however, is contingent.
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From:
G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §8)
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A reaction:
Despite my objections to Idea 8363, this is a good example. It won't establish the metaphysics of the direction of causation, though, because God might control rainfall by controlling floods. Maybe causation is more like a motorway pile-up than dominoes.
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8360
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We must further analyse conditions for causation, into quantifiers or modal concepts [Wright,GHv]
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Full Idea:
We may be able to analyse causation into conditionship relations between events or states of affairs, ...but conditions cannot be regarded as logical primitives, ... and must be analysed into quantifiers, or modal concepts.
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From:
G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §2)
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A reaction:
[very compressed] A nice illustration of the aim of analytical philosophy - to analyse the elements of reality down to logical primitives. This is the dream of Descartes and Leibniz, continued by Russell and co. Do we still have this aspiration?
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8365
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Some laws are causal (Ohm's Law), but others are conceptual principles (conservation of energy) [Wright,GHv]
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Full Idea:
Not all laws are causal 'experimentalist' laws, such as those for falling bodies, or the Gas Law, or Ohm's Law. Some are more like conceptual principles, giving a frame of reference, such as inertia, or conservation of energy, or the law of entropy.
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From:
G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §9)
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A reaction:
An interesting and important distinction, whenever one is exploring the links between theories of causation and of laws of nature. If one wished to attack the whole concept of 'laws of nature', this might be a good place to start.
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